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ABSTRACT 
 
This PhD thesis critically surveys vertical territorial and price restraints in the EU and the 
USA not just from a legal angle, but also from comparative, economic, theoretical and 
historical perspectives. Different aspects of such comprehensive research assist with 
tackling the different issues that have occurred in the law of vertical territorial and price 
restraints while determining its correct approach.  
 
This thesis argues against some existing competition policies and principles, such as the 
objective of the law of vertical territorial and price restraints. It shows that law of vertical 
territorial and price restraints should protect effective and free competition. Nevertheless, it 
follows that the object of effective competition is efficiency which is difficult to determine 
in situations when RPM or VTR is used. Furthermore, the complexity of vertical 
competition and vertical chains, including relationships, power and market structures, is 
surveyed. This thesis advocates the existence of vertical competition and further explains 
that it is bargaining power which should be assessed in RPM and VTR cases and not 
horizontal market power, which serves the purpose of horizontal rather than vertical 
competition.  
 
The development of the laws of vertical territorial and price restraints including the 
analysis of relevant and significant cases both in the EU and the USA within a broader 
historical framework and relevant theories unveil some inconsistencies and uncertainties. 
This thesis criticises the formalistic approach within traditional anti-competitive theories 
and the demagogical approach within the majority of pro-competitive theories offering 
new suggestions and points of view.  
 
Although vertical restraints have been part of US antitrust law and EU competition law 
almost since the beginning of their existence, this thesis reveals that their approaches have 
been unsettled and continue to develop with contradictory arguments on this issue across 
the legal, economical, empirical and theoretical scholarly works, which show lack of 
understanding of vertical competition. Unfortunately, vertical competition has not been 
acknowledged as the basic framework for vertical restraints in both the EU and US policies 
and their legislations. Therefore, this thesis concludes with legislative suggestions which 
better reflect the nature of vertical restraints. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“Antitrust is an interdisciplinary field that is best served by acknowledging that a deeper 
understanding of the issues will result by addressing the subject from several points of 
view.”1 (Oliver Eaton Williamson) 
 
 
1.1. Vertical Price and Territorial Restraints  
 
Vertical restraints have the ability to restrict competition in a primarily vertical fashion. 
They involve arrangements on a vertical chain, such as bilateral conducts between a 
manufacturer and a distributor. In contrast with horizontal collusions, vertical relationships 
are common and essential in a market consisting of bilateral or even multilateral 
arrangements. Nevertheless, such arrangements can include restrictive aspects which can 
lessen competition. Vertical territorial and price restraints have the potential to be the most 
restrictive forms of vertical restraints. Vertical price restraints (“RPM”) restrict price 
competition, and vertical territorial restraints (“VTR”) have the potential to restrict any 
form of competition, not just price. RPM includes practices where a seller and its buyers 
agree or one party is forced to agree that the latter will sell the sold product at set price, or 
at or above a price floor, which is also known as “minimum resale price maintenance” or 
“minimum price fixing/setting”, or at or below price ceiling, which is also known as 
“maximum resale price maintenance” or “maximum price fixing/setting”. VTR includes 
any territorial restrictions based on arrangements between a seller and its buyers when a 
buyer is allowed to sell only within a certain, set territory. 
 
Vertical price and territorial restraints are controversial topics in both economic and legal 
scholarly works. This is also reflected in the development of both US antitrust law and EU 
competition law. Despite the strong and stable positions of both of these legal systems, the 
approach and effects of vertical territorial and price restraints remain unsettled and 
tentative.2 
                                                 
1
 O.E. Williamson, Antitrust Economics: Mergers, Contracting, and Strategic Behaviour, (Basil Blackwell, 
New York, 1987) 158. 
2
 See, e.g., G.T. Gundlach, “Overview and Contents of the Special Issue: Antitrust Analysis of Resale Price 
Maintenance after Leegin” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 4-7; A.I. Gavil, “Resale Price Maintenance in the 
Post-Leegin World: A Comparative Look at Recent Developments in the United States and European Union” 
(2010) 1 CPI Antitrust Journal 2-3; M. Bennett, A. Fletcher, E. Giovannetti, D. Stallibrass, “ Resale Price 
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The recent case of Leegin, which changed the approach to RPM in the US, opened a new 
and intensive debate on RPM not just in the US, but also in the EU.3 There have been 
numerous articles published discussing RPM in the US in the last 4 years, most notably in 
2010.4 Scholars have managed to agree on one aspect of this area of competition law: 
change is inevitable. Nonetheless, this call for change has been ongoing since the creation 
of the per-se approach to RPM in 1911.5 Although the most notable, current scholarly 
stream is based on the idea of the application of a modern, restructured rule of reason, for 
instance in the form of a quick approach,6 it is argued in this thesis that the basic legislation 
should be changed to reflect the nature of vertical restraints, which is not captured in either 
the US Sherman Act or the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). 
 
Scholarly works reveal one paradox with regards to RPM: so much has been said recently 
regarding this issue but so little is known about it. Furthermore, the debate has frozen in 
terms of understanding VTR and almost nothing is known about the issue. The latest 
development of VTR shows the US approach to be very benevolent and different from the 
EU approach, which is considerably stricter. The obvious explanation for this difference 
would be the protection of free and internal markets as the main objective of the EU. 
However, another and more key explanation, although not as obvious, is inconsistency and 
lack of deep knowledge of the issue.  
 
1.2. Objective, Novelty and Methodology of the Thesis 
 
The lack of research studies in both areas of competition law has been frequently 
highlighted. Recent commentators have agreed that, with respect to vertical territorial and 
                                                                                                                                                    
Maintenance: Explaining the Controversy, and Small Steps Towards a More Nuanced Policy” (2010) MPRA 
Paper No. 21121, posted 4 March 2010/18:02, (at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21121/), p. 1; Brunell, 
R.M., “Overruling Dr. Miles: The Supreme Trade Commission in Action” (2007) 52 Antitrust Bulletin 528; 
T.R. Sass, D.S. Saurman, “Mandated Exclusive Territories and Economic Efficiency: An Empirical Analysis 
of the Malt-Beverage Industry” (1993) 36 J.L.&Econ. 153-154. 
3
 See, e.g. C. Callery, “Should the European Union Embrace or Exorcise Leegin’s ‘Rule of Reason’?” (2011) 
32(1) ECLR 43; A. Jones, “Resale Price Maintenance: A Debate about Competition Policy in Europe?” 
(2009) 5(2) European Competition Journal 479; further See Chapter 4 “Development of the US Law of 
Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints”, Chapter 5 “Development of the EU Law of Vertical Territorial and 
Price Restraints”. 
4
 See, e.g., Antitrust Bulletin: Vol. 55 No. 2/Summer, No. 1/Spring – both issues are dedicated to RPM. 
5
 See Chapter 4 “Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints” and Chapter 6 
“Theories of Pro-Competitiveness v. Anti-Competitiveness”; Williamson, Antitrust Economics, 143. 
6
 Ibid. 
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price restraints, comprehensive and empirical studies are missing.7 Ippolito summarises the 
necessity of filling this gap when she states that “detailed case studies, systematic 
statistical evidence, and in-depth legal investigations are all potentially important 
contributors to a clearer understanding of the uses of practice.”8  
 
This lack of research studies is even more obvious in relation to vertical territorial 
restraints, the studies of which include only vague, if any, discussion and empirical, 
persuasive studies are almost non-existent. Therefore, how can US antitrust policy come to 
the final conclusion that vertical territorial restraints are not, or almost always not, anti-
competitive? Or, in contrast, how can the EU states that such forms of vertical restraints 
are almost as anti-competitive as RPM? 
 
This thesis aims to address to a significant extent the gap in the demand for comprehensive 
research in this area of law, with the principal aim of discovering the most appropriate 
approach to the law of vertical territorial and price restraints for developed countries. 
 
Therefore, this thesis will answer this primary research question:  
• what is the most appropriate approach to the law of vertical territorial and price 
restraints?  
 
It will also attempt to answer related questions such as:  
• are vertical territorial and price restraints generally pro-competitive or anti-
competitive?  
• Do entities use these restraints for anti-competitive or pro-competitive reasons and 
why?  
                                                 
7
 See, e.g., F. Lafontaine, M.E. Slade, “Transaction Cost Economies and Vertical Market Restrictions – 
Evidence” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 608; B.Y. Orbach, “The Image Theory: RPM and the Allure of High 
Prices” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 278; P.J. Harbour, L.A. Price, “RPM and the Rule of Reason: Ready or 
Not, Here We Come?” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 227; P.M. Ippolito, “RPM Myths that Muddy the 
Discussion” (2010) 55  Antitrust Bulletin 151-165; W.S. Comanor, “Antitrust Policy Toward Resale Price 
Maintenance Following Leegin” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 78; A. Gavil, “Resale Price Maintenance in the 
Post-Leegin World: A Comparative Look at Recent Developments in the United States and European Union” 
(2010) 1 The CPI Antitrust Journal 1; R. Steiner, “Vertical Competition, Horizontal Competition and Market 
Power” (2008) 53 Antitrust Bulletin 252; M.P. Lynch, “Why Economists Are Wrong to Neglect Retailing 
and How Steiner’s Theory Provides an Explanation of Important Regularities” (2004) 49  Antitrust Bulletin 
911-940; P.J. Harbour, “An Enforcement Perspective on the Work of Robert L. Steiner: Why Retailing and 
Vertical Relationships Matter” (2004) Winter Antitrust Bulletin 997; Brunell, “Overruling Dr. Miles” 528; 
Sass, Saurman, “Malt-Beverage Industry” 154; S. Comanor, “The Two Economics of Vertical Restraints” 
(1992) 21 Sw.U.L. Rev. 1277. 
8
 P.M. Ippolito, “RPM Myths that Muddy the Discussion” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 154. 
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• What is and what should be the objective of the law of vertical territorial and price 
restraints?  
• Is current legislation rightly based to reflect the nature of VTR and RPM?  
• What are the current frameworks of the EU and US laws of vertical territorial and 
price restraints and how have these changed since their inception and why? 
 
The research questions require analysis of the issue from different perspectives, combining 
knowledge from law, economics and history. Thus, the qualitative methodology used in the 
thesis reflects this comprehensiveness and is based on doctrinal, comparative, legal-
economic and historical methodologies.  
 
Comparative methodology is a useful and even essential tool for the aim of the thesis as it 
must be determined whether differences in the systems mean that different principal 
approaches to the law of vertical territorial and price restraints should be introduced or 
whether it is possible to suggest one approach for both systems and, thus, whether there is 
a possibility for global harmonisation in this area of competition law in the future. 
Furthermore, the comparative approach allows the issue to be analysed from different 
perspectives, which thus enriches understanding of the topic. 
 
This thesis compares the EU and US approaches to vertical territorial and price restraints 
because both EU competition law and US antitrust law are well-recognised and respected 
worldwide and appear to be well-developed and soundly-based. They belong to the major 
systems of competition law and competition/antitrust law plays an important role in the EU 
and the US. 
 
Besides new arguments and legislative suggestions in this area of competition law, the 
novelty of this PhD thesis is also reflected in the comprehensiveness of its combined 
methodologies. As indicated above, existing research and literature in this area of 
competition law focuses only on one aspect or a few aspects of this issue and/or analyses 
vertical restraints from only one angle, generally using one or two methodologies or 
studying a specific market. Among others, a recent book dedicated to vertical restraints in 
the US and in the EU is a book written by Colino.9 Although this book contributes to our 
                                                 
9
 S.M. Colino, Vertical Agreements and Competition Law: A Comparative Study of the EU and US Regimes 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010); also see D. Hildebrand, Vertical Analyses of Vertical Agreements – A Self-
Assessment (Kluwer Law International, 2005), this book is based on previous, expired EC Block Exemption 
Regulation 2790/1999 and it focuses on economic analysis of vertical agreements which is only one aspect of 
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understanding of this issue, it does not focus specifically on RPM and VTR, but rather 
discusses vertical restraints in general. It is based on a general overview and a comparison 
of the current legal framework in both the EU and the US, and includes some economic 
theories and author’s suggestions. In contrast, this thesis deeply and comprehensively 
analyses the two forms of vertical restraints that have the most anti-competitive potential. 
It does not only summarise some aspects of existing knowledge of vertical restraints while 
making suggestions and predictions for future development, but it tackles this area of 
vertical restraints from several angles, including analysis of cases and the development of 
this area of competition law, critical survey of available theories in English, analysis of its 
objective and economic discussion and analysis of the functioning of this issue. It is based 
on comprehensive research substantially analysing vertical territorial and price restraints 
and introduces new arguments and novel legislative suggestions. 
  
1.3. Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters including Chapter 1 “Introduction” and Chapter 7 
“Conclusion”. Chapter 2 “Objective of the Law of Vertical Territorial and Price 
Restraints” determines the most appropriate objective for the law of vertical territorial and 
price restraints by discussing the nature of this issue from different perspectives, including 
US and EU legislation and different scholars’ perspectives. The key parameter of this 
thesis is to set out and explain the most appropriate objective of this area of competition 
law, as this is necessary to determine aspects which must be analysed to survey the 
appropriateness of the law and theories and, finally, to assist with legislative and policy 
suggestions.  
 
Chapter 3 “Vertical Competition and Structure” explains and analyses vertical chains and 
vertical territorial and price restrictions primarily from a macroeconomic perspective and 
within the framework of vertical relationships. It reveals their complexity and real 
functioning on the market, and discusses those aspects of the markets and competition that 
influence the use of both vertical territorial and price restrictions and their potential effects. 
 
Chapter 4 “Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints” and 
Chapter 5 “Development of the EU Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints” 
                                                                                                                                                    
the thesis and thus it substantially differs from the content and the aim of the thesis and its concentration on 
RPM and VTR. 
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critically survey the development of legislation, cases, policy and other aspects which have 
influenced the law of vertical territorial and price restraints to explain and make 
appropriate assumptions about the current situation in both systems. 
 
Chapter 6 “Theories of Pro-Competitiveness v. Anti-Competitiveness” critically analyses 
theories, introduces new arguments and novel ideas and determines the similarities and 
differences of these theories in RPM and VTR. This chapter builds on the knowledge from 
previous chapters, most notably on the development of this area of antitrust/competition 
law, to reflect how these theories fit within reality and how they have influenced law, and 
finally to introduce new arguments based on the overall comprehensiveness of the thesis. 
 
This thesis focuses purely on RPM and VTR within the vertical chain, which includes both 
upstream and downstream vertical arrangements, without discussing other aspects such as 
agencies and joint ventures. As this thesis concentrates on the most restrictive forms of 
VTR and RPM, the abbreviation VTR and its related meanings refer to exclusive and/or 
absolute vertical territorial restrictions, unless noted otherwise. Although maximum price 
fixing in general terms is also discussed, the focus is on the analysis of price fixing and 
minimum price fixing and it is these two forms of vertical price restraints that determine 
the meaning of the abbreviation RPM. 
 
In this thesis the terms “manufacturer” and “supplier” are generally used synonymously to 
describe undertakings which constitute the first link in the supply chain for a particular 
product, unless noted otherwise. Buyers further down the supply chain are referred to as 
distributors, wholesalers or retailers. The term “distributor” is used in a general sense and 
includes wholesalers and retailers, unless otherwise differentiated in the text. Finally, 
within the terminology of EU competition law, the meaning of “restriction of competition” 
includes all forms of restrictions, such as prevention, restriction and distortion of 
competition. 
 
 
This PhD thesis was finalised on the 31st of August 2011; therefore, the content reflects 
only those cases, literature and data available before this date. 
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Chapter 2: Objective of the Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to introduce the most appropriate approach to the law of 
vertical territorial and price restraints. Such research potentially requires, at its beginning, 
the determination of the right objective for this area of competition law and its comparison 
with the existing objectives to clarify against which principal objective the current 
approach is tested and on this and other bases to determine in following chapters whether 
the existing approach to vertical price and territorial restraints is rightly based. Therefore, 
this chapter analyses the possible goals of competition/antitrust law in a legal, economic 
and theoretical framework, and tries to determine the most genuine principal objective for 
the law of vertical territorial and price restraints.  
 
2.2. Efficiency 
 
The objective of competition law has not been soundly-based in either US antitrust law or 
EU competition law.1 Nevertheless, economic efficiency has often been recognised as the 
exclusive goal of competition and competition law.2 However, efficiency is not always 
considered as the only aspect of legality or illegality of vertical restraints. For example, 
Hovenkamp highlights that economic efficiency is not and has not been the only objective 
of US antitrust law, noting that current politics affect the decision of which “competing 
values” should be protected.3  
 
Based on the significant usage of efficiency as the objective of competition law, this 
chapter proceeds on the assumption that efficiency is the objective of the law of vertical 
territorial restraints and, therefore, its meaning is analysed within the framework of 
                                                 
1
 See below; see chapters Chapter 4 “Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price 
Restraints” and Chapter 5 “Development of the EU Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints”. 
2
 Ibid; see e.g., B.J. Rodger, A. MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the EC and UK, Fourth Edition 
(Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) 21; G. Monti, EC Competition Law, Reprinted (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008) 
8; F.M. Scherer, D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Third Edition (Houghton 
Mifflin, 1990) 29-30; W.S. Comanor, “Vertical Price-Fixing-Vertical Market Restrictions, And the New 
Antitrust Policy” (1985) 98 Harv.L.Rev. 983; R. Pitofsky, “In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for 
a Per Se Rule against Vertical Price Fixing” (1983) 71 Georgetown L.J. 1487. 
3
 H. Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, The Law of Competition and Its Practice, Third Edition 
(Thomson West, St. Paul, 2005) 71-72. 
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competition and competition law to determine whether it is efficiency or another goal that 
should be the genuine objective of the law of vertical territorial and price restraints. 
 
 
2.2.1. Consumer Welfare as a Goal of Efficiency? 
 
General understanding of the term “efficiency” differs. The Chicago School, along with 
other theorists including Comanor and Schmidt, believe that economic efficiency means 
consumer welfare, thus claiming that economic efficiency/consumer welfare should be the 
sole objective or at least the main objective of antitrust/competition law.4 
 
Fox and Cann, however, expand the attributes of economic efficiency under the alternative 
banner of “consumer satisfaction” that includes not just consumer welfare, but also 
diversity, choice and innovation.5 Although they highlight other aspects of efficiency, it 
could be argued that consumer welfare and consumer satisfaction are no different because 
both terms focus on consumers and their interests.  
 
Remarkably, Posner, who claimed that consumer welfare was the only objective of 
antitrust law, re-evaluated his position in 2001 after working as a judge in the Federal 
Court of Appeal in the United States. His new stance holds that economic efficiency 
includes multiple values and is much more than just consumer welfare, asserting that all of 
these values collectively create the objective of competition.6 Furthermore, the Harvard 
School argues that the aim of competition itself is good performance on a particular 
market, where that performance maintains and increases general material welfare without 
concentrating solely on consumer welfare.7  
 
                                                 
4
 W.S. Comanor, “Antitrust Policy Toward Resale Price Maintenance Following Leegin” (2010) 55 Antitrust 
Bulletin 59, 76-77; I.L.O., Schmidt, “The Suitability of the More Economic Approach for Competition 
Policy: Dynamic vs. Static Efficiency” (2007) 28 (7) ECLR 408; Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 75-
77; S. Bishop, M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement, 
Second Edition (Thomson, Sweet and Maxwell, 2002) 11-16; G. Amato, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1997) 21; F.H. Easterbrook, “Workable Antitrust Policy” (1986) 84 Michigan Law 
Review, 1703-1704; Comanor, “Vertical Price-Fixing” 983; R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at 
War with Itself (The Free Press, New York, 1978) 7, 51; see also below. 
5
 W.A. Cann, “Vertical Restraints and the ‘Efficiency’ Influence – Does any Room Remain for More 
Traditional Antitrust Values and More Innovative Antitrust Policies?” 24 Am. Bus. Lawyer 46 (1986) 526-
531; E.M. Fox, “The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium” 66 Cornell L. Rev. (1981) 1153-1155, 
1182-1161. 
6
 R.A. Posner, Antitrust Law, Second Edition (Chicago, 2001) 21. 
7
 J.S. Bain, Industrial Organisation Second Edition (Wiley, New York, 1968) 372; E.S. Mason, “The Current 
Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States” (1949) 62 Harvard Law Review 1266-1267. 
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Kaysen and Turner from the Harvard School assume that competition policy can have four 
alternative objectives: 
(1) Limitation of the power of big business; (2) performance (efficiency and progressiveness); (3) “fair 
dealing”; and (4) protection of competitive process by limiting market power.8 
  
However, even though the authors recognise only performance as being part of efficiency, 
all four objectives have an impact on efficiency. Furthermore, there are other economic 
values apart from competitive prices which constitute efficiency and from which society 
can benefit, such as innovation. Therefore, progressiveness should not be separated from 
efficiency but should be considered as its part. Innovation, diversity and output can 
increase or decrease economic levels. 
 
From a jurisprudential point of view, the term “competition” includes not just consumers 
but mainly competitors and the state as its subjects. The object of competition is not 
subjective but generally emphasises economic effect and benefit to the whole society and 
the state. Besides legal and theoretical analysis, such understanding of efficiency is also 
supported by economic disciplines. A basic economic model measuring efficiency is 
formed not only from consumer surplus but also from producer surplus and total welfare, 
and considers welfare on all markets and within the whole competition chain rather than 
just within consumer welfare.9 An older welfare model was based on Pareto optimality. It 
promoted consumer rather than total welfare as it argued that the transferring of wealth 
from consumers to producers was harmful.10 Later, total welfare was enriched by the 
concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which showed that the outcome was efficient not just 
if there were no losers, as in Pareto optimality, but also when the winners won more than 
the losers lost. Thus, winners can compensate for losers and still have an extra part of 
surplus left for them.11 Therefore, total welfare is not based on the results from when 
consumers receive all the welfare, but rather when the most efficient participants receive 
the highest and thus equivalent profits. Such a situation is beneficial for the whole of 
society, including consumers. 
 
 
                                                 
8
 C. Kaysen, and D.F. Turner, Antitrust Policy, An Economic and Legal Analysis (Harvard University Press, 
1959) 44. 
9
 R.L. Steiner, “The Leegin Factors – a Mixed Bag” (Spring 2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 44-45, 51. 
10
 V. Pareto, Manuale d'economia politico (Milan, 1906). 
11
 J. Hicks, “The Foundations of Welfare Economics” (1939) 49 Economic Journal, 696-712; N. Kaldor, 
“Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility” (1939) 49 Economic Journal 
549-552; also see Steiner, “The Leegin Factors” 44-45, 51. 
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2.2.2. Different Efficiencies 
 
Generally, to understand the basics of efficiency, one can use Pareto optimality,12 which 
states that “if everyone is made better off by the change (or no one is made worse off, and 
at least one person is made better off), then… the change is good”.13 However, reality 
usually includes cases where some parts of a society are better off and others are worse off, 
as is reflected in the Kaldor-Hicks model of efficiency.14 Positive and negative impacts 
must be measured and compared to determine whether particular behaviours are efficient 
or inefficient. 
 
The issue is further complicated by the different kinds of efficiency that exist in reality. 
The basic differentiation is between allocative and productive efficiency. Productive 
efficiency concentrates on a particular competitor and their business strategy and 
coordination of sources; thus, efficiency where resources are used in different stages of the 
vertical chain, such as production or distribution.  
 
Allocative efficiency refers to the market and the welfare of society; it considers available 
sources at various levels of production and industry.15 Understanding allocative efficiency 
is problematic because its definition differs as it is not possible to measure it in a precise 
and economic way. Nevertheless, Hovenkamp and Hammer contend that allocative 
efficiency is the economic efficiency that should play the main role in antitrust policy as it 
can determine total welfare.16  
 
Although allocative efficiency reflects total welfare better than productive efficiency, 
which is focused on a particular entity, it does not involve all aspects of efficiency within 
competition. Leibenstein argues that the term “efficiency” is broader than the economic 
term “allocative efficiency” for the purposes of competition and competition law. He terms 
efficiency, which is not part of allocative efficiency, as “X-efficiency”. He claims that 
allocative efficiency has a trivial impact on the market and the economy because allocative 
                                                 
12
 Pareto, Manuale d'economia politico. 
13
 W.K. Viscusi, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, Second Edition (The MIT Press, 1995) 74.  
14
 P.J. Hammer, “Antitrust beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge of 
Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs” (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 849-925; Viscusi, Economics of 
Regulation, 74. 
15
 See R.L. Steiner, “How Manufacturers Deal with the Price-Cutting Retailer: When Are Vertical Restraints 
Efficient?” (1997) 65 Antitrust LJ 445; J.F. Brodley, “The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, 
Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress” (1987) 62 NYULRev 1020, 1025. 
16
 Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, p. 72; Hammer, “Antitrust beyond Competition” 876-879. 
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efficiency is based only on the net marginal effects. This leads to the general assumption 
that every entity purchases and uses all of its inputs efficiently.17  
 
X-efficiency also includes productive efficiency; Leibenstein recognises aspects such as 
management, employee motivation and knowledge, properly operated incentive plans, 
working conditions, invention and innovation as significant factors in efficiency.18 
However, even this efficiency is not absolute as it has some gaps based on human 
imperfection. X-inefficiency includes, for example, non-absolute motivation and non-
utilisation of labour, unknown production functions and imperfections in some inputs.19 
This could also include Williamson’s bounded rationality and opportunism, which can lead 
to entities making mistakes in efficiency.20 Therefore, X-efficiency is impossible to 
measure precisely.21 
 
From a legal point of view, competition law on its own cannot directly regulate whether a 
company will make an effective, low-cost business decision based on productive efficiency 
and also X-efficiency. It is necessary that entities have the freedom to legally manage their 
business and carry the responsibility for inefficient decisions. Ineffective entities will risk 
bankruptcy on the fair competitive market, which should be ensured by competition law. 
The more ineffective decisions made by an entity should increase the possibility that the 
entity will become bankrupt. Competition law, by directly influencing aspects of economy, 
guarantees the right competitive conditions for a particular market and provides internal 
(productive) and external (allocative) economic efficiency, which both include X-
efficiency. Internal efficiency is maintained by governing external efficiency. 
 
Efficiency can be also divided into the categories of dynamic and static. Dynamic 
efficiency is a process based on the idea that competing companies must focus on 
innovation and research to keep consumers interested and to remain in the market.22 
Schmidt points out that what matters and what should be examined by competition 
authorities and the courts is dynamic efficiency and not static efficiency.23 However, 
                                                 
17
 H. Leibenstein, “Allocative Efficiency vs. ‘X-Efficiency’” (1966) 56 American Economic Review 392-415. 
18
 Ibid, pp. 401-415. 
19
 Ibid, pp. 406-413. 
20
 O.E. Williamson, Antitrust Economics: Mergers, Contracting, and Strategic Behaviour, (Basil Blackwell, 
New York, 1987), 126-127; for further discussion see Chapter 3 “Vertical Competition and Structure”. 
21
 See also L. De Alessi, “Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay in Economic 
Theory” (1983) 73 (1) American Economic Review 70. 
22
 P.J. Harbour, L.A. Price, “RPM and the Rule of Reason: Ready or Not, Here We Come?” (2010) 55 
Antitrust Bulletin 240-242. 
23
 Schmidt, “The Suitability” 408-409.  
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dynamic efficiency is based on a changeable and ongoing process in the market and it is 
therefore difficult to measure precisely.24 
 
In reality, competition and thus its efficiency are not static. It is impossible to measure 
dynamic efficiency as complex, static moments. In other words, situations at the beginning 
of applying a restriction and at any time after its application is used can be compared with 
situations on a market without restrictions.25 Hence, if the antitrust approach is based on 
economic analysis, authorities and the courts should survey the complexity of efficiency 
comparing situations with and without particular vertical restraints within an exact time 
slot. Nonetheless, as it follows from this subchapter, such an approach is technical, time-
consuming and costly, and contains one certainty: it is impossible to consider and analyse 
all forms and aspects of efficiency. 
 
2.3. The Objective of Competition Law: Effective Competition 
 
Although economic efficiency can be recognised as the main objective of competition law, 
it is more precise to argue that the aim of the economic efficiency approach is to protect 
competition26 and the objective of antitrust/competition law is the protection of markets 
and an assurance that they are competitive.27 In other words, as Furse states, competition 
law must prevent free competition from being disturbed to protect the entire competitive 
process.28 Similarly, the Ordoliberalist School believes that competition law should protect 
the process of competition as a means of protecting individual economic freedom. 
Therefore, competition should be free and best performing for the whole society, with 
competition law as a regulator of this process.29 To summarise, the protection of 
                                                 
24
 D. Hildebrand, “The European School in EC Competition Law” (2002) 25 World Competition 3, 8-9; G., 
Stigler, “Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated” (1957) 65 The Journal of Political Economy 1; 
J.M. Clark, “Toward a Concept of Workable Competition” (1940) 30 The American Economic Review 241; 
also see Harbour, Price, “RPM” 240-241. 
25
 EU Courts have clarified that situations with and situations without a particular restriction should be 
compared to determine the effects on competition: See Case 56/65, Société La Technique Minière v 
Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH [1966] ECR 235, [1966] CMLR 357, CMR 8047. 
26
 E.T. Sullivan, H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, Policy and Procedure: Cases, Materials, Problems, Fifth 
Edition, (LexisNexis, Newark, 2004) 2. 
27
 Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 3. 
28
 M. Furse, M. Competition Law of the EC and UK, Sixth Edition (Oxford University Press, 2008) 1; also 
see M. Bennett, A. Fletcher, E. Giovannetti, D. Stallibrass, “ Resale Price Maintenance: Explaining the 
Controversy, and Small Steps Towards a More Nuanced Policy” (2010) MPRA Paper No. 21121, posted 4 
March 2010/18:02, (at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21121/), p. 5. 
29
 W. Möschel, “Competition Policy from an Ordo Point of View” in Peacock, A.T., Willgerodt, H. (eds), 
German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy (Macmillan, London, 1989); W. Eucken, The 
Foundations of Economics, History and Theory in the Analysis of Economic Reality (William Hodge, 
London, Edinburgh, Glasgow, 1950) 314. 
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competition, in other words, of a competitive process without anticompetitive restrictions 
ensures economic freedom for competing entities, total welfare and fair allocation of 
resources. 
 
In the EU and in the USA, the competition authorities and the courts as the final instances 
set the objective of competition/antitrust law. However, most notably in the EU, the 
authorities and the courts interpret the existing legislation and therefore, the objective(s) 
set by them must reflect the words and meaning of the relevant provisions. 
 
The courts have stated in several cases that the Sherman Act and Articles 101 and 102 of 
the TFEU protect competition, effective competition or economic efficiency and not just 
competitors, consumers or the common market as was contended in the earliest cases.30 
Recently, in 2009, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) stated that the aim 
of Article 101 TFEU was not only to protect consumers but mostly to protect effective 
competition, which includes the protection of the market structure.31  
 
However, even though establishing the main goal of competition law seems to be essential, 
it has been neither consistent nor static. This is mainly true in the US. The US courts have 
used different policies as goals of US antitrust law since its existence; for instance, 
protection of small businesses,32 preserving small decentralised businesses rather than 
allowing them to merge or grow,33 protection of mere interbrand competition,34 protection 
of free choice for consumers35 and protection of consumer welfare.36  
                                                 
30
 See US: Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988), at 756 – Justice 
Stevens dissenting; National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), at 691-
695; Northern Pacific Railway. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), at 4; EU: C-501 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 
P, C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission of the EC [2009] 4 CMLR 2, paragraphs 
62-64; C-234/89, Delimitis  (Stergios) v. Henninger Bräu, 28 February 1991, [1991] ECR I-935, [1992] 5 
CMLR 210, [1992] 2 CEC 530; Case 56/65, Société La Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH 
[1966] ECR 235, [1966] CMLR 357, CMR 8047, p. 249; cases T-374, 375, 384 and 388/94, European Night 
Services v. Commission [1998] ECR II-3141 [1998] 5 CMLR 718; Chapter 4 “Development of the US Law 
of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints” and Chapter 5 “Development of the EU Law of Vertical 
Territorial and Price Restraints”. 
31
 C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P, C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission of 
the EC [2009] 4 CMLR 2, paragraph 63 (citing C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV v Road van bestuur van de 
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] 5 CMLR 11, paragraphs 38-39). 
32
 See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), at 322-323. 
33
 See United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), at 274-275; United States v. Brown Shoe 
Co., 370 U.S. 294 (1962), at 344. 
34
 PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc, 615 F.3d 412 (5th Circuit 2010), at 419; Leegin 
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc, DBA Kay’s Kloset…Kays’ Shoes, 551 U.S. 877 (2007), at 906; 
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 2 (1997), at 15. 
35
 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc, DBA Kay’s Kloset…Kays’ Shoes, 551 U.S. 877 
(2007), at 928 (Justice Breyer dissenting). 
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Most importantly, the objective of competition law being the protection of competition as a 
process is supported by collocations of words used in the Sherman Act and in the TFEU. 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, as the main piece of legislation on US antitrust law, 
prohibits multilateral conducts, which are “in restraint of trade or commerce”; and Section 
2 uses such words as “[e]very person who shall monopolize… any part of the trade or 
commerce…”. The Act is focused on the business affairs of the market when using words 
such as “trade” and “commerce” and also prohibits restrictions or monopolisation as forms 
of restrictions on competition. The Clayton Act prohibits any conduct that may 
substantially lessen competition under Section 7. This is in harmony with the protection of 
effective competition. Section 5 of the 1914 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act focuses 
on fairness rather than its effectiveness in competition when it condemns “unfair methods 
of competition”.37 Thus, the FTC Act covers unfair competition law if the differentiation 
typical of the continental European legal system is used. 
 
Protection of competition is even more obvious from the text in the TFEU. Article 101 
prohibits multilateral conducts “… which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition …”. Article 102 of the TFEU considers illegal 
“[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position … as it may affect trade 
between Member States”. It is reasonable to recognise abuse that affects trade as another 
form of restriction on competition. Article 101 directly quotes “restriction on competition” 
as illegal. Furthermore, Article 120 of the TFEU requires that the EU and the Member 
States act in accordance with the “principle of an open market economy with free 
competition”. 
 
Therefore, antitrust/competition law, as its principal objective, protects and should protect 
competition and its process. Competition maintains primarily allocative efficiency and 
other objective efficiencies which have an impact on productive efficiency. Further, it must 
be specified what competition, and in which form, protects best the competitive process 
and thus maximises efficiency. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
36
 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Business Elec. Corp. 
v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 
(1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
37
 For further discussion see Hammer, “Antitrust beyond Competition” 906-914. 
Barbora Jedličková                        Chapter 2: Objective of the Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
 15
2.3.1. Effective Competition 
 
In 1985, the European Commission focused its policy on effective competition, which 
protected the freedom of participants in the competitive process and free competition.38 
Additionally, recent developments in EU competition law have seen a notable use of the 
phrase “effective competition”39 and “fully-effective internal market”.40 Unfortunately, an 
official explanation of the meaning of the phrase “effective competition” has, to date, 
proven elusive.  
 
Bishop and Walker explain “effective competition” as competition that increases consumer 
welfare.41 Buttigieg goes further to explain that competition law’s most important objective 
is that of the protection of consumer interest.42 However, as discussed previously, the 
protection of consumer interest should be an objective of consumer law and not that of 
competition law, as competition law has an objective and not subjective nature. Consumers 
are just one aspect and one subject of competition law. Overall efficiency determines total 
welfare, not just that of consumer welfare.  
 
As argued by Vickers and Hay, it is more appropriate to recognise effective competition as 
achieving “a more efficient allocation of resources”.43 Steiner refuses to focus merely on 
consumer welfare in antitrust law and also refuses the protection of one kind of 
competition, interbrand or intrabrand, as the objective of the law of vertical restraints. He 
believes that focus should be aimed at total social welfare measured by a total surplus, the 
sum of three surpluses (consumer, manufacturer and distributor), as it considers efficiency 
                                                 
38
 European Commission, XV Annual Report on Competition Policy 1985 (1986). 
39
 See e.g. Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG. v. Commission [1979] ECR 461, [1979] 3 CMLR 211, 
paragraph 38; Case 2/76, United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, [1978] 1 CMLR 429, paragraph 65; 
Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, C(2009)864, Art. 6, 
10, 18, 27; Council Regulation 139/2004 [2004] OJ L124/1 (Merger Regulation), Art. 2 (3); Commission 
Evaluation Report on the Operation of Regulation No 1400/2002 Concerning Motor Vehicle Distribution and 
Services, p. 3; European Commission, Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, [2004] O.J. C31/5, paragraph 76; 
Competition Policy in Europe, The Competition Rules for Supply and Distribution Agreements, 
http://europa.eu.int [08/2008], p.5; Bishop, Walker, The Economics of EC”, 11-12. 
40
 The Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol 27. 
41
 Bishop, Walker, The Economics of EC”, 16; see also Schmidt, “The Suitability” 411. 
42
 E. Buttigieg, Conmpetition Law: Safeguarding the Consumer Interest: A Comparative Analysis of US 
Antitrust Law and EC Competition Law (Kluwer Law International, 2009), 1-3. 
43
 D. Hay, J. Vickers, “The Economics of Market Dominance” in D. Hay,  J. Vickers, (eds), The Economics 
of Market Dominance (Oxford University Press, 1987), 2. 
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and productivity in the market.44 Therefore, the effectiveness of competition as the 
objective of the law of vertical restraints can be measured by a total surplus. 
 
Even consumer associations have recognised that competition law should be focused on 
total welfare and should protect effective competition.45 Moreover, legislation and some 
case law should pay attention to the protection of competition not the protection of an 
aspect of competition. Related efficiency is focused on other primarily objective aspects. 
Indeed, consumer welfare and its interests are protected and increased by effective 
competition as a secondary effect; in other words, as a consequence of the protection of 
competition. Similarly, Furse claims that consumers can benefit from the protection of 
competition, even though this is not the direct objective of competition law.46 In general, 
when competition is effective the whole society should benefit.47 Therefore, effective 
competition is competition protecting efficiency and thus maximising total welfare. 
 
Although the European Commission uses the phrase “effective competition”, its most 
recent test is a test of the protection of consumers,48 which might, and arguably does, 
narrow the aim of effective competition. However, understanding of the term “consumers” 
within the Commission’s tests is broad as it includes anybody who purchases from the 
undertaking concerned. Therefore, it also includes other undertakings at the vertical level.  
 
Some illegal conducts, such as horizontal cartels, can sometimes harm just consumers; 
however, simultaneously, the competitive process is hindered. Nevertheless, a clear test of 
balancing the harm with the benefits of a conduct on all players in the market within 
competition, except for the benefit of restricting undertaking(s), would better reflect the 
genuine objective of competition law, which is effective competition. The CJEU recently 
criticised the Commission in this sense, stating that EU competition law protects not just 
                                                 
44
 Steiner, “The Leegin Factors” 44-45, 51; also see R.L. Steiner, “Sylvania Economics – A Critique” (1991) 
60 Antitrust L.J. 41; also see Hammer, “Antitrust beyond Competition” 849-925. 
45
 For instance, see Consumer Focus (the statutory organisation for consumers across England, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland) “Consumer Focus Response to Vertical Restraints Block Exemption 
Regulation” (September 2009) pp. 3, 4. 
46
 Furse, Competition Law, 2. 
47
 R.L. Steiner, “Exclusive Dealing + Resale Price Maintenance: A Powerful Anticompetitive Combination” 
(2004) 33 Sw.U.L.Rev. 476. 
48
 See, e.g., European Commission, Guidelines on the application of article 81(3) [2004] O.J. C101/97, 
paragraph. 13; see Chapter 5 “Development of the EU Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints”. 
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the welfare of consumers, but primarily competition itself, which includes the structure of 
the market, based on the text of the antitrust rules in the TFEU.49 
 
In the US, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) very clearly highlights that antitrust law 
must protect competition as a process: 
For over six decades, the mission of the Antitrust Division has been to promote and protect the 
competitive process — and the American economy — through the enforcement of the antitrust 
laws.50 
 
Furthermore, recently, the Antitrust Division has focused on other values that complement 
efficiency in competition: economic freedom and fairness.51 These values, already 
discussed above, ensure that competitors are free to compete, are not restricted by 
anticompetitive interests of other competitors and are therefore rewarded fairly for 
increasing efficiency in the form of procompetitive behaviour. Indeed, as this thesis will 
analyse further, primarily in Chapter 6 “Theories of Pro-Competitiveness v. Anti-
Competitiveness”, economic freedom and fairness do not contradict but rather enhance the 
protection of effective competition. 
 
2.3.2. The Term “Competition” 
 
It is necessary to understand the meaning of the term “competition” to establish boundaries 
for effective competition. For example, Cann sets the meaning of the term “competition” 
within the terms of allocative and productive efficiencies which determine the level of 
consumer satisfaction, including interbrand as well as intrabrand relationships.52 Fox is 
more concerned about business itself when explaining the term “competition”, arguing 
that, aside from reflecting legislative intent, it should also consider business initiatives, 
decentralised decision-making and power diffusion.53  
 
These explanations of competition include several attributes of competition but are 
arguably not complete. The understanding of competition in accordance with both the 
                                                 
49
 See cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P, C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v 
Commission of the EC [2009] 4 CMLR 2; C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV v Road van bestuur van de 
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] 5 CMLR 11. 
50
 DOJ, Antitrust Division, “Overview” (Washington, DC, 29/09/2009),  
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/overview.html. 
51
 DOJ, Ch.A. Varney, “Vigorously Enforcing the Antitrust Laws: Developments at the Division,” 
(Washington, DC, 24/6/2011, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/272536.pdf), pp. 1, 15. 
52
 Cann, “Vertical Restraints” 526-528. 
53
 Fox, “The Modernization of Antitrust” 1153-1155, 1182-1190. 
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Sherman Act and the TFEU is based on competition in the market considering the general 
and total impact of restrictions on the market, without concentrating on individual 
competitor’s or only on consumers’ interests.  
 
Competition does not only exist among competitors offering similar products or services 
(interbrand competition), but also among competitors who sell one-brand products 
produced by one manufacturer (intrabrand competition). Steiner, Cann and Burns claim 
that not only interbrand competition should be discussed when making judgments about a 
particular vertical restraint, but also intrabrand competition, and that both, including 
vertical competition, should be protected by competition law.54 
 
Therefore, the term “competition” consists of the following aspects:  
• Competitors: Competition must exist; this means that there are competitors 
competing in the market and also on the vertical chain. 55 
• Competitive Environment: There should not be any restrictive, efficiency-hindering 
agreements or other artificial actions or boundaries which would prevent 
competitors from competing. 
• Market: Each market and related vertical markets are specific because of the 
nature of the product, environment, competitors’ and consumers’ choice. Hence, 
different forms of competition are suitable for different markets. 
• Consumers 
• Product (or Service) and its Substitutes. 
 
To summarise, competition is a state of affairs and allocation of resources among 
competitors, including vertical competitors, who are driven by rivalry and are influenced 
by consumers’ choices and preferences, and thus maintain a competitive environment in 
the market concerned, as well as in vertically related markets. 
 
2.4. Basic Models of Markets and Market Behaviour 
 
Competition can be effective only when it respects the nature of the market concerned. 
Although, generally, perfect competition is an ideal situation, it is not always effective to 
                                                 
54
 Steiner, “The Leegin Factors” 32; J.W. Burns, “Vertical Restraints, Efficiency, and the Real World” (1993) 
62 Ford. L. Rev. 597; Cann, “Vertical Restraints” 526-549; for further discussion see Chapter 3 “Vertical 
Competition and Structure”. 
55
 See Chapter 3 “Vertical Competition and Structure”. 
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aim for such a situation if the nature of the market inclines to a different model. Hence, 
basic models and theories are briefly discussed here to assist with finding the appropriate 
systems for different markets, to explain the functions of competition and to understand 
differences in market structures.  
 
2.4.1. Perfect Competition Model 
 
The perfect competition theory, with its roots in Adam Smith’s idea of the competitive 
market, supposes that a firm’s objective is profitability and the only consumer choice is 
price, while the company’s profit only covers its maintenance of investment in the 
industry.56 Perfect competition is a situation where prices equal marginal costs; output is 
the highest possible and prices are the lowest possible.57 The theory can apply when there 
is a competitive environment in a market that includes: 
• An industry with a number of small firms with small outputs;  
• The firms are producing identical, homogenous products; 
• They have the same access to inputs and free and available information about the 
market and competitors; 
• They are charging the same price; and 
• Manufacturers and distributors compete and create perfect competition.58  
 
This theory is based on the relationship between supply and demand. To sell for the most 
competitive price, supply must cover the whole demand while making a profit high enough 
to cover companies’ investments.59 If the company tries to sell its product for a higher 
price it would not make any sales, and if it tries to sell under the market price it would lose 
the highest perfect competition profit. If new companies enter the market, the quantity 
supplied will exceed the quantity demanded and the price will therefore fall. If the price is 
too low, companies will leave the market or decrease their production to make an 
                                                 
56
 D. Besanko, … [et al.], Economics of Strategy, Fifth Edition (John Wiley & Sons, 2010), p. 30; 
Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 3; Bishop, Walker, The Economics of EC”, 17. 
57
 H. Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution (Harvard University Press, London, 
2005),16. 
58
 Besanko,  Economics of Strategy, 30-31; Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 3; P. Areeda, L. Kaplow, 
A. Edlin,  Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text and Cases, Sixth Edition (Aspen, 2004), 5; V. Korah, An 
Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice Ninth Edition (Hart Publishing, 2008), 13; Bishop, 
Walker, The Economics of EC”, 17; Harrington, Vernon, Viscusi, Economics of Regulation, 73; R.B. 
Bouterse, Competition and Integration – What Goals Count? (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
Deventer – Boston, 1994), 22-23. 
59
 Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 3-4; Bishop, Walker, The Economics of EC”, 17-19. 
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accounting profit but most likely without an economic profit. Hence, the price remains 
optimal for consumers and high enough for producing companies.60 
 
The model of perfect competition does not take into account any external factors, such as 
changes in consumer income, new inventions replacing old products, war and, most 
importantly, all of the factors aside from price that come from competing among 
competitors, such as quality, availability and promotion.61 Furthermore, the theory of 
contestable markets recognises perfect competition as competition in a market where there 
is no need for regulation by competition law because the market is perfectly contestable 
with absolutely free entry and an absolute costless exit.62 Nevertheless, competition law is 
necessary in contestable markets because without law there is no guarantee that barriers 
will not be created in the future.  
 
2.4.2. Game Theory, Oligopoly 
 
Game theory is based on the probability of the reactions of rivals which have an impact on 
market price, thus highlighting subjective business decisions. Companies try to predict 
how their rivals will react, particularly in a market with a small number of competitors, 
such as Boeing and Airbus in the aircraft-production market. The main factor of this theory 
is profit-making for the competing companies.63 Part of game theory is Nash Equilibrium, 
which considers the strategies of other players while trying to find the best strategy for the 
player who “plays the game”, including not just profit maximisation, but also expansion of 
capacities and anything which is in their collective interest.64 For example, if a company 
increases price this would lead to a higher profit only if the strategies of its competitors 
follow its example and increase their prices as well.  
 
Game theory is typical of an oligopoly or oligopsony.65 An oligopoly or oligopsony is 
natural for transparently-concentrated markets with homogenous products, significant 
barriers to entry and inelastic demand. Moreover, game theory can be used with regards to 
                                                 
60Besanko, Economics of Strategy, 30-35; Bishop, Walker, The Economics of EC”, 17-19. 
61
 Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 7. 
62
 W.J. Baumol, “Contestable Markets and Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure” (1982) 72 American 
Economic Review, 1. 
63
 Besanko, Economics of Strategy, 34-35. 
64
 Ibid., pp. 36-37; Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 162-165; Bishop, Walker, The Economics of EC”, 
28-29. 
65
 H. von  Stackelberg, Marktform und Gleichgewicht (1934, Julius Springer, Berlin)  in P. Dobson, M. 
Waterson, A. Chu, “The Welfare Consequences of Exercise of Buyer Power” 16 (Sept. 1998) Office of Fair 
Trading, Research Paper, p. 8. 
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artificial oligopolies, such as concerted practices or other cartels. However, in contrast to 
natural oligopoly, competitors are at risk of cheating in cartels. 66 
 
The conflict between self and collective interests is referred to as the prisoners’ dilemma67 
and is more typical of an artificial oligopoly. For instance, increasing production can 
increase a company’s profit; however, in this case, it would be in other competitors’ 
interests to increase their production, which would in turn decrease the first company’s 
profit. Therefore, the collective interest is to keep production the same, giving all 
competitors the ability to obtain the best profit from their collective profits. However, in 
some situations,68 when the company makes the first strategic move, it will increase its 
profit while other competitors can only accommodate their own strategies around the first 
company’s strategy, not to lose but to keep their profits as high as possible.69 This can also 
mean a risk for the leading entity, as it can lead to profit loss if, for instance, the leading 
company increases its prices and its competitors do not and consumers subsequently switch 
to competitors. 
 
2.4.3. Monopoly Model and Social Cost 
 
The ideal monopoly or monopsony includes markets which consist of one monopolist and 
significant barriers to entry. A monopolist with absolute power will set the price at the 
highest possible level to receive maximum profit. Each product has its natural price peak. 
If the price is higher than this price maximum limit, consumers will decrease their 
purchase in such an amount that the monopolist will lose its profit.70 As Hovenkamp 
explains:  
The monopolist will not be able to charge an infinite price for its product. Even the orthodontists 
may be unwilling to pay more than $3000 per pound for steel; if the price goes higher they will 
change to silver or some other alternative.71 
 
The scenario of an absolute monopolist earning the maximum profit includes social cost, 
which is a net loss that society suffers as a result of absolute monopolistic behaviour. The 
                                                 
66
 See, e.g. EU: C-89/85, 104/85, 114/85, etc. A Ahlström Oy v Commission [1993] 4 CMLR 407; C-172/80, 
Züchner v. Bayerische Vereinsbank [1981] ECR 2021, [1982] 1 CMLR 313; US: E.I. Du Pont De Nemours 
& Co v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (1984, 2d Cir.). 
67
 Besanko, Economics of Strategy, 27-28. 
68
 Where demand is not inelastic or absolutely inelastic which is, again, not typical of a natural oligopoly. 
69
 Besanko,  Economics of Strategy, 36-38. 
70
 Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 12-17; Areeda, Kaplow, Edlin, Antitrust Analysis, 10-14; Bishop, 
Walker, The Economics of EC”, 21-23. 
71
 Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 12. 
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social cost is less if the monopoly has an efficient impact on society. For example, fairly 
created monopolies based on innovative, patented products can increase social benefits 
rather than decrease them when introducing such products into newly created markets.72 
Moreover, the nature of some markets predicts that there can be space only for a limited 
number of companies, for instance, the railway market. A private company would probably 
introduce a maximum profit price if it is not regulated by the state.73 
 
2.4.4. Models and Real Markets 
 
Although the perfect competition model assists with predictions as to whether a certain 
situation is efficient in the market, it cannot answer the question of whether other aspects 
or effects on competition should be considered and whether the market itself is suitable for 
this model.74 Furthermore, such horizontal focus does not consider the effects of certain 
vertical conducts on related vertical markets.75 The same can be said for all models; they 
are useful in understanding the nature of competition however the reality is generally more 
complicated.  
 
Moreover, real competition is never based solely on price competition but on other ways of 
competing and other interests of competitors and consumers, such as services.76 Cann 
argues that consumer choice can be made “upon geographic accessibility, product 
differentiation, misinformation and intensity to price quality adjustment”.77 
 
The perfect competition model assumes that production and distribution costs are the same. 
However, a new process could be developed by one company which decreases production 
costs and thus creates an advantage over its competitors and allows that company to 
increase its production and decrease its price.78 Even in markets where society benefits 
from having a high number of competitors, competing products can be differentiated. This 
is not just the case for sophisticated and technical products, but basic goods such as fruit 
and metals can also be differentiated by competitors in terms of specific distribution, 
                                                 
72
 Ibid., pp. 17-20; Areeda, Kaplow, Edlin, Antitrust Analysis, 25-27; see also Viscusi, Economics of 
Regulation, 84-87 
73
 Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 31-34. 
74
 Ibid, pp. 26-27, 71; Areeda, Kaplow, Edlin, Antitrust Analysis, 10. 
75
 Further see Chapter 3 “Vertical Competition and Structure”. 
76
 See Chapter 6 “Theories of Pro-Competitiveness v. Anti-Competitiveness”. 
77
 Cann, “Vertical Restraints” 526-549. 
78
 See Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 26-31. 
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country of origin, trademarks or specific packaging. For this reason, manufacturers and 
distributors can make different arrangements and introduce restrictions.79  
 
On the other hand, a market with products that are homogenous and not differentiated can 
establish a natural oligopoly. If there are a lot of competitors, an oligopoly has a lot of 
similarities with perfect competition with the exception that all competitors will try to 
pursue their own common interest: profit maximisation. The market with fewer 
competitors will tend to have higher prices than those markets similar to the perfect 
competition model.80  
 
Generally, different strategies and costs, such as distribution costs, must be considered.81 It 
is more efficient for some companies to distribute products themselves, while for other 
companies it may be cheaper to conduct business with independent distributors. Other 
typical attributes of real markets are research and development costs, patent systems, risks, 
such as defect products, and government regulation, all of which create barriers to entry.  
 
In reality, different markets and different forms of competition exist. The right market with 
the right form of competition creates effective competition; different models are available 
to help and understand different markets. Industrial organisation theory determines this 
suitability and indicates whether a particular behaviour is or is not efficient in that market. 
For instance, trying to achieve the perfect competition model can result in an increase in 
efficiency in some markets while this might not be a suitable structure for other markets.82 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
The genuine objective of competition law is to protect effective competition. The right type 
of competition for the right market increases its efficiency. Such an objective has not 
always been recognised and applied by the courts and competition authorities as the 
principal objective of competition law. If antitrust/competition law concentrates on values 
other than efficiency and protection of competition, for example on the protection of small 
businesses, then this will be at the expense of such factors as development and research. If 
effective competition is protected by competition/antitrust law and policy, then each aspect 
                                                 
79
 See ibid., p. 37; Areeda, Kaplow, Edlin, Antitrust Analysis, pp. 18-20; see also Bouterse, Competition and 
Integration, 23-24. 
80
 See Areeda, Kaplow, Edlin, Antitrust Analysis, 14, 235. 
81
 See Chapter 3 “Vertical Competition and Structure”. 
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 Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 26-27. 
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of competition will be valued which will lead to fair allocation of resources and thus fair 
competition. For instance, small business will have its place in the market if the nature of a 
particular market structure allows it and if small businessmen make effective business 
decisions. Different groups and subjects of competition and factors creating total welfare in 
the market will be in harmony and will benefit in the right way. 
 
Perfect competition does not occur in reality, even though the real market can be only a 
few steps away from perfect competition. Moreover, each market requires a different 
natural structure. For example, it is naturally impossible for the global aircraft producers’ 
market to include more than a few competitors, and railways will usually only have one 
owner, making the railway market naturally restricted. Effective competition can be 
understood as the competition that is the most efficient for a particular market or a 
particular market model. All aspects of competition including the nature of the market 
must be considered, to determine the efficiency of competition and efficiency of certain 
conduct in the market, in other words, whether certain conduct such as RPM or VTR is 
anticompetitive or pro-competitive. This reflects total welfare, not just consumer welfare 
and this consideration is complicated due to its complexity. 
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Chapter 3: Vertical Competition and Structure 
 
“For every seller there is a buyer.”1 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter, “Objective of the Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints” 
explains that the principal objective of the law of vertical territorial and price restraints is 
the protection of effective competition enhancing efficiency. Along with the following 
chapters, it highlights that analysis and an understanding of the nature of competition, the 
market and its interactive aspects within the vertical chain is essential for studying RPM 
and VTR as this creates the basis for the determination of anti-competitiveness or pro-
competitiveness of RPM and VTR, and thus their best legal approach. Such key elements 
including, among others, market structures, horizontal market power, bargaining power 
and their vertical interactions show whether RPM and/or VTR occurring in specific 
markets with specific vertical relationships hinder effective competition and if yes to what 
extent; or whether RPM and VTR have the potential to improve efficiency and hence to 
increase effective competition in certain markets. Therefore, this chapter critically surveys 
these key aspects. It studies the nature of vertical interactions between markets and 
between vertical relationships and thus it sets this market analysis within a framework of 
vertical chains and vertical competition revealing that bargaining power influences the 
existence of VTR and/or RPM and determines the intentions for their applications. The 
existence of vertical competition is also established and explained in this chapter. 
 
3.2. Distribution and Its Forms 
 
3.2.1. Vertical Integration and Its Aspects 
 
Non-integrated companies cooperate with independent entities in order to specialise in one 
aspect of the vertical process, such as manufacturing or distribution. However, any entity 
has the option to be vertically integrated; therefore, to produce, distribute and sell its 
products/services on its own or with the assistance of agencies, thus being self-sufficient in 
                                                 
1
 R.D. Blair, J.L. Harrison, “Antitrust Policy and Monopsony” (1990-1991) 76 Cornell L. Rev. 298, 339. 
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areas where it could obtain assistance from another entity.2  In 1925, Frank explained that 
vertical integration is “the functional coordination of one or more units in each of the 
several successive stages of production, so that they are all operated as a single, unified 
industrial process”.3  
 
The basic principles of how the market and companies operate are explained in “the 
neoclassical model of economic welfare”, which has its roots in the theories of Adam 
Smith.4 John Bates Clark, William Jevons and Alfred Marshall introduced the marginal 
cost curve. They believed that strategic companies make their decisions based on the value 
and cost of the next choice, because they are concentrating on the future and not on an 
evaluation of past accounting costs.5 
 
Indeed, it is not just the matter of capital but also that of efficiency which plays an 
important role when deciding whether an entity will be vertically integrated or not. Even 
the current markets of developed countries include both situations. This is determined by 
the nature of the market and by all of its aspects, including the nature of the product.   
 
Any business decision and any part of the business process, including bargaining with non-
integrated entities or taking responsibility for an integrated part of an entity, has its 
transaction costs. Consideration of this cost determines the structures of companies.6 In 
addition to this, companies make strategic decisions based on different transaction costs 
with their bounded rationality, which is based on limited information.7 Transaction costs 
and economies of scale offer explanations as to why some markets and/or producers are 
vertically integrated and others are not.8 For instance, Hovenkamp explains that a small 
pizza restaurant delivers its own pizzas rather than hires delivering companies because it is 
cheaper, quicker and probably more reliable and is, therefore, more efficient. By contrast, 
very large manufacturers such as Colgate-Palmolive or General Electric do not usually sell 
                                                 
2
 M. Ricktetts, The Economics of Business Enterprise: An Introduction to Economic Organization and the 
Theory of the Firm (London, Edward Elgar 2002). 
3
 L.K. Frank, “The Significance of Industrial Integration” (1925) 33 J.Pol.Econ. 179. 
4
 H. Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution (Harvard University Press, London, 
2005), 15. 
5
 A. Marshall, Principles of Economics (London: Macmillan, 1890); W.S. Jevons, The Theory of Political 
Economy 3rd Edition (London: Macmillan, 1888); J.B. Clark, The Philosophy of Wealth (Boston: Ginn, 
1886). 
6
 R. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) 4 Economica 386; also see H. Hovenkamp, “Harvard, Chicago, 
and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 624-625, 628-630. 
7
 O.E. Williamson, Antitrust Economics: Mergers, Contracting, and Strategic Behaviour, (Basil Blackwell, 
New York, 1987), 24-38. 
8
 M.P. Lynch, “Why Economists Are Wrong to Neglect Retailing and How Steiner’s Theory Provides an 
Explanation of Important Regularities” (2004) 49 Antitrust Bulletin 922-925. 
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directly to the final customers but, rather, they sell to distributors, dealers or large 
retailers.9  
 
According to Williamson, strategic decision-making based on transaction costs includes 
two aspects: bounded rationality and opportunism. Bounded rationality means that 
companies are not absolutely capable of making the most efficient decisions because there 
are simply too many aspects and too much information that they must consider. 
Opportunism means that it is wrong to presume that companies always tell the truth, rather 
if they recognise an opportunity they will do whatever they can not to miss it.10 
 
Competition law and its policies play an essential role when companies make decisions as 
to whether they will be vertically integrated. This decision-making process includes other 
aspects such as innovation.11 Companies judge different situations and make strategic 
decisions based on the consideration as to whether integration will be more profitable to 
them, taking into account transaction costs, while constantly evolving.12 Williamson argues 
that “neither firms nor markets come in predetermined shapes”.13 Although this 
observation is highly valuable, it could also be argued that it has its limits, mainly in the 
nature of the markets concerned. Airway transport from Glasgow to Prague is not, and 
probably will not be, as competitive as the jeans market in Glasgow because of the nature 
of the market, including entry boundaries. 
 
Ineffective competition policy and law could possibly lead to vertical integrations in 
markets where the nature of the market determines that market integration is not the most 
efficient way of distribution. It is arguable whether unlawful RPM and VTR lead to such 
situations. It also depends on the size of the market. For instance, a German producer of 
TV sets will not distribute and sell its products on its own in the whole of the EU. 
Moreover, EU competition law and US antitrust law incorporate stricter approaches 
regarding both forms of vertical restraints, most notably at the beginning of their existence. 
However, this has not led to a vertical-integration wave. On the other hand, tolerating the 
                                                 
9
 Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise, 181-182. 
10
 Williamson, Antitrust Economics, 126-127; also see W.S. Grimes, “A Dynamic Analysis of Resale Price 
Maintenance: Inefficient Brand Promotion, Higher Margins, Distorted Choices, and Retarded Retailer 
Innovation” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 101-149. 
11
 Hovenkamp, “Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost” 625-626; P.E. Areeda, H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust 
Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, (Volume VIII, Second Edition, Aspen 
Publishers, 2004), 109-113; Williamson, Antitrust Economics, 138-141. 
12
 Williamson, Antitrust Economics, 124-125; also see Hovenkamp, “Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction 
Cost” 624-625. 
13
 Williamson, Antitrust Economics, 124. 
Barbora Jedličková                                                                      Chapter 3: Vertical Competition and Structure 
 
 28
existence of RPM and VTR has restricted and even eliminated the businesses of at least 
some distributors.14 
 
It is important to note that the purpose and objectives of firms that are integrated or non-
integrated differ. Yale economist, Irving Fisher, recognises in his “separation theorem” that 
a firm’s profit maximising goals differ from the goals of individual shareholders.15 
Therefore, a vertically integrated company’s goal could serve the purpose of its mother 
firm contrary to the goal of an independent entity operating at the same level which will 
probably aim at maximising its profit.  
 
Although, it is possible to agree with Easterbrook, that both cooperation across entities and 
cooperation within one entity are beneficial,16 it depends on the market structures and other 
aspects to determine which cooperation is more efficient and thus more beneficial. His 
further argument is moot as he argues that  
[r]estricted dealing is a form of cooperation. One firm (the retailer) agrees to do things the way a 
manufacturer specifies, just as an employee does things within an integrated firm... Such contracts 
are the market at work.17  
 
An independent entity cannot be compared to an employee, as the independent entity’s 
goal differs to that of an agency, an employee and his/her employer. Circumstances which 
pressure one party to agree and, thus, put itself in the position of an integrated rather than 
independent firm cannot be seen as the workings of a market at its most efficient. 
 
3.2.1.1. Vertically Combined Systems 
 
Aside from vertically integrated distribution and non-integrated distribution, a 
manufacturer can decide to co-distribute their products, thus establishing dual distribution. 
                                                 
14
 The allowance of RPM and VTR in the US: Toledo Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 
F.3d 204 (2008); Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Continental 
T.V. v. GTE-Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United States v. Colgate & Company, 250 U.S. 300 (1919); it was 
ruled that vertical restraints in question restricted competition in the EU recent cases with the less stricter 
approach: Case C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P, C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v 
Commission of the EC [2009] 4 CMLR 2; Commission Decision of 30 October 2002: COMP / 35.587 PO 
Video Games, COMP / 35.706 PO Nintendo Distribution and COMP / 36.321 Omega – Nintendo; 
97/123/EC, IV / 35.679 – Novalliance / Systemform, Official Journal L 47, 18/02/1997; Case 107/82 
Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft AEG-Telefunken AG v Commission of the EC [1983] ECR 3151; and 
others; further see Chapter 4 “Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints” and 
Chapter 5 “Development of the EU Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints”. 
15
 See The Works of Irving Fisher. edited by William J. Barber et al. 14 volumes (London : Pickering & 
Chatto, 1996).  
16
 F. H. Easterbrook, “Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason”, (1984) 53 Antitrust L.J. 140. 
17
 Ibid., p. 140. 
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Alternatively, retailers can decide to sell so-called “private labels”. The reasons behind and 
the results of such vertically combined systems are higher profits and stronger bargaining 
power on the side of the entity, which combines its specialisation with another stage on the 
vertical chain. 
 
Areeda and Hovenkamp rightly argue that manufacturers of dual distribution systems, who 
are also distributors, do not have to introduce RPM to increase their own profit, although 
the opposite could seem to be reasonable at first glance. They are in a position where they 
can increase their profit by increasing wholesale prices. Moreover, their bargaining power 
should be stronger than in a situation where they were not distributing their own 
products.18 Therefore, the reasons for using RPM are equivalent to the reasons arising from 
independent distribution-production relationships rather than reasons arising from 
horizontal arrangements. For instance, RPM can occur if the manufacturer does not have 
sufficient bargaining power, despite the dual distribution, and is forced by its distributor(s) 
to use it. In contrast, in the case of territorial restraints, such manufacturers can be 
motivated by concentrating on and increasing their own distribution business and thus 
eliminating other distributors from certain territories.  
 
In the second scenario, manufacturers producing products for retailers’ private labels are 
generally smaller companies with lower bargaining powers.19 Retailers selling private 
labels have stronger bargaining and market powers and thus the possibility that they would 
agree “horizontally” with a restriction of their own private labels is low and rather 
illogical.20 On the other hand, they can still have the same reasons for using vertical 
restraints, such as RPM, in relation to branded products. It is also arguable whether any 
limitation upon private labels should be recognised as horizontal or vertical limitation in 
situations where a retailer does not produce such a product itself but only lends its name, 
label and packaging. 
 
                                                 
18
 Hovenkamp, “Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost” 641-642; Areeda, Hovenkamp,  Antitrust Law, 68-
81; compare with D. Gilo, “Private Labels, Dual Distribution, and Vertical Restraints – An Analysis of the 
Competitive Effects” in Private Labels, Brands, and Competition Policy (2009, Oxford University Press), 
141-152. 
19
 H. Smith, J. Thanassoulis, “Bargaining between Retailers and Their Suppliers” in Private Labels, Brands, 
and Competition Policy (2009, Oxford University Press), 45-70. 
20
 Compare with Gilo’s arguments which focus on the limitations of “horizontal” private labels: Gilo, 
“Private Labels” 141-152. 
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Private labels are used by large and powerful retailers.21 They are popular in Europe, with 
the exceptions of Italy and Russia, and have a long tradition in the UK in sectors such as 
food, drinks and household categories. This has driven away some smaller manufacturers’ 
brands which have become “integrated” under private labels.22  
 
Nonetheless, private labels have positive rather than negative effects on competition. 
Firstly, it is more efficient for large retailers if they cover both manufacturers’ brands and 
private labels. Therefore, private labels do not eliminate branded products, except for those 
products produced by less effective and smaller manufacturers. Secondly, manufacturers 
who have made the right business and strategic/marketing decisions are driven by private 
labels to improve their products and offer more and new options for consumers. In general, 
successful and thus efficient manufacturers concentrate on advertising and innovation, thus 
increasing and maintaining a high quality with a good reputation and value for money, and 
distinguishing their products.23 Moreover, private labels have been used in practice to 
increase competition where a strong brand was significantly powerful.24 
 
3.2.2. Current Distribution Systems 
 
Non-integrated vertical chains can have different forms of distribution, including selective 
systems and franchising systems. A basic distribution relationship is as follows: 
manufacturers supply wholesalers and wholesalers supply retailers. The European 
Commission notes that it would be almost impossible to analyse all forms of distribution 
systems separately.25 
 
The Commission distinguishes four types of distribution systems for analytical purposes: 
• Exclusive selling (a producer sells only to one distributor in a particular territory) 
• Exclusive buying (a distributor takes supplies only from one producer – this is 
typified by the beer and petrol markets) 
• Franchising (a franchisee exploits the know-how and intellectual property rights of 
the franchiser and sells in a standardised format in an allocated territory) 
                                                 
21
 R. Herbert, “Private Labels – What Drives Them Forward?” in Private Labels, Brands, and Competition 
Policy (2009, Oxford University Press), 4. 
22
 Ibid., pp. 4-6. 
23
 Herbert, “Private Labels” 21-46. 
24
 Smith, Thanassoulis, “Bargaining” 68-69. 
25
 Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, Economic Analysis, COM (96) 721, points 
4, 13. 
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• Selective distribution (distributors are chosen on the basis of objective criteria).26 
 
Indeed, there are a number of forms and types of distribution, some of them more complex 
than others. For example, franchising, in comparison to mere absolute territorial 
restrictions, ensures certain benefits such as services, quality and brand maintaining and 
protecting, disclosing and protecting know-how and other IP rights. It is a detailed 
promotional and business tool based on close cooperation between entities, such as the 
cooperation between a company and its agent.  
 
However, distribution is not static and has been continually changing.27 The most recent 
changes are due to developments in information technology and the creation of new 
distribution systems that have resulted in ongoing greater concentration and integration, 
and the decline of traditional distribution channels (manufacturers-wholesalers-retailers).28 
However, the situation differs in different sectors; for instance, wholesalers have a strong 
position in the pharmaceutical sector in the EU, whereas in other sectors, wholesale trade 
has become integrated with suppliers or buyers.29 
 
In general, the retail sector has become more concentrated and is expanding.30 Distributive 
trades, including wholesaling and retailing, increased from roughly 20% in Denmark and 
Belgium to 40% in Greece in the EU in 1990s.31 In the US, a buyer’s power has increased 
in retail, health care, manufacturing and the entertainment market.32 
 
New forms of competition have arisen, such as online shopping and new technologies, 
which influence changes in consumer shopping habits. Large retail stores have developed 
and have played an important role in the changes by increasing their bargaining power and 
becoming concentrated and vertically integrated, most notably in the food industry. 
                                                 
26
 Ibid., point 4. 
27
 See below; Lynch, “Steiner’s Theory” 912-913; Williamson, Antitrust Economics, 124; for historical 
development see H. Hovenkamp, “The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880-1960” 
(2010) 95 Iowa Law Review 863-918. 
28
 G.T. Gundlach, J.P. Cannon, K.C. Manning, “Free Riding and Resale Price Maintenance: Insights from 
Marketing Research and Practice” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 391-401, 403-410, 412-413; Green Paper on 
Vertical Restraints (96), points 20, 40, 41, 44. 
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 Green Paper on Vertical Restraints (96), point 24. 
30
 Lynch, “Steiner’s Theory” 912-913; Herbert, “Private Labels” 3-20; D. Bell, “The Business Model for 
Manufacturers’ Brands” in Private Labels, Brands, and Competition Policy (2009, Oxford University Press), 
21-46; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development., “Buying Power of Multiproduct 
Retailers” 7 OECD (Policy Roundtables),  (1998) DAFFE/CLP(99)21, Introduction, pp. 15-18 at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/18/2379299.pdf (9/11/2009). 
31
 Green Paper on Vertical Restraints (96), point 15. 
32
 T.A. Piraino, “A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Buyers’ Competitive Conduct” (2004-2005) 56 Hastings 
L.J. 1121-1122. 
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However, the structure and performance of the retail distribution market differs widely 
from one state to another.  
 
In general, the retailing sector creates more than 10% of GDP.33 Large retailers created 
over 50% of retail sales in most of northern Europe, with the exception of Sweden and 
Finland, with the retail sector being less concentrated in southern Europe in 1996.34 The 
concentration of the world retail market, which should be recognised generally as 
bargaining power rather than a traditional monopsomy, increased at the end of 20th 
century.35  
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) report on 
buying power from 1998 shows that, in general, it cannot be concluded that buyers (retail) 
have been gaining power and manufacturers have been weakened in the recent 
developments. Although the retail market has become more concentrated and the market 
share of retailers has increased, profitability of large manufacturers has also increased.36 
There are two possible explanations for this. Firstly, this could mean that social welfare has 
been generally growing and the most efficient players have benefited the most from such 
situations. Secondly, players with bargaining power have “abused” their positions at the 
expense of weaker “vertical competitors” and, potentially, consumers. 
 
It is possible that the type of product can influence the forms of distribution, as claimed by 
Gellhorn, Kovacic and Calkins. They argue that RPM is generally used for convenience 
goods, such as drugs, and vertical territories are involved in more complicated products 
which are usually sold on their own, such as cars and TV sets.37 However, Chapter 4 
“Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints” and Chapter 5 
“Development of the EU Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints” and Overstreet’s 
study prove this claim to be rather elusive and definitely not an absolute rule.38 
                                                 
33
 O. Boylaud, G. Niccoleti, “Regulatory Reform in Retail Distribution” (2001) 32 OECD Economic Studies 
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from the Past” (1985) 3 Contemp. Policy Issues 43-58. 
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3.3.Vertical Competition 
 
Competition process also takes place vertically. Entities are competitors when they can 
take sales or profit, margins and market share from each other.39 Manufacturers compete 
among themselves, distributors compete among themselves, and manufacturers and 
distributors also compete among themselves at the vertical level. Distributors attempt to 
bargain down manufacturers’ wholesale prices and decrease selling prices for retailers. 
There is not only a complementary, but also a competitive relationship between firms at 
different vertical stages. 
 
In reality, horizontal and vertical competitions coexist in close relationship and are 
correlated; vertical competition influences horizontal social welfare. If a manufacturer 
increases its horizontal market power it will arguably gain a stronger bargaining power at 
the vertical level. Lower vertical bargaining power will potentially lead to lower horizontal 
power and a lower market share.40 Moreover, decreasing supplier margins can also 
increase the manufacturer’s market share and power.41 
 
A manufacturer’s bargaining power is also influenced by the horizontal market power of 
its distributors, as indicated previously. Generally, if the distributor and manufacturer 
simultaneously increase their market power, the manufacturer does not necessarily increase 
its bargaining power.   
 
Economic analysis based on a single stage market is insufficient to make accurate 
assumptions about vertical restraints.42 Steiner recognises that margins at both stages are 
determined by three forms of competition: “interbrand competition among manufacturers, 
intrabrand competition among retailers and manufacturer/retailer bargaining”.43 It must be 
noted that interbrand competition among retailers is also important; this includes private 
labels’ interbrand competition. However, as discussed below, when determining vertical 
                                                 
39
 R.L. Steiner, “Vertical Competition, Horizontal Competition and Market Power” (2008) 53 Antitrust 
Bulletin 254; also see F.A. Hayek, “The Meaning of Competition”, in Individualism and Economic Order 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press [1948] 1996), 96. 
40
 Steiner, “Vertical Competition” 252, 257, 260, 268; R.L. Steiner, “The Leegin Factors – a Mixed Bag” 
(Spring 2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 35-36. 
41
 Steiner, “Vertical Competition” 269. 
42
 Steiner, “Vertical Competition” 254; Lynch, “Steiner’s Theory” 911-940; P. Dobson, M. Waterson A. 
Chu, “The Welfare Consequences of Exercise of Buyer Power” 16 (Sept. 1998) Office of Fair Trading, 
Research Paper, p. 6; R.L. Steiner, “How Manufacturers Deal with the Price-Cutting Retailer: When Are 
Vertical Restraints Efficient?” (1997) 65 Antitrust LJ 409; Hayek, “The Meaning of Competition” 96. 
43
 Steiner, “How Manufacturers Deal?” 409. 
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restraints, intrabrand competition among retailers can be more important than interbrand 
competition, as the lack of intrabrand competition increases retail margins.  
 
Steiner argues that the vertical process is based on “dual-stages” factors or “triple stage 
effects”, rather than a horizontal single stage market.44 Aside from consumer preferences 
and the demand curve, there are other aspects that influence such a process: 
…(1) retail penetration – which measures the share of retail market held by dealers stocking the 
brand; (2) dealer support – which measures the additional demand due to display, local advertising, 
and other promotional efforts by the brand’s retailers; and (3) retail gross margin (RGM) – roughly 
the difference between the brand’s retail price and its factory price divided by the former.45 
 
Although Steiner has been advocating the existence of vertical competition through the 
entirety of his scholarly work, in a recent article he adds another aspect to the triple stage 
effect: “the vertical competition effect”, which highlights that an entity faces upstream and 
downstream competition.46 
 
Steiner is not the only scholar who promotes the existence of vertical competition and the 
complexity of vertical arrangements, including vertical restraints.47 Already in 1968, 
Palamountain recognised three types of competition: horizontal competition, competing 
among different types of retailers and vertical competition, which he termed “vertical 
conflict”. He stated that the last type had been mostly ignored by antitrust policy and law.48 
Dobson, Waterson and Chu suggest that anti-competitive vertical practices should include 
a consideration of the market power of both buyers and sellers, followed by an analysis of 
market behaviour with regard to the nature of trading relationships, and finally an analysis 
of the underlying economic conditions in distribution, most notably cost in the buying 
process.49 
 
Unfortunately, both US and EU laws and policies have not properly acknowledged, and 
have not included, vertical competition as described above and have not considered the 
                                                 
44
 Steiner, “The Leegin Factors” 30-31; Steiner, “How Manufacturers Deal?” 409. 
45
 Steiner, “How Manufacturers Deal?” 411. 
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 Steiner, “The Leegin Factors” 31. 
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 See Dobson, Waterson, Chu, “Welfare Consequences” 6; J. Palamountain, Jr., The Politics of Distribution 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955); J.K. Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of 
Countervailing Power (Transaction Publishers, 1993 [1952]); also see below. 
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complexity of vertical restraints in their analysis.50 As Steiner argues, failure to recognise 
such complexity of vertical relations and vertical competition leads to false conclusions in 
vertical-restraint cases and related policy.51 He sarcastically describes the existing policy 
which analyses vertical restrictiveness in antitrust law as “single-stage model in which the 
markets downstream from the manufacturer can be ignored because they are perfectly 
competitive”.52 
 
However, even Steiner openly admits that he does not know the best approach to determine 
the level of restrictiveness in cases on vertical restraints because of the complexity and 
complication of the matter.53 Although he made such an attempt in his most recent article, 
his suggestion takes into consideration and builds on the existing US legal approach, but 
does not include all of the essential aspects of his arguments for determination of the anti-
competitiveness/pro-competitiveness of RPM and VTR.54 
 
3.3.1. Interbrand and Intrabrand Competition and Bargaining Power 
 
Retailers like large shopping stores usually distribute for more than one single producer. 
Such retailers can have a major effect on the sale of specific products. Indeed, in this 
situation, vertical integration between two sectors, or parts of the vertical chain, is unlikely 
to occur.55 Thus, their application of bargaining power is usually aimed at upstream 
interbrand rather than intrabrand competition. Although intensive interbrand competition 
can increase retail margins, it is intrabrand competition that lowers the retail margins and it 
should thus be valued by competition policies.56 
 
Steiner observes that retailers have bargaining power when consumers tend to switch 
brands within the one store.57 However, if consumers are loyal to their brands and switch 
stores rather than brands, manufacturers of such brands have the primary bargaining 
                                                 
50
 Compare with Chapter 4 “Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints” and 
Chapter 5 “Development of the EU Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints”. 
51
 Steiner, “Vertical Competition” 253, 259-262; also see P.C. Carstensen, “Buyer Power, Competition 
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power. Thus, although interbrand restrictions can have more significant effects on 
competition than intrabrand restrictions, in reality, this is not an always-applicable rule. 
For instance, Steiner explains that if a brand has a well-established reputation, such as 
Colgate, the price cut of such a product in one retail store will be noticeable for consumers 
and they will easily switch to this price-cutting retailer. On the other hand, the effect of 
discounting one product (Colgate) in one retail store and another product (Crest 
Toothpaste) competing with the first product in another store will be less direct. Such 
intrabrand competition will be intensive with lower distributors’ or retailers’ margins. If a 
retail store has higher prices on well-established brands, consumers will assume that such a 
store has higher prices on all products in general.58 If retailers are continually decreasing 
retail prices of a well-established brand as part of competing, then they are highly 
motivated to use RPM. 
 
In such a scenario, if a manufacturer increases the reputation of its brand, most notably 
through advertising, the elasticity of the demand curve decreases.59 Thus, as Steiner claims 
and Lynch supports with empirical data and an economic model, interbrand competition 
among retailers can never be as intensive as intrabrand competition among retailers. 
Therefore, intrabrand and not interbrand competition is a significant factor, within the 
retailers’ market, which can indeed influence the interbrand competition on the vertical 
chain.60 
 
Nevertheless, there are two situations where interbrand and intrabrand competition is 
equally intensive: when they are both very intensive or both very lenient, both of which are 
influenced by consumer behaviour. If they are lenient, this is due to a very low flexibility 
in consumer demand. In this scenario, retailers’ and manufacturers’ bargaining power and 
margins, which will most likely be high, are relatively the same. They are also relatively 
the same when both intrabrand and interbrand competition is intensive. However, in such 
situations, consumers are highly flexible in switching both the stores within brand and 
brands within a store and thus the margins of manufacturers and the retailers will be low 
                                                 
58
 Steiner, “The Leegin Factors” 31-34; Steiner, “Vertical Competition” 258; R.L. Steiner, “Exclusive 
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and their bargaining power will be balanced.61 Such flexibility depends also on distribution 
channels which, if enhanced, become a highly notable competitive means.62 
 
3.4. Market Structure and Power 
 
Market structure directly and significantly influences market power. Easterbrook defines 
market power as “the ability to raise price significantly without losing so many sales that 
the increase is unprofitable”.63 Such ability differs in different markets depending on the 
market structure. 
 
Nevertheless, a simple form of a vertical chain which includes a seller and a buyer is based 
on two forms of power: the horizontal market power of the seller and the buyer, and the 
vertical bargaining power which consists of buyer power and seller power. Bargaining 
power is essential in vertical restrictions and relationships. Market power determines only 
partially the strength of the bargaining power of each player on the vertical chain. Market 
structure is an aspect, amongst others, that determines both market and bargaining power. 
 
The term “buyer power” has been used to describe market power or bargaining power 
(countervailing power), or both.64 Although, the meaning of horizontal market power is 
arguably unified, different definitions of bargaining power and buyer (seller) power exist.65 
This results from the fact that vertical competition has not been accepted by authorities and 
has not been properly analysed by a wide range of experts, as discussed previously.  
 
In this thesis, the term “buyer power” (and the term “seller power”) is used to capture how 
strong the competitor is in relation to their vertical partner/competitor; thus, at the vertical 
level. This reflects the definition of the OECD, which defines buyer power as “the ability 
of a buyer to influence the terms and conditions on which it purchases goods”.66 Such 
meaning is based on bargaining power and indeed specifies the owner of that power. The 
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reason for the usage of the terms “buyer power” and “seller power” is that the terms 
“buyer” and “seller” indicate themselves that this power reflects interaction on the vertical 
and not on the horizontal chain.  
 
3.4.1. Bargaining Power 
 
Bargaining power, consisting of buyer power and seller power, exists in relation to a 
vertical relationship, at any stage of the vertical process.67 Bargaining power is a power 
where one party has such a position that it can make a credible threat or, in other words, it 
can effectively threaten other parties on the vertical chain that, for instance, it will 
terminate their contract or pressure them to deal solely with them.68 
 
Bargaining power can significantly influence social welfare, not just manufacturer’s 
price.69 Bargaining power increases and/or creates entrance barriers, as it is difficult for an 
entering company to compete against a competitor with the bargaining power to buy 
cheaper and sell dearer than the entering company.70  
 
Market power is one of the factors that influences bargaining power. It can be observed 
that players with a stronger market power do not necessarily have stronger bargaining 
power. When considering bargaining power, and also market power, aspects other than 
market share must be taken into account, for instance brand reputation. Steiner claims and 
Lynch supports this with empirical data and an economic model that shows that one of the 
best ways to increase bargaining power is via successful advertising and with a reputable 
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brand name. A manufacturer can also strengthen its bargaining power by increasing its 
vertical downstream market share and thus become a stronger salesman.71  
 
Smith and Thanassoulis explain that in situations where there is a clear upstream monopoly 
and a competitive buyers’ market, larger buyers will tend to negotiate higher wholesale 
prices than smaller buyers. This conclusion could seem surprising; however, it is due to the 
consequence that the monopolist is able to “dictate” conditions and is well aware of the 
fact that higher wholesale prices will give them a higher profit if negotiated with buyers 
who buy more products than small buyers. They conclude that there is no direct 
relationship between the size of the buyers’ market power and their bargaining power 
towards the monopolist.72 Conversely, stronger buyers obtain higher profits from private 
labels’ suppliers by using bigger outlets than retailers with a smaller market power.73 
 
Carstensen recognises two main groups with strong buyer power. The first group occurs 
because of a significant disproportion between buyers and sellers; for example, farmers 
and a relatively small number of processing companies, doctors, dentists, hospitals and 
insurance companies in the US. The second group includes branded or specialised 
consumer products, as buyers have a significant ability to influence the price and other 
selling conditions.74 Carstensen further shows that although buyers have significant 
bargaining power in both cases, their market share and horizontal market power differ 
significantly. The buyers’ market is relatively competitive and unconcentrated in the 
second scenario.75 
 
However, Carstensen does not address one particularly vulnerable group, that of the private 
label producers. Large retailers have significant bargaining power over the private label 
producers as private labels create uncertainty for already small producers.76 When 
compared to Carstensen’s groups, this group could be part of the first group with some 
differences. For example, it is typical for the first group that a farmer’s vertical market for 
selling their raw products such as chickens is geographically very limited; however, once 
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processed, the products can be shipped anywhere.77 On the other hand, not all private label 
products have such a feature. 
 
In the case of private label producers, it is obvious that short and easily-terminated 
contracts with no certainty, including no certainty of an outlet for suppliers, strengthen 
buyers’ powers. Homogenous products are particularly eligible for such situations and a 
strengthening of buyer power.78 
 
Hovenkamp, Areeda and Carstensen explain that if ability, risk (for example, if the first 
buyer finds out that the seller is looking for a new buyer) and cost, including negotiating 
the cost of switching and finding a new buyer, are high, the buyer has significant 
bargaining power.79 However, the seller has another option in such situations: vertical 
integration. Although this involves cost, time and other investments, it is an option for a 
seller, for instance, in the relationship between a farmer and a processing company, to 
reduce the buyer’s bargaining power. However, this is not usually efficient, for example, in 
a situation where retail stores are essential and are therefore not an option for the seller.  
 
Cartensen and Lande identify other aspects that influence bargaining power: transparent 
and correct information. Market failures in the form of defective information, such as 
misleading information at any level of the vertical chain, and the lack of transparent 
information among buyers and sellers, when the arrangements including price between 
sellers and buyers are kept secret, create bargaining power and thus unfair advantages 
which are not based on competitive efficiencies.80 
 
It appears that the SSNIP test is not the right method of determining bargaining power. 
Carstensen proposes several factors which must be analysed; one of them is that market 
must be defined “in the terms of seller’s options in both geographic and product terms” 
which generally consists of narrow local markets for sellers.81 Another factor is the way 
products or services are sold to buyers, including transparency of information among 
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sellers; less transparent information means more power for the buyers.82 Finally, the 
number of potential buyers, regardless of whether sellers deal with a monopsonist or 
oligopsonists, is important.83 This list is not complete,84 for instance, advertising can 
significantly increase bargaining power.85 As Steiner observes, successful advertising 
strengthens manufacturer’s power and intrabrand competition, increasing its profit and 
decreasing the profits of retailers who compete more intensively within that brand.86 
 
Moreover, the last factor can be misguided in the so called “branded market”, the market 
that belongs to the second group of Carstensen’s discussion, because a seller needs a wide 
range of buyers to sell an efficient quantity of its products. The buyer who buys large 
numbers of the products has potentially better bargaining power than the one who buys 
only a small number.87 However, this can have also a different effect, depending on the 
reputation of the brand. If the brand has no reputation at all, then Carstensen’s presumption 
will apply. However, as explained by Steiner and showed by Lynch, if the seller’s brand is 
well-established, consumers will follow the buyer who sells that brand and thus the buyer 
who buys a high quantity of such products fears losing this seller as loyal consumers will 
not switch to other substitutes. This in turn increases the seller’s bargaining power.88 
 
The market of such products is geographically very narrow and is segmented into several 
markets for a seller as they need many outlets to satisfy production.89 Such reality is not 
reflected in the SSNIP test, which is based on the final consumer demand in general and 
not on producers’ or suppliers’ options and efficiencies. 
 
To conclude, it is obvious that a buyer (or a seller) does not have to have a monopolistic 
market share to exercise significant bargaining power and dictate those conditions on the 
vertical chain that influence horizontal markets at the buyer and seller levels. Indeed, 
vertical competition which exercises bargaining power has an impact on social welfare, 
efficiency and effective competition. 
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3.4.2. Market Structure 
 
Different market structures occur in different markets. Basic and still-applied market 
structures on the vertical chain including buyers and sellers were discussed by Stackelberg 
from Germany in 1934.90 These structures are illustrated in Table 1.91 A year before, in 
1933, Chamberlin examined the relationship between price and the market explaining that 
as markets differed so did their price behaviour.92 Bain further developed this theory.93 He 
differentiates the market structures accordingly and offers examples of aspects which 
influence the behaviour of undertakings including pricing strategy:  
the number of and the degree of concentration among buyers; the durability of the good in question; 
whether the good is purchased by producers or by consumers; the adaptability of the good to 
variation over time, including the importance of style elements; the geographical dispersion of the 
market and the importance of transport cost.94  
 
Another aspect of markets and competition is transaction costs. Williamson observes that 
transaction costs differ in different market structures.95 When analysing vertical restraints, 
all aspects including transaction costs should be considered at each stage of the vertical 
chain, otherwise the presumption concerning vertical restraints cannot be accurate. Indeed, 
the structure is more complicated than the one at the horizontal level, as it does not only 
include structures of horizontal monopolies, oligopolies and competitive markets but also 
the structure of buyers, which involves monopsony, oligopsony and competitive markets, 
as well as the interaction between sellers and buyers.  
 
The complete market, including the whole vertical chain, is even more complicated than 
the analysis of sellers and buyers as the chain can include more than two horizontal 
markets.96 This is illustrated in Table 2.97 For instance, the production of furniture includes 
the producers of raw materials, such as wood; their distributors; manufacturers of furniture; 
their distributors and finally retailers. Illegal horizontal price cartels at the beginning of the 
chain, among the producers of raw materials, could influence prices for the final 
consumers of furniture. For example, Carstensen explains such an influence on the vertical 
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chain in cheese production and distribution including the influence of raw milk.98 This is 
also well documented in one of the oldest antitrust cases in the world from Ancient Greece, 
in 388 BC.99 
 
The question arises as to whether RPM of raw materials or VTR at the beginning of the 
chain could influence prices and other aspects of competition at the end of the chain. It is 
possible to assume that it can and that this can have an even more restrictive impact than if 
RPM implies at the end of the chain. Assume that the producer is a monopolist in a certain 
market, for instance Lesy Ceska Republika, s.p., producers of wood in the Czech Republic. 
If the producer applies RPM or VTR to its distributors, this can influence their price which 
will influence prices of the producers of furniture, their distributors and their retailers not 
only in the Czech Republic, but also in the market where the producer exports raw 
materials. However, the import of raw materials and of furniture into the Czech Republic 
must be also considered. Even if the producer is a monopolist of raw materials in the 
Czech Republic, it still does not mean that the import of furniture is not high in the Czech 
Republic. If the percentage of imported furniture was high, then the RPM or VTR would 
not have such a strong impact on the final consumers as it would if the percentage was low.  
 
However, suppose that RPM and VTR are legal. It could then be assumed that if 
everybody applies such restraints, the interbrand competition of the whole chain could be 
seriously restricted and the prices could reach monopoly prices at all levels of the vertical 
chain in the naturally competitive markets. Obviously, results of different scenarios further 
depend on game theory and the market structures. This is further discussed below and the 
complexity of vertical chains based solely on market structures and related bargaining 
power is illustrated in Table 2. 
 
3.4.2.1. Monopolies and Oligopolies 
 
If manufacturers are oligopolists or monopolists and the buyer’s market is competitive, the 
manufacturers will most likely have the bargaining power. Dobson, Waterson and Chu 
claim that in the case of monopoly, perfect competition at the retailer level can decrease a 
manufacturer’s profit. Therefore, it is profitable for the manufacturer to select only some 
retailers.100 However, this depends on the nature of the product concerned and the 
                                                 
98
 Carstensen, “Buyer Power” 287. 
99
 L. Kotsiris, “An Antitrust Case in Ancient Greek Law” (1988) 22(2) International Lawyer 451. 
100
 Dobson, Waterson, Chu, “Welfare Consequences” 21. 
Barbora Jedličková                                                                      Chapter 3: Vertical Competition and Structure 
 
 44
manufacturer’s margin, including their production, as the manufacturer could be interested 
in covering as many retailers as possible to increase the number of consumers.101  
 
• Vertical Restraints’ Strategies 
 
Vertical territorial and price restraints have the potential to lead to monopolistic prices 
and/or oligopolistic tendencies. Williamson states that vertical restraints are of a restrictive 
nature when considering transaction costs in situations where a vertical restraint enhances 
strategic purposes or oligopolistic interdependence.102 He recognises and highlights 
exclusive dealings as having the potential to restrict competition, while arguing that other 
vertical restraints can restrict competition only in exceptional circumstances.103  
 
US antitrust policy does not reflect Williamson’s arguments on exclusive dealing in the 
form of absolute territories, which in practice have the tendency to lead to artificial 
oligopolies. In contrast, US policy considers RPM to be potentially more restrictive than 
absolute territorial restraints.104  
 
The network effect, as further discussed in Chapter 6 “Theories of Pro-Competitiveness v. 
Anti-Competitiveness”, could lead to oligopolistic interdependence. Such situations occur 
when, for example, other manufacturers and/or retailers follow the retail prices of a 
“leader” using RPM. It is sufficient if RPM is used within one brand and the others follow 
the rise of the retail price of this brand. Steiner observes that others tend to follow well-
established brands. He discusses the example of Levi Strauss jeans in the US, explaining 
that the price of jeans dropped significantly and a consumer surplus in men’s jeans grew by 
approximately $203 million in the US after Levi Strauss stopped using RPM.105 
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Similarly, the elimination of RPM in the toy industry in the US in the early 1960s 
accompanied by a TV advertisement increased industry output, productivity and 
innovation and decreased retail prices.106 
 
However, this presumes that the brand using RPM must be the leading one or there must 
be another reason why others follow the leader, even if the leader has a minority market 
power. When considering game theory, this could occur because it could be more 
profitable for others to increase their prices while keeping the same output but receiving a 
higher profit per item.  
 
In general, in situations where a monopoly or oligopoly already exists, RPM and VTR will 
have restrictive tendencies. Mathewson and Winter’s analysis shows that in an imperfectly 
competitive market, where a manufacturer has some monopoly power, vertical restraints, 
even those minimally sufficient, maximise joint profit. On the other hand, in the 
competitive price system in a competitive market, vertical restraints would probably not 
lead to profit maximisation.107  
 
3.4.2.2. Monopsonies and Oligopsonies 
 
A market structure can be such that at the sellers’/manufacturers’ level, the market can be 
competitive, however, at the buyers’/distributors’ level, the market can be based on 
monopsony or oligopsony. In such situations, buyers could have the bargaining power and 
could dictate the conditions of the vertical market. 108 
 
Monopsony can have a negative impact on consumer welfare in a similar way to 
monopoly.109 However, in certain situations, it can also have positive effects. If an 
upstream market is competitive because there is no monopoly or oligopoly, however 
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buyers are oligopsonists or monopsonists and so have bargaining power, the buyers have 
the potential, if they decide to do so, to lower upstream-market/wholesale prices. This is 
typified by the relationship between large retailers and their private label producers.110 Big 
retail chains have the power to negotiate low wholesale prices and can potentially pass 
these low prices on while still making a great profit and offering their own private brands 
to consumers as they compete with small local stores. Thus, low prices are key in their 
business.111 However, this is due to interbrand competition. In the case of private labels, 
the retailer market can be relatively competitive.112  
 
Monopsonies and oligopsonies can lead to situations where suppliers are forced to sell 
their products to buyers below the competitive price because they lack market power in 
comparison to buyers. However, this is not a situation which could exist forever because 
buyers need suppliers.113 Moreover, a lowering of supply prices by powerful buyers is not 
necessarily positive for competition. Indeed, it is questionable whether the final consumers 
will benefit from this situation as buyers are driven by profit maximisation and lower 
wholesale prices would be beneficial to retailers rather than to final consumers.  
 
The courts could presume, and indeed the US Court of Appeals has presumed, that 
retailers’ pressure to decrease wholesale prices does not decrease consumer welfare. It has 
ruled that such conduct is not anti-competitive.114 Blair and Harrison criticise the court’s a 
ruling and argue that even the conduct of monopsonists or oligopsonists, which decrease 
wholesale prices, cause inefficiencies and are therefore anti-competitive.115 Although they 
pressure manufacturers to lower wholesale prices, monopsonists are interested in a higher 
profit for themselves; therefore, retail price does not necessarily decrease, but arguably 
increases because of the monopsonist’s power.116 For example, one of the oldest known 
antitrust cases in the world shows that wholesalers do the maximum to keep as high a 
profit as possible for themselves, rather than passing on the benefits to their final 
consumers.117 
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On the other hand, decreasing wholesale prices passes benefits to final consumers, as 
shown in some cases such as products in Wal-Mart supermarkets in the US. This can even 
have a positive effect on the entire state economy. For instance, Wal-Mart’s policy helped 
reduce the inflation rate in the US.118 However, as Blair and Harrison demonstrate, such 
behaviour also decreases the quantity in comparison with competitive wholesale prices, 
even when the supply curve is inelastic, and as such a reduction of the manufacturers’ 
profit has a negative impact on future supply.119 Or, as Piraino claims, such conduct can 
drive out innovation and services on the side of suppliers.120 The question is moot as to 
what would be the best balance in such scenarios; indeed, the ideal situation would be 
perfect competition at each stage of the vertical chain. 
 
• Vertical Restraints’ Strategies 
 
The likelihood of negotiating some forms of vertical restraints, such as exclusive 
territories, increases when buyers have bargaining power.121 It can be in the interest of a 
single retailer or a group of retailers to use RPM or VTR to decrease competition and/or 
restrict smaller but possibly more efficient competitors. They can have such strong 
bargaining power that they are able to “persuade” a manufacturer to enforce vertical 
restraints on the remaining retailers.122 For instance, it is in the interest of a strong retailer 
who charges higher prices than its competitors not to lose customers who are driven by 
price. It, therefore, has reason for the application of RPM and this results in efficiency loss, 
welfare decreases and the restriction of competition. 
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3.4.2.3. Bilateral Monopoly/Oligopoly 
 
The natural competitive market is positive for both consumer and total welfares. However, 
what happens if the market structure is based on a bilateral monopoly, with monopolistic 
buyer and seller powers? In such situations, both parties have a similar bargaining power; 
therefore, both parties need to find a way to maximise both of their profits. This will likely 
set prices high in a way that will be beneficial for each party but not for consumers.  
 
Another result is that, as Steiner argues, a bilateral strong market power will neutralise 
effects on the final consumers as it lowers the retail price in comparison to situations where 
a monopoly power exists at only one end of the vertical chain, depending on the pass-
through.123 However, balancing buyer power can mean that sellers will try to merge to 
obtain better bargaining (market) power, which does not necessarily lead to efficiency, but 
rather inefficiency.124  
 
An OECD study from 1998 shows that it is impossible to make exact predictions of results 
in each market on the vertical chain if there is a bilateral (multilateral) monopoly or 
oligopoly. Results depend on negotiation abilities as both parties seek the best profit for 
themselves. Therefore, their relationship will be more balanced and the profit will be not 
concentrated within one party (monopoly, oligopoly/monopsony/oligopsony). Buyer power 
will leave the produce surplus, including buyer surplus, unchanged and high or even 
increase it up to its maximum as each player seeks to gain the highest possible profit for 
itself. However, in certain cases producers can be motivated to maximise their outputs.125 
Nonetheless, this could lead to monopolistic prices and non-excluding situations where 
producers maximise their output in order to obtain the highest possible profits. 
 
Bilateral monopoly, in particular, has a strong potential to restrict the efficiencies based on 
a phenomenon known as double marginalisation.126 However, this can also arise in 
situations where only one player (players) on the vertical chain has market power but both 
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have bargaining power.127 Marginalisation can be also triple or any other “multiple” 
depending on the market power of all the players on the vertical chain, which can include 
more entities than just a buyer and a seller. Although, it would seem to be an essential 
problem if multiple marginalisation occurs, such phenomena is limited by consumer 
demand. Depending on the elasticity of the demand curve, consumers would start 
decreasing their purchasing if prices were too high. In other words, each price has its 
monopolistic peak; if players go beyond it, they start to decrease rather than increase their 
profits. 
 
• Vertical Restraints’ Strategies 
 
RPM and potentially VTR can increase manufacturers’ bargaining powers in oligopoly-
oligopsony or monopoly-oligopsony vertical markets because it prevents downstream 
players from pressuring upstream players to decrease wholesale prices.128 In the case of 
VTR, it prevents intrabrand competition and, thus, depending on the market structure, it 
most notably strengthens the buyer’s power. 
 
3.4.2.4. Bargaining Power in Other Market Structures 
 
A single entity does not have necessarily to possess a pure monopoly or monopsony power 
or be part of oligopoly or oligopsony to execute its bargaining power. As Kirkwood argues, 
a buyer has excessive bargaining power even when it is not a pure monopsonist but when it 
possesses a strong, or dominant, position in its relationship with its sellers. As discussed 
previously, this depends on several factors aside from market power. It also depends on the 
differentiation of products and their reputations, the positions of both the buyer and the 
seller and the number of the seller’s buyers.129 As Steiner observes, if a brand does not 
have loyal consumers and the market is competitive, it is easy for retailers to switch to 
different brands.130 
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• Vertical Restraints’ Strategies  
 
In general and regardless of market structure, Grimes shows (based on several cases) that 
manufacturers use RPM to more easily maintain higher wholesale prices as they guarantee 
retail margins through RPM.131 Other reasons for using RPM are that a manufacturer wants 
to maintain distributor loyalty. A dominant distributor or a dominant group of distributors 
is threatened by more efficient but smaller distributors, or the manufacturer is establishing 
a reputation for a premium, expensive brand.132 This also occurs in cases where there are 
upstream monopolies.133 
 
A manufacturer of a well-established brand does not have to use vertical restraints unless it 
is forced to do so by a retailer who has strong bargaining power, as was the case in 
Business Electronics.134 However, a smaller producer may fear even being considered by a 
large retailer and/or it needs to lobby for better shelf position. Therefore, introducing RPM 
or territorial restraints can give it some benefit in the bargaining process.135 
 
Thus, even if the retailers’ market does not create a monopsony or oligopsony and the 
manufacturer has a well-established brand, retailers can possess a certain amount of 
bargaining power and pressure the manufacturer to act in a certain way. Hovenkamp 
discusses an example of such a scenario. In the US, druggist retailers, through their 
association, pressured Pepsodent, a well-established brand of toothpaste, to return back to 
RPM, after it had stopped using it in the 1930s. They simply stopped displaying its 
products on their shelves, however, they had them in stock for loyal consumers of 
Pepsodent. That way, the retailers were not injured, but Pepsodent was. Such constraint 
was successful and Pepsodent returned to RPM.136 
 
• Strategies of Combination of Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
The existence of a combination of vertical restraints is not unusual, it seems to be more 
common in practice; however, the US courts do not usually examine all restrictions but 
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only one of them based on legal actions, in contrast with the EU cases.137 Logically, if both 
vertical restraints are used in combination, the result would be more restrictive than the 
mere existence of one of them.138 Steiner claims, and shows in two cases, that exclusive 
dealing, which could include exclusive territorial restraints although it did not, in 
combination with RPM results in “substantial anti-competitive effects” because exclusive 
dealing when applied by producers restricts interbrand competition raising each producer’s 
margin, and also RPM intrabrand competition thus increasing retailers’ margins. This 
would increase consumer prices, result in welfare losses and create entry barriers to protect 
the producer’s market power.139 Therefore, Steiner states that RPM in combination with 
exclusive dealing restricts both intra- and interbrand competition.140 A new competitor 
would have to be both a producer as well as a distributor/retailer to penetrate the market 
which is costly and technically difficult to do, even more so if such a combination of 
restraints covers an extensive geographic market.141 
 
The first market that Steiner shows with significantly restricted competition when both 
vertical restraints were used is the US contact-grill market, a “monopolistically competitive 
market” which could be explained as a competitive market with a significant number of 
retailers.142 The second market, the US light bulb market, differs from the first. In contrast 
to grills, light bulbs are short-lived, low-cost products with a rather inelastic demand curve 
(the grills market has an elastic demand curve), which are bought by customers on a daily 
basis without the importance of brand loyalty.143 Three major US producers of light bulbs 
established a collusion and used RPM and exclusive dealing. This led to the creation of a 
monopolistic power with profits on the 45.7% price/cost margin, 82% above the average of 
all manufacturing markets.144 Steiner concludes that this combination of vertical restraints 
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led to high retail prices, prices higher than those based on a monopoly-monopsony chain, a 
monopoly or monopsony competitive market chain.145 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter advocates several points. Firstly, it is the existence, importance and 
complexity of vertical competition, despite the fact that not much has been written in 
relation to it.  Secondly, bargaining power and not horizontal market power determines the 
existence of VTR or RPM. Thirdly, vertical interactions and related market structures and 
results are highly complicated and it is difficult to predict the effects of certain actions on 
competition with any real certainty. For example, a monopolist could tend to negotiate 
higher wholesale prices with powerful retailers rather than with small retailers as small 
retailers buy a smaller number of products than the powerful ones.  
 
The development and changes in distribution systems are based primarily on new 
technologies and technical progress rather than vertical restraints. The prohibition of RPM 
and VTR and changes in their approach have not led to any obvious changes in vertical 
integration. 
 
Vertical interactions among buyers and sellers are based on different market structures. If 
RPM or VTR is used in a monopolistic/oligopolistic sellers-competitive buyers’ structure, 
such conducts will restrict competition. Moreover, mainly VTR can lead to 
oligopolies/monopolies and thus restrict competition. If the market is based on a 
monopolistic/oligopolistic buyers’ market, this would lead to lower wholesale prices, 
which do not necessary result in lower retail prices; however, the opposite could be true. 
Nonetheless, retailers have both the potential and the interest to use RPM and even VTR. 
 
Although bilateral monopolies/oligopolies can result in more balanced bargaining power, 
this does not necessarily lead to competitive prices, but rather to monopolistic prices and 
other negative impacts. Nonetheless, such situations are difficult to predict as there are 
other aspects that influence bargaining power and strategies involving vertical restraints. 
This means that even two vertically related competitive markets can be based on the 
bargaining power of one group at one vertical stage and thus can restrict competition and 
efficiency. Furthermore, when there is some form of collusion, even a smaller retailer can 
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pressure a well-established manufacturer to introduce RPM and thus restrict competition. 
Finally, combination of vertical restraints leads to an even more harmful restriction of 
effective competition. 
 
When considering the vertical chain and vertical competition, it seems to be impossible to 
state with any certainty that arrangements such as RPM and VTR have definite effects on 
competition as these effects depend on several factors. Moreover, it is also impossible to 
state in advance what the effect of a specific action on the vertical chain will be. Such a 
conclusion might be highly frustrating; however, it reflects the reality. Nevertheless, it is 
important to ensure that competition law and policy maintains effective, fair and free 
competition, where each player has equal opportunity in the sense that it is free and not 
restricted by others based on, for example, an “abuse” of bargaining power and thus its 
profit fairly reflects how efficient, and not how abusive, its business is, based on the ability 
to save costs and innovate.  
 
Bargaining power on its own is not a negative but rather a natural factor which can lead to 
innovation, improvement of products and healthy competitive tensions.146 However, 
bargaining power can be abused and this has not been recognised in the US antitrust policy 
and the EU competition policy, as will be discussed in the following chapters. Abusing 
bargaining power includes pressuring a second party to agree with vertical restrictions, 
such as RPM and territorial restrictions. 
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Chapter 4: Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses US vertical price and territorial restraints from a broad perspective. It 
is based on the assumption that the law is influenced by theories, politics and the social 
environment. It explains and discusses them (primarily antitrust legislation and antitrust 
development) because these aspects influence courts’ decisions. The most significant cases 
are analysed in this chapter. Their doctrines, legal theories and development are explained, 
logically arranged and argued in the context of the facts of the cases. Current and future 
policies and their application are also discussed. 
 
4.2. The Sherman Act and the Common Law 
 
4.2.1. The Common Law Era 
 
The modern antitrust law as introduced by the Sherman Act has its roots in the common 
law,1 which stems from English law and was further developed by American law.2 Thorelli 
relates the English common law to the period extending from the Middle Ages to the 
American Revolution, and it has influenced antitrust law ever since.3 National 
independence brought a different economic approach to the common law.  
 
One of the most important eras in British history was the middle of the 18th century, the 
industrial revolution, which brought about an unrestricted freedom of contract as well as a 
freedom of trade and competition. British common law, although not specifically relating 
to competition, developed several terms used by antitrust law today: the rule of reason, the 
doctrine of conspiracy, restraint of trade and the per se rule.4 
 
Before the Sherman Act was passed, antitrust violations had been judged under the 
common law. One of the main differences was that, under the common law, cartels were 
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not considered to be illegal if all they did was increase prices and did not control the 
markets by dividing territories to avoid competition. 5 The common law did not create a 
complex system of antitrust law.6 It classified forestalling as a crime of fraud and it 
included purchasing any amount of products on the market.7 
 
The common law era was typified by small businesses where a maker did not use the 
services of independent distributors and retailers, but instead sold and distributed their 
products themselves. For instance, a shoemaker usually made shoes, repaired them and 
sold them. This form of production and distribution was concentrated on small local 
markets and was highly vertically integrated.8  
 
After the American Civil War, corporations were not allowed to purchase other 
corporations’ shares and stocks. Therefore, stock in corporations was placed into trusts. 
Several trusts, such as Standard Oil Trust, were powerful in manipulating markets by such 
actions as price fixing.9 The classic common law tolerated most vertical practices based on 
the understanding that the market could regulate competition itself. Later, in the 1870s and 
the 1880s, neoclassicism brought an awareness of the imperfections of a market that 
supported anti-competitive practices.10  
 
4.2.2. The Sherman Act Era 
 
Throughout the existence of the Sherman Act,11 the concepts of antitrust law, antitrust 
policy and economic and legal theories have undergone various changes.12 Pitofsky, 
Handler and Baker compare changes in US antitrust policy to “pendulum narrative”: there 
were active eras in the 1960s and 1970s, replaced by passive eras in the 1980s and a 
moderate era in the 1990s. Two extreme periods helped to create the “golden middle 
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way”.13 However, as shown in the analysis below and explained by Kovacic, this 
comparison does not reflect the real historical development of antitrust policy precisely and 
it simplifies some historical and current issues.14 
 
4.2.2.1. The Purpose of the Sherman Act 
 
The Sherman Act passed in 1890. Bork explains the existence of the Sherman Act 
according to the theory of allocative efficiency and the theory of distributive justice;15 
however, there are a few historical facts that indicate that these theories do not reflect the 
reasons for the Act’s existence.16 Firstly, besides passing the Sherman Act, Congress also 
passed the McKinley Tariff, one of the largest and most anti-consumer tariffs in history of 
the United States of America. As Hovenkamp claims, most economists were opposed to 
the passing of the Sherman Act at the time because they believed that large firms ensured 
lower prices and higher output. The decade before the Sherman Act was a period of 
declining prices, therefore Congress was not concerned about consumers paying high 
prices; however, the declining prices resulted in rapid economic growth. Congress could 
have used the Sherman Act as a tool for maintaining this economic growth caused by the 
competitive lower prices. It is also important to highlight that the Sherman Act was passed 
before the theory of allocative efficiency was developed.17 Therefore, even if Congress had 
considered the impact of low prices on consumers and economy, the theory of allocative 
efficiency was not the reason for passing the Sherman Act. 
 
The most accurate reason for the existence of the Sherman Act could be that Congress 
wanted to protect small businesses and thus tried to weaken the power of some strong 
combinations and monopolists, such as railway and oil companies. Those companies 
obtained their monopolistic power due to conditions throughout and after the Civil War.18  
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The Sherman Act, as an antitrust act, discouraged horizontal mergers and shortened 
monopolists’ power.19 During the discussion of the Sherman Act in Congress, associations 
of independent and small businesses were among the most effective lobbying organisations 
as their existence was threatened by large vertically integrated competitors. Moreover, 
Senator Sherman could have acted on behalf of independent oil producers, which 
competed with the Standard Oil Company. Companies with strong market and political 
power brokered fear and their existence went against the American ideology which 
proposes that anybody can enter and compete in the US market. Therefore, the market 
should be free to create competition.20 Finally, the term “antitrust law” itself indicates that 
the reason for the existence of the Sherman Act was to protect small businesses. 
 
4.2.2.2. First Application of the Sherman Act 
 
The purpose of the Sherman Act was to “federalise” and make the common law more 
effective by creating a statute with jurisdiction over more than one state, as stated by 
Senator Sherman and confirmed in the case of Addyston Pipe.21 The statute should have 
been used as a tool against (anti) trusts; however, it started as a process of protecting 
competition. 
 
The agreements addressed under Section 1 of the Sherman Act were unenforceable under 
the common law. The Sherman Act prohibited them so that the aggrieved party could 
obtain damages or injunctions. The obvious element of novelty was that collusions 
restricting trade and monopolisation were declared to be public offences under the 
Sherman Act. However, the courts were partially influenced by the common law when 
applying the Sherman Act. They referenced the common law in their decisions using 
language not used in legislation, such as “the per se rule” and “the rule of reason”. 
Nevertheless, the Sherman Act changed courts’ judgements and standards of justification. 
This is obvious even in the first Sherman Act cases, in particular the oldest cases of Trans-
                                                 
19
 D. Besanko. … [et al.], Economics of Strategy (fourth edition, (John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken 2007) 176-
178. 
20
 Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 51-52; Hylton, Antitrust Law, 37-38; Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust 
Policy, 164-234; Stocking, Watkins, Monopoly and Free Enterprise, 80. 
21
 Senator John Sherman, 20 Congressional Record, year 1889, 1167; United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel 
Co., 85 Fed. 271, at 278-291 (6th Cir. 1898), affirmed 175 U.S. 211, 20 S.Ct. 96 (1899) (“Addyston Pipe”); 
also see Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 52; Goyder, Neale, The Antitrust Laws, 17; Thorelli, The 
Federal Antitrust Policy, 9. 
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Missouri22 and Joint Traffic23, where the court rejected the common law standard of 
reasonableness.  
 
4.2.2.3. The Content of the Sherman Act 
 
The Sherman Act make unlawful multilateral as well as unilateral restrictions (including 
vertical restrictions). Section 1 prohibits only multilateral actions, which could have three 
different forms: “every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy.” However, the courts have simplified these forms. Terms such as 
“combination” and “conspiracy” have not been individually defined by the US courts; 
however, all terms commune with each other and the broad definition of the term 
“agreement” can be used for all.24 An agreement is illegal if it restrains trade or commerce 
as stated in the Sherman Act, however, this restraint must be unreasonable to be illegal, as 
specified in Trans-Missouri.25 
 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act included unilateral as well as multilateral conducts. 
Unilateral conduct must have a form of monopolisation or be an attempt to monopolise 
under Section 2. Case law specified that only harmful monopolisation was illegal.26 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act also prohibited multilateral conduct in the form of “every 
person who … combine or conspire with any other person or persons …;” this included all 
forms of multilateral conduct specified in Section 1.27 Generally, Section 2 prohibited the 
process of monopolisation (not a situation) if illegal, as is obvious from language in the 
Sherman Act (“monopolization or attempt to monopolize”) and from relevant case law.28  
 
Violating Section 2 by using vertical practices is rare but not impossible.29 A person can 
become a monopolist or use its monopolistic power unreasonably by restraining 
                                                 
22
 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S.290 (1897) (“Trans-Missouri”). 
23
 United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U.S. 505 (1898). 
24
 Compare: Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); Addyston Pipe; Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 
246 U.S. 231 (1918); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); Maple 
Flooring Mfrs Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 
(1972); National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Arizona v. 
Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
25
 Trans-Missouri. 
26
 Since the case of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (“Standard Oil”). 
27
 American Bar Association, Antitrust Law Development, Volume I, Fifth Edition (ABA Book Publishing, 
Chicago 2002), 308 – 313. 
28
 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 
148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945). 
29
 H. Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution (Harvard University Press, London, 
2005), 183. 
Barbora Jedličková            Chapter 4: Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
 59
competition at the vertical level though its distributors. In particular, monopolists can use 
vertical collusions to set high or predatory prices or create boundaries for other competitors 
willing to join the market. The distributors have little choice but to cooperate with the 
monopolist if they wish to stay in the market. However, Section 1 also included collusions 
between distributors and a manufacturer having a monopoly in the market. The question is 
whether these examples should be judged under Section 2 or Section 1, as an “agreement”, 
considering that one party was pressured by another. In reality, both Sections have applied 
in these cases. 30 It depends on private parties and their actions in private litigations as to 
which Section will apply in a particular case. 
 
4.3. Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints throughout the Sherman Act Era 
 
4.3.1. Early Period: Dr. Miles Doctrine 
 
4.3.1.1. Background 
 
Throughout the first period of the existence of the Sherman Act, antitrust law started to 
hold an important position in US society. The era between passing the Sherman Act and 
the end of the World War I was crucial for forming the first rules and interpretations of the 
Sherman Act. The courts referred to common law in early cases of the Sherman Act.31 
However, the Sherman Act began the development of a different legal field, as discussed 
previously. Even though the roots of the rule of reason were set in common law,32 the 
existence of the Sherman Act developed and changed the application of the rule of reason 
to accommodate new antitrust law.33  
 
The Supreme Court stated that the Sherman Act condemned not all restraints but only 
unreasonable restraints of trade.34 In the case of Addyston Pipe, the Court explained that 
the term “reasonable” did not mean whether the prices in the market were reasonable but 
whether the practices, such as setting the prices, were reasonable.35 In the case of Chicago 
                                                 
30
 Compare: Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990), Section 1; United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001), Section 2. 
31
 E.g. United States v. Addyston Pipe; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926); Cline v. 
Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927). 
32
 Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P.Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711): This was part of contract law. 
33
 See Standard Oil, at. 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S., 
106, 31 S.Ct. 632 (1911). 
34
 Standard Oil, at 3-4. 
35
 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), at 235-236. 
Barbora Jedličková            Chapter 4: Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
 60
Board of Trade, 36 the Court stated that the restriction concerned had to have an 
appreciable effect on the market and had to restrict competition to be unreasonable. 
 
Antitrust law and its policy were at the centre of attention throughout the presidential 
election in 1912 when the major political parties promised stronger and stricter antitrust 
law.37 The majority of politicians disagreed with the Court’s ruling that the Sherman Act 
prohibits only unreasonable restraints38 and that the Sherman Act did not include tying 
arrangements.39 Indeed, Congress approved two acts in this respect. First, the Clayton Act 
(1914), focusing on unfair competition and prohibiting anti-competitive forms of tying, 
exclusive dealing (§3) and price restraints (§2) as price discrimination and other unfair 
methods of competition. These restraints were illegal also at the vertical level. For 
example, if a manufacturer discriminated against distributors in price without legal 
justification, this would be illegal under §2. The second act, the FTC Act (1914),40 
established the Federal Trade Commission with the authority to enforce antitrust law. The 
FTC Act protects not only competition, but also consumers, against unfair practices. 
 
The beginning of the 20th century and the year 1911 were important milestones for the 
existence of vertical restraints case law. Firstly, merging, including vertical integration, 
was seen as suspicious and was consequently considered to be unwanted and illegal.41 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act was used to attack vertical integrations.42 This trend 
continued in later periods and was reflected in Section 7 of the Clayton Act (1914).43 
Secondly, the Sherman Act was in existence for roughly 20 years before the first doctrine 
and first case dealing with RPM was discussed by the Supreme Court. Although the courts 
had already been applying both the rule of reason and the per se rule, the Supreme Court 
decided to apply a stricter approach, the per se rule, to RPM cases.44 This was a logical 
outcome considering the antitrust policy of the time.  
 
                                                 
36
 Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
37
 H. Hovenkamp, H.A. Shelanski, E.T. Sullivan, Antitrust Law, Policy and Procedure: Cases, Materials, 
Problems 6th edn. (LexisNexis, 2009), 669. 
38
 Standard Oil. 
39
 Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 32 S.Ct. 364 (1912). 
40
 Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58, as amended), most notably, Section 5. 
41
 Hovenkamp, “Vertical Integration”, 879-880. 
42
 See Standard Oil. 
43
 Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 (Pub.L. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730, enacted October 14, 1914, codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 12-27, 29 U.S.C. § 52-53); see United States v.Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United 
States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). 
44
 See below the discussion on Dr Miles Medical Company v. John D. Park & Sons Company, 220 U.S. 373 
(1911) (“Dr Miles”). 
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4.3.1.2. The First RPM Doctrine 
 
A) Dr. Miles45 
 
The Dr Miles Medical Company sold medicines that were protected by trade secret, 
distinctive packages and labels and trademarks.46 The company fixied minimum prices for 
both wholesale and retail prices, with the set minimum prices part of agreements signed 
between the Dr Miles Medical Company and over 400 US wholesalers and 25,000 US 
retailers.47 
 
According to the Court, the agreements violated both the Sherman Act and the common 
law.48 The Court stated that vertical agreements fixing prices and thus restricting 
competition were against the public interest, were illegal and were without reasonable 
justification.49 While it was not directly expressed that this kind of restriction was illegal 
per se, this is obvious from the court’s ruling.  
 
Areeda and Hovenkamp criticise the court for not analysing the intentions of the 
manufacturer to fix retail prices as such an analysis could have led to the reasonableness of 
the restriction.50 Peritz claims that the court, when applying the Sherman Act, based its 
hypothesis on common law doctrines by attempting to find a balance between competition 
and property rights, favouring free competition.51 However, it can be argued that the Dr. 
Miles doctrine is based on several legal theories: 
 
1) IP Rights as Entitlement to Vertical Restraints 
 
The Supreme Court differentiated statutory IP rights, such as patents and copyrights, from 
other rights including trade secrets. It stated that trade secrets protected the process of 
manufacturing and, therefore, did not entitle the holder to have the intrabrand monopolist’s 
rights over its products and to freely restrict competition including RPM.52  
 
                                                 
45
 Dr Miles Medical Company v. John D. Park & Sons Company, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
46
 Ibid., at 374. 
47
 Ibid., at 374, 381. 
48
 Ibid. at 409. 
49
 Ibid., at 408. 
50
 P.E. Areeda, H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, 
Volume VIII, Second Edition (Aspen Publishers, Frederick, 2004), 215. 
51
 R.J. Peritz, “A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine” (1988-1989) 40 Hastings L. J. 516-529. 
52
 Dr Miles, at 400-403. 
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Firstly, the Court asked whether there was any difference between the products produced 
by a manufacturer with trade secret and without.53 The Court stated that the patents were 
granted statutorily; it recognised that an owner of the patent could use the benefit of the 
market control that arises from exclusive manufacturing with the aim to promote 
invention.54 However, this case was not based on a statutory grant and, therefore, could not 
benefit from the same privileges as the case of patents.55 
 
Secondly, the Court stated that the trade secret allowed the owner to sell licenses. It was 
also a subject of confidential communication and concerned the process of manufacturing. 
However, the minimum prices were fixed for the products not for the manufacturing 
process and the process was not communicated to the wholesalers, retailers and consumers. 
Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the trade secret entitled the manufacturer to control 
sales through minimum price setting. The purpose of the trade secret in this case was to 
restrict others from producing the product as the process of production was secret.56 
 
2) The Theory of Ownership and Freedom 
 
The Supreme Court ruled that the manufacturer lost its ownership rights when it sold its 
products to distributors and to retailers, and was therefore not entitled to determine resale 
prices and other sales conditions; only the owners of the products were entitled to do so. In 
this case, the distributors and retailers were free to do whatever they wanted to with the 
products they owned.57 The owners of the product must be free to determine its business 
and to compete. 58 
 
The Supreme Court confirmed that the previous doctrine established by the common law 
that had regulated contracts restricting trade was “substantially modified” by the Sherman 
Act. The Supreme Court recognised public interest as the most important goal, as it is in 
the interests of both individuals and the public that every person is free and not restricted in 
their own business.59 
 
                                                 
53
 Dr Miles, at 400-401; the Court cited a case on patents: Bement v. National Harrow Company, 186 U.S. 
70, pp. 92, 93. 
54
 Dr Miles, at 401-402. 
55
 Ibid. at 402. 
56
 Ibid., at 402-403. 
57
 Ibid., at 404-405. 
58
 Ibid., at 406. 
59
 Ibid., at 406. 
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Mr Justice Holmes dissenting opinion overturned the theory of freedom. He argued that it 
was the manufacturer who should have been free to determine the retail prices of the 
products it manufactured as this was part of the manufacturer’s business.60 He explained 
that the company had tried to set profitable, and for consumers affordable, prices, which 
were therefore fair prices. If the price was not affordable for the consumers, they would 
choose different products.61 This idea was partially reflected in the later case of Colgate.62 
 
Firstly, it could be argued that free competition should determine the retail prices and not 
the manufacturer. Secondly, if the theory of ownership is applied then, in this case, the 
owners of the products were the retailers and the wholesalers, and so they should have 
been free to determine the prices and not the manufacturer. It can be argued that the 
distributors and the retailers know their customers and consumers and should hence be free 
to make their own business decisions and determine the best and fairest prices for them. 
The manufacturer already does this when setting the wholesale prices. Under Justice 
Holmes’ scope, the agreements concerned would clearly violate retailers’ and wholesalers’ 
business freedom, which includes the freedom to set their own prices. 
 
One could reasonably argue that the distributors and retailers concerned made their 
business decisions on prices when agreeing with the manufacturer’s price policy. 
Therefore, the case involved collusion, but the ownership theory could not apply as 
justification for the per se rule. It was the agreement itself that restricted trade. The 
affiliated problem was the language used by the Supreme Court, which created the 
assumption that the manufacturer itself restricted competition by fixing minimum retail 
prices. However, Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires multilateral conduct, which 
existed in this case. 
 
3) Intrabrand monopolists 
 
The Supreme Court did not differentiate between intrabrand and interbrand competition 
and different forms of competition. It ruled that the entire retailer’s competition was 
completely foreclosed because the manufacturer controlled the prices of all sales by 
reaching restrictive agreements.63 It cited Park & Sons,64 where the Court of Appeals 
                                                 
60
 Ibid., at 412. 
61
 Ibid., at 412. 
62
 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
63
 Dr Miles, at 394, 399. 
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explained that the kind of practice that set minimum prices and did not allow retailers to 
sell to other retailers had destroyed all of the retailers’ competition. 65 
 
Areeda and Hovenkamp assume that the Court believed that dealers pressured the 
manufacturer. They further explain that the manufacturer’s intention to fix RPM would 
almost always be pro-competitive.66 However, wording used by the Court suggests that the 
Court assumed that the manufacturer had initiated the price fixing and the Court did not 
differentiate between the foreclosure of intrabrand and interbrand competition. 
 
Shores argues that the illegality of Dr. Miles is based on two values: economic values, 
which are the foreclosure of competition; and social or political values, which protect the 
freedom of dealers. He also claims that the objective of the Sherman Act is to protect 
economic values and not any others.67 Although the purpose of the Sherman Act is the 
protection of economic values, the theory of ownership does not purely reflect political or 
social values but rather sets boundaries between the rights and responsibilities of different 
parties at the vertical level and, thus, it assists the understanding of those who bear the 
responsibility for antitrust conduct.68 
 
B) Park & Sons69 
 
The case of Park & Sons introduced the theory of free riding in RPM. Similar to the case 
of Dr. Miles, the Court of Appeals examined the common law exemption and the 
ownership rules in its decision from 1907. As in Dr. Miles, the manufacturer controlled 
sales and resales of medicine through their distribution system. This distribution system 
maintained minimum prices for wholesalers and retailers and controlled the sales of 
proprietary medicines, initially for patented products or products protected by copyrights. 
This later included all products protected by trade secrets.70 The Court described this as an 
absolute elimination of competition.71 Similar to Dr. Miles, the Court of Appeals did not 
consider interbrand competition or other forms of competition. It also used wording in its 
                                                                                                                                                    
64
 153 Fed. Rep. 24. 
65
 Dr Miles, at 399; John D. Park & Sons Company v. Samuel B. Hartman, 153 Fed. Rep. 24 (Sixth Circuit, 
1907), at. 42. 
66
 Areeda, Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, 213-217. 
67
 D.F. Shores, “Vertical Price-Fixing and the Contract Conundrum: Beyond Monsanto” (1985) 54 Ford. L. 
Rev. 386. 
68
 See Chapter 6 “Theories of Pro-Competitiveness v. Anti-Competitiveness”. 
69
  Park & Sons, 153 Fed. Rep. 24 (Sixth Circuit 1907). 
70
 Ibid., at 26, 41-42. 
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 Ibid., at 42. 
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decision that the manufacturer had restricted competition and not multilateral conduct of 
the manufacturer and its distributors. 
 
 1) Common Law 
 
The ruling on the common law of the Court of Appeals is comparable to the ruling of the 
Supreme Court delivered in Dr. Miles. The Court of Appeals explained that trade secret 
owners were not free to create “exclusive monopolies”. Therefore, they are prohibited from 
controlling trade, in the form of fixing prices for example, because the existence of the 
trade secret is only based on the fact that the process is secret.72 The common law rule 
explains that once a product is sold, the buyer is free to do with it whatever it wants; 
patents and copyrights, however, are exempt from this rule.73 The patent statute gives an 
advantage only to the patentee in the form of an “exclusive monopoly”. If the owner of the 
secret process cannot bring the process under the protection of the patent statute, based on 
the complete publication of the invention, it also cannot claim the advantages from this 
statute.74 Therefore, the trade secret does not have any impact on, and cannot be used as a 
justification for, restrictions on trade. 
 
 2) Restriction and Free Riding Theory  
 
Considering the fact that there was not a decision on RPM by the Supreme Court in 1907, 
the Court of Appeals de facto applied the rule of reason to analyse whether this restraint 
was reasonable.75 The Court quoted Addyston Pipe and stated that the restriction could be 
ancillary to the purpose of protecting the secret process and its business. It further analysed 
the necessity of this restraint asking “whether the restraint was necessary to the retained 
business and therefore ancillary to the principal purpose of the agreement”.76 It concluded 
that the system of contracts had restrained trade and, therefore, the complainant had to 
prove that this was necessary for the protection of his business. However, the complainant 
failed to justify this restriction.77 
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 Ibid., at 39. 
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Barbora Jedličková            Chapter 4: Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
 66
Surprisingly, in 1907, the Court itself, not the complainant, expressed the possibility of 
using such a restraint to avoid price-cutting, in other words to protect the business and 
businesses of its retailers against free riding. This justification occurred for the first time. 
Nevertheless, this was not proved in this case.78 However, as the Supreme Court applied 
the per se rule in Dr. Miles, the free riding theory was not used as justification for RPM for 
a century. 
 
Generally, “competition is desirable” and partial restriction of competition can only be 
allowed under reasonable and necessary circumstances. Such restriction must only be 
ancillary to require protection. However, the restraint is not ancillary if the only purpose of 
the contract is the restriction of competition, as it was in this case.79 The question is moot 
as to whether the Court would have found this restriction ancillary if the complainant had 
introduced the free riding justification as mentioned by the Court itself.  
 
4.3.2. New Deal Era: Controversial Era 
 
4.3.2.1. Background 
 
In the 1920s and 1930s, antitrust-theory and policy debates were full of contrast over 
whether to believe in the freedom of the market or stricter antitrust enforcement. The 
beginning of this period was significant for free market policy, as illustrated in the new 
Colgate doctrine. However, in later years and until the end of World War II, the ideology 
that advocated primarily the protection of small businesses became state policy.80 This 
stricter approach was reflected in the case of Bausch & Lomb,81 where the court was 
suspicious of exclusive dealing. It established a quasi per se rule, as in the case of Standard 
Oil.82 This rule was less strict than the per se rule with regards to tying as the courts 
believed that tying was more restrictive than exclusive dealing.83 
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 Ibid., at 45. 
79
 Ibid., at 45. 
80
 Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 51, 57-58; E.Hawley, “Herbert Hoover and the Sherman Act, 1921-
1933: an Early Phase of a Continuing Issue” (1989) 74 Iowa L. Rev. 1067. 
81
 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944). 
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 Standard Oil Co. of California v United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). 
83
 Gellhorn, Kovacic, Calkins, Antitrust Law and Economics, 394-395; see Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. 
United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 398 (1947). 
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The per se rule was also applied in cases of buyer power. Mandeville Island Farms v. 
American Crystal Sugar84 is one of the oldest cases where buyer power played a major 
role. The refiners, who were buying sugar beets from growers, were shown to have fixed 
prices and such a horizontal buyers’ cartel was found to be illegal per se, although the 
directly injured party was the sellers.85 
 
Throughout the New Deal era, the main economic ideology and antitrust policy focused on 
government regulation which began to regulate several industries, creating various degrees 
of antitrust immunity. The economic ideology of the early New Deal supposed that 
antitrust policy existed to avoid the problems of unregulated markets. This was reflected in 
the antitrust policy in strict vertical practices and mergers after 1935. By that time, 
economic theories had already changed,86 for instance, Ronald Coase fully developed the 
marginalist theory of firm organisation and structure. He explained the reasoning behind 
vertical integration and vertical interactions among companies and argued that it was 
cheaper for companies to be vertically integrated.87 However, marginalism’s boom began 
in earnest several decades later.88 
 
Antitrust legislation reflecting policy included some contradictions. In 1936, the Robinson 
Patman Act amended Section 2 of the Clayton Act, which forbade various forms of price 
discrimination. The Robinson Patman Act became a far more complex statute. It was 
passed to protect small firms against unfair, price discriminative competition from 
vertically integrated, multi-location chain stores which, Congress believed, could dominate 
markets through predation and other forms of economic advantages.89  
 
On the contrary to the strict approach, the situation and the view on RPM temporarily 
changed when the Miller-Tydings Act permitted states to authorise resale maintenance 
agreements. This was passed only one year after the Robinson Patman Act90 in 1937 and 
the exception was broadened in the McGuire Act91 in 1952. The Act allowed states to 
create laws which would permit manufacturers to enforce RPM as unilateral conducts or 
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even in an agreement with dealers. The acts and their authorisations were withdrawn by the 
Consumer Goods Pricing Act92 in 1975. 
 
4.3.2.2. The Colgate Doctrine 
 
The approach to RPM of the Supreme Court was amended just eight years after ruling of 
Dr. Miles. The Supreme Court started to change its view before the 1920s and decided to 
follow the ideology of the free market. 
 
A) Colgate:93 The Reversed Theory of Ownership and Unilateral Conduct 
 
Colgate & Company was a US manufacturer producing soup and toiletries. It sold its 
products through distributors and wholesalers in the US.94 The defendant circulated letters, 
telegrams and other lists to dealers requiring uniform prices stating that sales would be 
cancelled to those who did not follow its policy. The manufacturer put dealers who did not 
follow the policy on a suspended list and business with them was terminated. Furthermore, 
the manufacturer requested assurances and promises from its dealers to follow the price 
policy, many of which were given. In cases where the promise was not given, the 
manufacturer refused to sell. Sales were unrestricted to all dealers who complied with the 
new price policy and gave their assurances.95 
 
The Supreme Court based its decision primarily on the control and the disposal of 
property.96 It explained that the retailer was free to do whatever it wanted after it had 
bought the product. However, it was also aware that the manufacturer could refuse to sell 
its products if they did not respect the manufacturer’s price policy. Therefore, the Supreme 
Court found this conduct unilateral, contrary to the Dr. Miles doctrine, which involved 
agreements between the manufacturer and its dealers.97  
 
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court changed its view on the freedom to 
make business decisions relating to ownership rights, because it stated that the 
manufacturer could set retail prices before it chose its retailers and could terminate 
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distribution on this basis. Rretail prices would normally be in the scope of retailers under 
the Dr. Miles doctrine. Shores claims that the Court completely changed one of the pillars 
established in Dr. Miles with regards to upholding the manufacturer’s freedom to trade. 
Moreover, the Court did not discuss another important aspect of Dr. Miles: the economic 
impact on trade, the key element of the Sherman Act.98 
 
The Court stated that except for creating and/or maintaining a monopoly, the Sherman Act 
did not restrict the rights of a person, in this case the manufacturer, freely to choose its 
business partners, in other words, with whom it would deal. This also included the 
announcement of conditions under which the manufacturer will sell. The Court cited the 
case of United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association,99 where the Supreme Court 
confirmed that traders were free to sell to whomever they wished.100 
 
However, it could be argued that, firstly, the law should balance the rights of both parties, 
the rights of manufacturers and the rights of distributors, and not give preference to 
anyone, particularly if preference means that competition is restricted. Secondly, the 
boundary between multilateral and unilateral conduct is not clear in this case as the prices 
could not have been maintained if the retailers did not agree and/or comply with the price 
policy. Dealers had to promise to follow the prices; therefore, RPM was based on 
multilateral conduct not on unilateral actions. The District Court found this conduct illegal 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act claiming that the defendant together with the dealers 
did not conclude an agreement but instead engaged in a combination with wholesalers and 
retailers to maintain fixed prices.101 Additionally, Gellhorn, Kovacic and Calkins argue that 
there was collusion between the manufacturer and hits dealers.102 
 
B) Frey & Son103 
 
Two years after Colgate, the courts fully applied the Colgate doctrine on price fixing in the 
case of Frey & Son, stating that issuing letters by a manufacturer from time-to-time urging 
its distributors to apply its fixed prices constituted unilateral conduct.104  
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C) General Electric 105 
 
In the case of General Electric, the Court, without changing the per se rule, found an 
agreement for fixing prices at the vertical level legal because the manufacturer was an 
owner of patents and the distributors were genuine agents which justified the existence of 
price restrictions under the theory of ownership. 
 
D) Bausch & Lomb106 
 
Bausch & Lomb had dealings with Soft-Lite’s distribution system, an exclusive distributor 
of pink tinted lenses.107 Soft-Lite bought the non-patented lenses from the producer Bausch 
& Lomb and sold them on to wholesalers (who sold to retailers) under its trade name 
“Soft-Lite”. Soft-Lite’s long-running integrated distribution plan contained a provision, 
among others, that wholesalers would provide the retailers with optical glasses as well and 
that retailers provided sales promotions to customers.108 
 
Soft-Lite published a list of prices for wholesalers and retailers where it indicated the 
prices wholesalers should charge retailers.109 Soft-Lite dealt only with wholesalers who 
were willing to follow Soft-Lite’s distribution policy, including their price policy. They 
were free to distribute to competitors of Soft-Lite but Soft-Lite lenses could only be 
distributed to retailers who were holders of licenses from Soft-Lite. If a wholesaler had 
delivered to a retailer without the licence, Soft-Lite would have excluded the wholesaler 
from its distribution.110 
 
In 1940, after the Miller-Tydings Act introduced an exception for states to legalise 
minimum price fixing between manufacturers and distributors, Soft-Lite concluded its 
price maintaining contracts in those states. The District Court called these contracts “a 
patch upon an illegal system of distribution of which they have become an integral part”.111 
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1) The Theory of Complex Restriction 
 
Among other restrictions, the Court discussed RPM in this case.112 The Supreme Court 
explained that each illegal practice in this case had to be considered in context and as part 
of the Soft-Lite distribution system.113 Therefore, different aspects were recognised as 
parts of one illegal conduct and not as different, separate restrictions. 
 
2) Changing the Colgate Doctrine 
 
The Supreme Court also applied Colgate, however, it can be surmised that this case made 
the boundaries of the Colgate doctrine unclear. The appellant based its claim on unilateral 
refusals to deal and cited Colgate. The Supreme Court replied that although this case did 
not include written agreements, it went beyond the Colgate doctrine saying that Soft-Lite 
illegally conspired with at least some wholesalers.114  
 
Analysing Bausch & Lomb in comparison with the two previous cases of Colgate and Frey 
& Son, it is difficult to determine when an action is unilateral and when it is multilateral if 
there was no written agreement between the manufacturer and its distributors fixing prices. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court stated that it was usually the seller who made others 
comply.115 The same language was used in the aforementioned older cases on RPM. This 
language assumes the existence and imposing of the seller’s power and a lack of free will 
on the part of the participants. 
 
3) Luxury Products – Justification 
 
For the first time, the Supreme Court simply claimed that choosing its customers was 
essential for Soft-Lite due to the luxurious nature of its products and its aim to achieve “the 
highest standard of service”, however, the Court did not classify this as sufficient 
justification for vertical restrictions.116  
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One could argue that services were not the basis for the selection, but price was. Moreover, 
such policy based on RPM created a luxurious character artificially. It was not the 
customers who would recognise high quality, nor was it the customers who would group 
this product among luxury products. Is this competition at its most effective? Certainly, the 
artificially-created luxury products keep prices high and outputs low without further 
justification.  
 
4.3.3. Strict Era: the 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s 
 
4.3.3.1. Background 
 
After World War II, the importance of efficiency and economic theories increased.117 
There were obvious influences from the Harvard School theory, which was based on the 
empirical studies of American industries,118 and the Chicago School theory, which 
established its own theory as a reaction to the Harvard School. The school introduced a 
revolutionary approach to antitrust theory, which was theoretical rather than empirical, in 
the 1950s. It determined economic efficiency as the antitrust goal based on a free market. 
The Chicago School believed that inefficiency occurred only randomly in the market, 
arguing that monopolists had no interest in facilitating a monopoly or in narrowing access 
in vertically related markets and, thus, vertical restraints were usually efficient.119 
 
However, the antitrust policy of that period was very different from the Chicago School. 
Throughout the era of Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the most important 
antitrust policy issue was the protection of small businesses and their “right” to compete 
with larger companies. This was the main objective of antitrust law of that time. The Court 
was also suspicious of innovation and IP law and reviewed a high number of petitions.120 
The Celler-Kefauver amendment, which passed in the 1950s, confirmed that market 
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imperfections had become a priority, which increased the strictness of antitrust policy 
suppressing innovation.121 
 
Inevitably, this had an impact on vertical restraints. American agencies became stricter 
when dealing with RPM and they also started to pay attention to vertical non-price 
restraints and mergers. Vertical integration was recognised as being usually restrictive in 
vertical cases.122 In 1975, the Consumer Goods Pricing Act emulated the Dr. Miles 
doctrine and repealed the Miller-Tydings Act and the McGuire Act. In the 1960s and 
1970s, the DOJ, the FTC and the courts were active in declaring illegal a wide range of 
business conduct with an emphasis on vertical distribution practices.123  
 
Although, the per se rule was winning over the rule of reason in vertical restraints,124 the 
Supreme Court stated in the case of Arnold Schwinn125 that exclusive distributorships were 
legal as long as the product concerned competed with other products.126 Further cases from 
this era established some boundaries of legality for exclusive dealerships.  Exclusive 
distributorships were subject to challenge when the territory was unreasonably broad,127 if 
their duration was unreasonably long,128 if the distributor concerned also had exclusive 
distributorships with other suppliers129 and if either the distributor or the supplier had a 
dominant market position.130 
 
4.3.3.2. Price Fixing: Changes in the Colgate Doctrine 
 
A) Parke, Davis:131 Colgate Doctrine v. Dr. Miles Doctrine 
 
This case dealt with an allegation against the appellee, the Parke, Davis Company that they 
and their retail and wholesale druggists illegally conspired and violated Section 1 (and 
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Section 3) of the Sherman Act by maintaining prices of around 600 different Parke, Davis 
pharmaceutical products marketed nationally through wholesalers and retailers.132 
 
Retailers and wholesalers were informed that they would lose their supply from Parke, 
Davis if they did not maintain the suggested minimum retail prices. Furthermore, 
wholesalers were prohibited from selling to retailers who did not follow the suggested 
minimum retail prices.133 Each wholesaler and retailer was interviewed individually by 
Parke, Davis and was informed that every other wholesaler and retailer had been told the 
same. Some retailers refused to assure the company that they would comply with the 
suggested resale prices and continued selling below these prices. These retailers lost their 
supply from Parke, Davis and wholesalers refused to supply to them also.134 
 
Following this, Parke, Davis again interviewed retailers individually. One of the retailers 
announced that it was willing to stop advertising but would not necessarily keep selling 
under the suggested minimum prices. Other retailers followed suit saying they would cease 
advertising; their supplies were not cancelled. After a month, one retailer started to 
advertise again and others followed.135  
 
The District Court followed the Colgate doctrine stating that the Sherman Act was not 
violated because the actions concerned appeared to be unilateral.136 However, the Supreme 
Court argued that the basic difference between the case of Colgate and the case of Dr. 
Miles is that Dr. Miles was based on written contracts between distributors and the 
manufacturer, whereas Colgate did not involve an agreement, it merely protected the 
manufacturer’s right to deal with whomever they chose.137 
 
The Supreme Court pointed out that the cases of Bausch & Lomb and Beech-Nut138 had 
narrowed and clarified the Colgate doctrine. Both cases explained that the Colgate doctrine 
included a simple refusal to sell to the distributors who did not resell at the prices 
suggested by the manufacturer. The Sherman Act includes not only agreements but also 
any other combination, such as when a manufacturer goes beyond the refusal to sell.139 The 
                                                 
132
 Ibid., at 30-32. 
133
 Ibid., at 33. 
134
 Ibid., at 33-34. 
135
 Ibid., at 35-36. 
136
 Ibid., at 36. 
137
 Ibid., at 38-39. 
138
 Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, at 455. 
139
 Parke, Davis, at 43. 
Barbora Jedličková            Chapter 4: Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
 75
most important aspect is the actions of the parties and not the language, phrases and words 
used.140 
 
The Supreme Court explained that Parke, Davis exceeded the Colgate doctrine and 
fulfilled conditions set in the cases of Bausch & Lomb and Beech-Nut, as Parke, Davis had 
not only announced retail prices and stopped supplying to retailers who were not willing to 
follow the price policy, but it had cooperated with wholesalers to avoid the possibility that 
retailers would buy from them directly and sell below the price.141 Moreover, it was willing 
to make exceptions for larger retailers.142 Parke, Davis not only announced a refusal to 
deal, it also discussed the subject with Dart Drug and other retailers. Parke, Davis required 
and offered assurances of compliance, and without this, it would not have been able to 
change its policy.143 
 
Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Whittaker, jointly dissenting, 
argued that the Supreme Court de facto overruled Colgate.144 Additionally, in Colgate, the 
distributors were made to promise the manufacturer that they would follow its price policy. 
This case, and the cases of Bausch & Lomb and Beech-Nut, narrowed the boundaries in 
that anything more than a pure announcement of price policy and its observation went 
beyond the Colgate doctrine. 
 
B) Simpson v. Union Oil:145 Dr. Miles’s Theory of Ownership 
 
The Union Oil Company sold gasoline. It signed one-year agreements with retailers 
requiring lessees of retail outlets and that the ownership of gasoline remained with Union 
Oil until it was sold to consumers. Retailers were responsible for all personal and property 
insurance. An agreement fixed the price of gasoline, however Simpson, one of the retailers, 
sold gasoline below the fixed price. Union Oil then refused to renew their lease with 
Simpson.146 
 
In this case, the Supreme Court confirmed Dr Miles’ theory of ownership. It found the 
agreements illegal, claiming that independent dealers should have been free to make their 
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own decisions on prices.147 This means that the Supreme Court shifted its focus from the 
manufacturer’s freedom to make business decisions, established in the Colgate doctrine, 
back to the dealers’ freedom. 
 
4.3.3.3. Maximum Price Fixing 
 
Before vertical maximum price fixing was challenged in the Supreme Court, the case of 
Kiefer-Stewart148 discussed horizontal maximum price fixing. Although the Court of 
Appeals found this kind of conduct legal and beneficial for competition applying the rule 
of reason,149 the Supreme Court ruled that horizontal maximum price fixing restricted 
competition and was illegal because agreements to fix maximum prices “cripple[d] the 
freedom of traders and thereby restrain[ed] their ability to sell in accordance with their own 
judgment”.150 Sixteen years after the horizontal case, the Supreme Court discussed vertical 
maximum price fixing in the case of Albrecht151 stating that maximum price fixing was 
illegal per se. 
 
A) Albrecht 
 
The respondent in this case was a publisher of the morning newspaper, the Globe-
Democrat, distributed by independent carriers. Each carrier had its own exclusive territory 
under the condition that the carrier would not exceed the suggested price. The respondent 
printed the suggested maximum retail price in its newspapers.152  
 
The petitioner increased the price above the maximum level in 1961. The respondent then 
sent a letter to the petitioner stating that it would deliver the newspaper for customers who 
did not want to pay the overcharged price. It also warned the petitioner that it would 
terminate their contract if they did not stop selling for the overcharged price.153 
 
The respondent offered the lower price and direct delivery to customers over the phone 
through a company, Milne Circulation Sales, Inc. Roughly 300 out of the 1200 petitioner’s 
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customers switched to the direct delivery from the publisher. Following this, the 
respondent granted its 300 customers to another carrier, George Kroner.154 
 
1) The Dr Miles Doctrine v. the Colgate Doctrine 
 
The District Court applied the Dr. Miles doctrine, in which it found a violation of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act based on a combination to fix resale prices between the respondent and 
the plaintiff’s customers and/or Milne Circulation Sales, Inc. and/or George Kroner and 
stated that this conduct was per se illegal.155 On the contrary, the Court of Appeals applied 
the Colgate doctrine and ruled that there was no violation of the Sherman Act as, firstly, 
this was unilateral conduct and, secondly, maximum price fixing did not establish a 
restraint of trade. Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed, rightly, that the maximum 
prices were established in exclusive territories.156  
 
However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals. It argued that there was 
a combination because the respondent had gone beyond the “mere announcement of his 
policy and the simple refusal to deal…” as quoted in Parke, Davis & Co.157 as the 
petitioner was pressured by the respondent and by Milne and Kroner.158 
 
Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting disagreed with the existence of a combination with Milne 
and Kroner as they had had no special interest in the respondent’s reason for setting a 
maximum price.159 He said that there had to be some power generated in the combination, 
simply hiring companies such as advertisers by telephone or delivery companies is not a 
combination under the Sherman Act. These are jobs that the respondent could do itself.160 
One could argue that distribution could also be done by the manufacturer; however, the 
main difference is that advertising is the advertising companies’ only business and they do 
not, therefore, compete with the distributor and have no interest to drive the distributor out. 
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2) Complex Restriction - Exclusive Territories 
 
Unfortunately, exclusive territories were not part of the petition and hence they were not 
discussed before the jury at the lower court.161 The Supreme Court expressed that if 
exclusive territories had been part of the petition and these exclusive territories had had a 
negative impact on the public, then the Court of Appeals would have had to find the entire 
scheme, including both the exclusive territories and the maximum prices, illegal under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.162 The Supreme Court obviously followed the theory of 
complex restriction discussed in Bausch & Lomb. 
 
3) Intrabrand Monopoly 
 
Mr. Justice Stewart dissented. He partly applied the traditional ideology of intrabrand 
monopolies obvious in the oldest cases such as Dr. Miles. He stated that the respondent 
had only protected consumers from being charged monopolistic prices and the exclusive 
territories were granted only if the maximum price was not exceeded and this was agreed 
by the distributors.163 However, the respondent was not a monopolist as such. Even though 
it was the only daily morning newspaper in that municipality, it is likely that it was 
competing with other newspapers and thus did not want to risk a decrease in output and a 
subsequent profit loss. 
 
Mr. Justice Stewart argued that both cases, Kiefer-Stewart Co. and Parke, Davis, could not 
apply here because they did not include monopoly products distributed through exclusive 
territories. Due to the fact that the reseller was a monopolist in its territory, the protection 
of the retailer’s free judgement as an objective did not apply here.164 The respondent 
cannot be liable under antitrust law for not allowing its distributor to hold a complete 
monopoly. Therefore, Mr. Justice Stewart concluded: “The Court today stands the 
Sherman Act on its head”.165 
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4) Restriction – Effect on Competition 
 
The Supreme Court ruled that maximum price fixing restricted competition. Even though 
maximum and minimum price fixing can have different impacts on trade, maximum price 
fixing restricts competition for several reasons. It restricts the ability of buyers to compete 
and, if the price is set too low, the dealer does not have the ability to furnish services for 
customers or to compete at all.166 There was no other explanation for the illegality of 
maximum price fixing.  
 
One could argue that, firstly, if there are no dealers able to compete, the manufacturer 
would have to increase the maximum price. If only some are not able to compete, this can 
simply mean that the others are not as effective as dealers who are able to compete. 
Secondly, it is a paradox that by applying the per se rule in RPM, the Supreme Court 
refused the service-theory justification and by applying the per se rule in maximum price 
fixing, the Court agreed with this theory. Moreover, the manufacturers can always pay 
extra for services while setting maximum prices. 
 
Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting highlighted some additional economic considerations. He 
claimed that minimum and maximum price fixings differed.167 He said that RPM had its 
effect in “higher prices, less efficient use of resources and an easier life for resellers”.168 It 
lessens intrabrand competition without any importance of its form, whether distributors 
horizontally agree among themselves on this practice or it is vertically dictated by a 
manufacturer.169 He continued his argument explaining that these actions including RPM 
presented as vertical unilateral policy created combinations because they were in the 
interest of distributors and not that of manufacturers. The per se rule is the correct 
approach as there is no acceptance of the proffered justification as price floors are fixed in 
such cases.170 
 
However, this is economically different to vertically imposed price ceilings.171 Minimum 
price fixing is in the interest of distributors as they “may treat the product better if they 
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have a secure high margin of profits”; however, the maximum price setting is in the 
manufacturer’s interest in avoiding anti-competitive actions of their distributors.172 
 
The mere statement of the Court that both practices “cripple the freedom of traders” to sell 
under their own judgment does not justify the application of the per se rule. Even if one of 
the objectives of the Sherman Act is to protect freedom and multiplicity of traders, this 
itself does not justify the application of the per se rule.173 The price ceilings have a 
justification in the prevention of distributors charging monopoly prices and receiving 
monopoly profits in situations where the manufacturer assumes that there is insufficient 
competition. Therefore, this practice sets prices closer to prices which would arise from 
intense competition and does not lessen competition unless both parties miscalculate the 
maximum price.174 
 
4.3.3.4. Territorial Restrictions 
 
In 1963, territorial restraints were addressed by the Supreme Court for the first time in 
White Motor.175 The strict approach is not necessarily obvious at first sight here. However, 
in this case, the Supreme Court protected a small company that was in compliance with the 
antitrust policy of that era. It stated that it did not have a good knowledge of this kind of 
restraint from previous cases, therefore, it did not declare it per se illegal but it did not 
confirm that the rule of reason should apply to VTR either. 176 A few years later, territorial 
restraints were declared to be per se illegal in Schwinn;177 however, conducts were 
unilateral and legal if territorial restraints were part of franchising systems.178 
  
A) White Motor179 
 
In this case, the appellant, White Motor Co., was a manufacturer of trucks and spare parts 
for trucks. It sold its products to distributors, dealers and directly to large users. 
Distributors then sold the products to users and dealers selected by the appellant.180 
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The appellant instituted agreements with its distributors and dealers limiting exclusive 
territories and persons or classes of persons for each distributor and dealers.181 The 
consumer clause restrained distributors and dealers from selling to public entities. 
Therefore, the only company who could sell trucks and White Motor’s spare parts directly 
to the public entities was the manufacturer.182 Moreover, distributors agreed to charge the 
same price to dealers as the appellant charged when selling its products directly to dealers. 
This type of agreement constituted 5% of White Motor Co. sales.183 
 
1) Complex Restriction - Price Fixing without an Appreciable Effect on Sales 
 
As the percentage of price fixing was low, the Supreme Court refused to apply the case of 
Bausch & Lomb.184 The Supreme Court stated that price fixing and other restraints did not 
create “an integral part of the whole distribution system” as found in the case of Bausch & 
Lomb.185 However, it confirmed that the per se rule applied in this case of price fixing.186 
One could argue that this contradicts the ruling in Bausch & Lomb. Even if this on its own 
involved only a small percentage of sales of the manufacturer’s products, it was a restraint 
and should thus be considered. Indeed, the issue here is the unwillingness of the Supreme 
Court to set a precedent on exclusive territorial restraints and to protect a small producer. 
 
2) Effect and Interest 
 
Although the Supreme Court refused to state whether the rule of reason or the per se rule 
should apply to territorial restraints, it said that “a vertical arrangement by one 
manufacturer [was] restricting the territory of his distributors or dealers”.187 The point is 
moot as to just how illegal this conduct was under Section 1 of the Sherman Act when the 
Court expressly stated that the manufacturer itself, not in conduct with others, had arranged 
this territorial restriction. 
 
Mr Justice Brennan agreed with the Court that there was not enough knowledge about this 
issue; however, he added his opinion because of the novelty of this case.188 He observed 
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that, unlike in a franchising system, the agreement was a disadvantage for distributors and 
dealers and therefore the agreements served the manufacturer’s interests exclusively.189 
 
He compared territorial restraints to RPM stating that the intrabrand effect could be the 
same in territorial restrictions. However, this was not necessarily true of the interbrand 
effect as RPM restricts interbrand and intrabrand competition.190 He did not explain why 
he believed so; he only highlighted the appellant’s general claim that its restriction fostered 
interbrand competition.191 
 
3) The Protection of Small and/or New Entities 
 
The appellant argued that the restrictions in question were “fair, reasonable and necessary” 
to compete against large competitors; its distribution system was the only method they had 
to effectively compete.192 The Supreme Court did not deny that such a practice was a 
practicable means of a small company to compete with aggressive competitors.193  
 
Mr Justice Brennan also argued that such a restriction could allow the manufacturer to 
penetrate a market if the manufacturer was a small company, or if it started with a “risky” 
product, or in order to ensure that its products were promoted and/or serviced.194 He 
claimed that these justifications distinguished VTR from horizontal territorial restraints and 
from RPM.195 However, as discussed in Chapter 6 “Theories of Pro-Competitiveness v. 
Anti-Competitiveness”, RPM can have the same benefits. 
 
4) The Principle of Proportionality 
 
Mr Justice Brennan further stated that a mere justification of conduct was not enough, it 
had to be proved that the restriction concerned was necessary or proportionate. Therefore, 
a comparison must be made between the restrictive anti-competitive effects, including any 
possible disadvantages, which distributors must bear and the benefits arising from the 
restriction. Moreover, the Court must also consider whether there are no other means (e.g. 
                                                 
189
 Ibid., at 267. 
190
 Ibid., at 268. 
191
 Ibid., at 268. 
192
 Ibid., at 256-257. 
193
 Ibid., at 263. 
194
 Ibid., at 269. 
195
 Ibid., at 270. 
Barbora Jedličková            Chapter 4: Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
 83
franchising systems) that are less anti-competitive and would introduce the same benefits 
as the restriction.196  
 
B) Schwinn197 
 
The complaint was based on three restrictions of competition which were held to violate 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act: 
1. Conspiracy involving price fixing; 
2. Conspiracy involving allocation of exclusive territories; and 
3. Confinement of merchandise to franchised dealers.198 
The government’s appeal concerned only the last restriction, the distribution limitations 
(not price fixing), which included territorial restraints in a franchising system.199 
 
In contrast with White Motor, Schwinn was not a newcomer but a well-established 
manufacturer.200 Schwinn produced bicycles and spare parts for bicycles. Schwinn 
introduced the aforementioned restrictive conducts in 1952. In 1951, it was the largest 
manufacturer of bicycles in the US with a market share of 22.5%. Its market share 
decreased to 12.8% in 1961 and the largest bicycle company became Murray Ohio 
Manufacturing Company, which increased its market share from 11.6% in 1951 to 22.8% 
in 1961. However, Schwinn’s production increased throughout these ten years, despite its 
reduced market share.201  
 
One of Schwinn’s methods of sale included sales to retailers under the “Schwinn Plan”. 
The Plan covered more than half of Schwinn’s distribution, around 75% in 1962. It was 
based on a form of franchising which did not prevent the franchisees from selling other 
brands but required the promotion of Schwinn products and purchasing only from a 
distributor authorised to sell in that exclusive territory. The distributors with exclusive 
territories were authorised to sell only to the franchisees and not to other dealers.202 
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1) Complex Restriction  
 
In contrast to White Motor, the Supreme Court considered territorial and price restrictions 
as part of one illegal conduct following the theory established in Bausch & Lomb. It stated 
that there was no need to examine the reasonableness and the competitive effect in this 
case when VTR was “ancillary to the price-fixing”203 or if it was “an integral part of the 
whole distribution system” with price-fixing.204 
 
2) Theory of Ownership and Franchising Systems 
 
The government argued that once distributors purchased goods from the manufacturer, 
they could not be territorially restricted in their sales because the distributors owned the 
goods.205 The Supreme Court agreed with the government’s argument. The Court stated 
that the distributors should have been free to decide who they would deal with.206 
 
However, the Supreme Court further explained that this case included unilateral conduct 
on the part of the manufacturer, based on the franchising and allocation of territories.207 
The Court claimed that under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the outcome was different 
regarding whether the manufacturer completely retained ownership and the risk of loss or 
not.208 
 
The District Court ruled that territorial restrictions were per se illegal if used once the 
products were sold to distributors. This also applies to the restrictions of outlets. Both 
situations are unreasonable under the Sherman Act.209 The Supreme Court confirmed this, 
however it also argued that the per se rule did not apply in territorial vertical restrictions in 
franchising systems in cases where the manufacturer remained the owner of the 
products.210  
 
Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. Mr. Justice Stewart argued that the 
Court did not follow the rule of reason when judging distribution through sales to 
                                                 
203
 Ibid., at 375-376. 
204
 Schwinn, at 375-376; (Baush & Lomb, 321 U.S. at 720). 
205
 Schwinn, at 377. 
206
 Ibid., at 378. 
207
 Ibid., at 378. 
208
 Ibid., at 378-379. 
209
 Ibid., at 379. 
210
 Ibid., at 379-380; 382. 
Barbora Jedličková            Chapter 4: Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
 85
wholesalers. The Court found this per se illegal, even though the government asked the 
Court to judge this under the rule of reason.211 Thus, it overruled the 4-year old case of 
White Motor without providing any new data supporting this change.212 However, the per 
se rule applied only to some territorial restraint situations and did not apply to franchising 
systems, as later confirmed by lower courts.213 
 
Changing the ownership approach based on franchised and non-franchised products, 
particularly when the term “franchising” may not even be completely correct as the dealers 
also distributed other products, is rather demagogic and in contrary to the objective of the 
law of vertical restraints as discussed in Chapter 2 “Objective of the Law of Vertical 
Territorial and Price Restraints”, and the theory of ownership itself. In fact, this was a 
selective system rather than a franchising one. 
 
3) Effective Distribution 
 
Mr. Justice Stewart claimed that, according to studies, Schwinn’s previous distribution 
system had been ineffective and had restricted the promotion of Schwinn’s products. For 
that reason, Schwinn created a new qualitative, “active and stable” distribution system 
which included maintaining services and promotions.214 Schwinn chose its distributors 
based on qualitative requirements, hence, distribution was provided by small companies. 
By choosing small companies, Swchinn was able to compete with giant chain distributors 
and even though profits decreased, sales increased.215 Mr. Justice Stewart believed that a 
franchising system was a way for smaller companies to compete effectively and efficiently 
with larger, integrated companies.216 
 
Williamson argues that Schwinn’s system was effective in the sense that it assisted the 
manufacturer firstly to target its consumers, provide them with information and services 
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and simplify the way consumers located Schwinn’s bicycles. Secondly, it resulted in a 
saving on transaction costs.217  
 
However, it could be argued that it is not obvious which system this situation is compared 
with when claiming that transaction costs were saved. It is not obvious why price 
restrictions were necessary and whether territorial restriction had to be absolute to achieve 
such aims, as described by Williamson. It is also arguable whether small retail shops made 
the search for Schwinn’s bicycles easy, because customers still had to locate the shops that 
sold Schwinn’s bicycles and locating small retail shops can be more complicated than 
locating larger, specialised stores. Moreover, if Schwinn aimed its policy at customers 
interested in quality bicycles, as explained by Williamson, it is questionable whether small 
retail shops were the best option for such customers as they have a restricted choice with 
which to compare Schwinn’s bicycles. Finally, it could be assumed from the dramatic drop 
in Schwinn’s market share after introducing its new policy, that its system was not the 
most efficient one or the one with the lowest transaction costs. It cannot be claimed that 
such a decrease in market share was caused by the entrance of foreign low-cost bicycles 
into the market given that Murray Ohio Manufacturing Company was a US company. 
Nonetheless, the last part of Williamson’s arguments, which conclude that interbrand 
competition was not restricted,218 is presumably correct.  
 
4.3.4. Free Era: the 1970s and the 1980s 
 
4.3.4.1. Background 
 
Throughout the period of the 1970s and 1980s, and mainly throughout Reagan’s 
administration, antitrust policy began to focus more on the economic aspects of 
competition and became inspired by the Chicago School theory, which argued that vertical 
restraints enhanced competition and consumer welfare.219 Hovenkamp recognises this 
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period as “the antitrust counterrevolution”, concentrating on consumer welfare and 
economic understanding of competition as a process that should maintain low prices, high 
output and innovation.220 However, this was still insufficient. Fox argues that even in this 
time the importance of economic efficiency and proper economic studies were still missing 
in antitrust cases.221  
 
By the late 1970s, the courts started to narrow the wide range of illegal business conducts. 
This continued into the 1980s when antitrust cases including VTR and RPM decreased.222 
The DOJ and the FTC did not deal with RPM cases in the 1980s.223 From being strict and 
very active, the antitrust policy reached a point where the competition system was in 
danger because antitrust policy had become passive in its enforcement. The area of illegal 
vertical restraints was also narrowed.224 In 1982, the FTC started to take a more tolerant 
approach to exclusive dealing.225 This freedom and the tolerant approach were new in 
antitrust policy compared to previous periods and their concentration on small firms.  
 
The free approach is also obvious in the case of Balmoral Cinema,226 which deals with 
buyer power, where the buyers agreed not to engage in competitive bidding for films. The 
Court applied the rule of reason and ruled that buyers had not decreased consumer welfare 
and, thus, trade had not been restricted. Blair and Harrison disagree with the Court and 
argue that consumer welfare was reduced.227 Nevertheless, in comparison with American 
Crystal Sugar from 1948, where the Supreme Court applied the per se rule on fixing 
wholesale prices by buyers, the Court obviously applied a rather more relaxed approach to 
the conduct caused by buyers’ power when it did not find any violation of antitrust law. 
 
In general, the approach to vertical restraints was still unsettled. In 1985, the DOJ issued 
Vertical Restraints Guidelines (“Guidelines 1985”),228 which were withdrawn by the 
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Assistant Attorney General Anne Bingaman in 1993.229 Guidelines 1985 distinguished 
between non-price and per se illegal price vertical restraints. They pointed out that any 
vertical restraint could have an impact on price but that was not a reason for the application 
of the per se rule.230 Initially, its existence only minimally influenced private cases as there 
were only two opinions that cited the Guidelines 1985 throughout the first 2 years of its 
existence.231 In 1985, Congress stated that the Guidelines 1985 should not be treated as an 
“accurate expression of the Federal antitrust laws or of congressional intent with regard to 
the application of such laws to resale price maintenance and other vertical restraints of 
trade”.232 Moreover, Assistant Attorney General William Baxter believed in the free 
market and, thus, favoured overruling the Dr. Miles’ per se rule.233 
 
The approach in private litigation differed. In Sylvania in 1977,234 territorial restraints were 
declared to be judged under the rule of reason and not under the per se rule. Several cases 
followed Sylvania in the 1980s in which the Supreme Court confirmed the rule of 
reason.235 The Supreme Court’s view on RPM at the vertical level also changed. 
Distribution was considered an important tool for manufacturers, and for the RPM aspect 
of strategies, to enhance interbrand competition. Furthermore, although the cases on RPM 
were ruled under the per se rule, there were obvious tendencies to limit this scope in cases 
in the 1980s.236 Business Electronics stressed interbrand competition as the aim of 
competition at the vertical level. Chevrolet237 and Caymen238 explained that the per se rule 
of RPM applied only to retail prices and not to prices at different vertical levels, such as 
wholesale prices. The courts stated that mere suggestion of retail prices without an 
obligation to maintain them did not create RPM agreements and were legal.239 These 
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changes in the approach to vertical restraints were based mainly on the Chicago School’s 
doctrine.240 Nevertheless, the inconsistency and overly formalistic decisions without 
reasons to differentiate price and non-price restrictions in vertical restraints case law were 
criticised by Liebler and Peritz.241 
 
4.3.4.2. RPM – Further Limitation of the Per Se Rule 
 
A) Monsanto:242 Existence of an Agreement 
 
The Supreme Court specified that in the case of RPM, the respondent had to provide direct 
or circumstantial evidence which would exclude the possibility of independent acting by 
the manufacturer and non-terminated distributors.243 The evidence presented must show 
activities towards collusion on both parties.244 The Court argued that even the disclosure of 
an intention to set retail prices and marketing strategy did not prove the existence of 
collusion, and that exchanging this kind of information was legitimate.245 Therefore, an 
assumption based on indirect evidence was not enough to prove the existence of collusion. 
An exchange of information, including information on prices, arises in the normal course 
of business and this includes the coordination of activities between a manufacturer and its 
distributors with the aim to be efficient.246 
 
In Monsanto, the Court found sufficient direct evidence of the existence of an agreement 
between Monsanto and its distributors based on: 
1. Monsanto’s threats against Spray-Rite to terminate the contract if it did not raise 
prices;  
2. Threatening actions against other price cutters shortly after the plaintiff’s 
termination, followed by maintaining prices by distributors;  
3. Evidence of discussions between Monsanto and Spray-Rite on maintaining prices;  
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4. A newsletter for distributors published prior to the termination of Spray-Rite urging 
distributors to follow Monsanto’s policy.247  
 
The Court also confirmed that there was evidence that the termination was part of 
collusion.248 
 
B) Business Electronics:249 RPM or Non-Price Restraint?  
 
The Supreme Court went further in Business Electronic than in Monsanto, mainly because 
it stated that any collusion between a distributor and a manufacturer to terminate an 
agreement with a price cutter was not per se illegal unless there was an agreement on 
RPM.250 
 
The respondent, the Sharp Electronics Corporation, manufactured electronic calculators. 
The petitioner, Business Electronics, became the exclusive retailer of Sharp Electronics 
calculators in the Houston Area in Texas in 1968. The respondent appointed another 
retailer, Gilbert Hartwell, in the same territory in 1972.251 
 
The respondent published a list of suggested retail prices but there was no evidence that the 
retailers were obliged to follow these prices. The petitioner’s prices were often below the 
suggested prices and, generally, its prices were lower than Hartwell’s prices, which were 
only seldom below the suggested minimum prices. Hartwell complained to the respondent 
about the petitioner’s prices several times giving the respondent an ultimatum in June 1973 
claiming that they would terminate the contract unless the respondent finished dealing with 
the petitioner within 30 days. The respondent terminated the contract with the petitioner in 
July 1973. Although the Court raised a question as to whether the respondent had been free 
riding on Hartwell’s educational and promotional services, it did not examine it further.252 
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 1) Limits of Application of the Per Se Rule 
 
The Supreme Court set the boundaries for the application of the per se rule. It argued that 
certain categories of agreements were illegal per se because they were “manifestly anti-
competitive” and tended to “always or almost always restrict competition and decrease 
output”.253 The restriction concerned must have an obvious, demonstrable economic 
impact on trade to apply the per se rule.254  
 
Interestingly, the Court highlighted that the per se rule was not justified in this case 
because the simple cancellation of distribution to a “price cutter” based on an agreement 
between the manufacturer and its second distributor without the existence of an agreement 
on price or minimum price setting did not demonstrate a restriction of competition or a 
reduction of output.255 One could argue that the conduct in question served the purpose of 
maintaining the prices and therefore it cannot be stated that this was a non-price restriction. 
Moreover, the Court confirmed the existence of an agreement between the manufacturer 
and its distributor who agreed to terminate its dealings with the price cutter. Indeed, the 
only reason for the termination was that the price cutter did not maintain the suggested 
prices. 
 
Justices Stevens and White disagreed with the Majority on the Supreme Court that this 
practice was a non-price vertical restraint. Rather, they claimed that it should have been 
considered as a non-price horizontal restraint, where one or more distributors boycotted a 
manufacturer.256 Such situations are also described by Steiner, who claims that it is 
common practice and that such situations result from a significant bargaining power on the 
part of the retailers.257 He also argues that the market data indicates that Business 
Electronics Corp. had lower prices not because it was free riding but because it was more 
efficient than Hartwell. However, Hartwell possessed significant bargaining power and, 
therefore, Sharp decided to comply with Hartwell’s demand to keep a higher profit from 
the Hartwell purchase.258 It can be concluded that the Court agreed with foreclosing 
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competition for the more efficient competitor, which is contrary to the objective of 
effective competition. 
 
 2) Vertical Price v. Vertical Non-Price Restrictions 
 
The Supreme Court believed that there was “a significant distinction” between non-price 
and price vertical restrictions in that the price restrictions tended to reduce interbrand price 
competition because they “facilitate[d] cartelizing”.259 With regards to non-price vertical 
restraints, the Supreme Court, citing GTE Sylvania and Monsanto, took the approach that a 
presumption in favour of a rule-of-reason standard always existed.260 Therefore, the Court 
required a demonstration of the existence of “economic effect, such as the facilitation of 
cartelizing.”261  
 
Unfortunately, the Court did not base its claim and distinction on any economic or market 
study. Thus, it is difficult to agree that vertical price restraints usually facilitate cartels and 
that non-price restraints normally do not and, indeed, that this statement should constitute a 
distinction between non-price and price vertical restraints for the application of two 
different rules: the per se rule and the rule of reason. Finally, it is difficult to agree that this 
practice was not a vertical price restriction. 
 
Justice Stevens recognised that the agreement to stop dealings with the petitioner 
eliminated price competition.262 This supports the petitioner’s theory that the agreement 
had the same effect as a price-fixing agreement.263 Indeed, the manufacturer and the 
second distributor boycotted the first distributors with the purpose of eliminating price-
cutting. When entities multilaterally maintain and pursue set prices and stop dealing with 
entities that do not follow the set prices this is, in fact, the core aspect of RPM. 
 
 3) Justification: Providing Services and Free Riding 
 
The Supreme Court assumed that the manufacturer’s reasons for termination were to 
ensure the provision of adequate services.264 Non-price vertical restraints can lead to higher 
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prices but have the aim of ensuring services and stopping free riders. This can be seen as 
the true motivation for its application.265 However, based on the existence of exclusive 
territories, this motivation can be difficult to prove because it is possible the manufacturer 
simply dislikes cutting prices.266 
 
Justice Stevens said that eliminating price competition did not absolutely assure the 
increase of service competition and, therefore, “a better marketplace for consumers.”267 
However, there was the certainty of the elimination of price competition. This was just a 
theoretical possibility of not even providing increased services. Thus, Justice Stevens did 
not see the service justification as effective justification.268 Simply, this practice had its 
sole object in the restriction of trade, thus it was not a pro-competitive vertical non-price 
restraint.269 The purpose of this practice was to “eliminate price competition at Hartwell’s 
level” and, thus, it was naked restraint.270 Moreover, the Court of Appeal clarified this 
conduct when Hartwell followed the suggested prices and pressured the manufacturer to 
terminate the contract with the second distributors because the cutting of prices was seen as 
evidence of the existence of an agreement.271 
 
The lower courts had been following the Supreme Court rulings and applied the limits set 
in Monsanto and Business Electronics, which narrowed the per se rule for decades.272 The 
approach was changed in the case of Leegin in 2007, discussed below. 
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4.3.4.3. Territorial Restraints 
 
A) Sylvania273 
 
The respondent, GTE Sylvania Inc., a manufacturer of television sets, adopted a new 
franchise plan in 1962 selling directly to its smaller franchised retailers and granting each 
retailer one non-exclusive territory. Sylvania hoped that this new distribution system would 
increase its market share.274 The new franchise plan was a success with Sylvania’s market 
share increasing approximately 5% between 1962 and 1965. At the time, the company was 
the eighth largest manufacturer of colour television sets in the US.275 
 
In 1965, Sylvania decided to franchise Young Brothers, an established television retailer in 
San Francisco, as an additional retailer because Sylvania was not satisfied with the existing 
retailers’ sales in that geographical market. The proposed location for Young Brothers was 
approximately one mile from a retail outlet operated by the petitioner, Continental T.V., 
Inc., which was a successful Sylvania franchisee. Continental did not agree with the 
location for the new retailer claiming that it was against Sylvania’s marketing policy, to 
which Sylvania disagreed. Continental then replaced a large order of Sylvania’s products 
with televisions from Phillips.276 At the same time, Continental was negotiating with 
Sylvania for the opening of a new store in Sacramento in California. Sylvania refused and 
terminated Continental’s franchises.277 
 
Among other complaints, Continental claimed that Sylvania had violated Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act by entering into franchise agreements, including territorial restraints.278 
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1) Ownership 
 
In contrast with Schwinn, where the Supreme Court stated that Schwinn was the owner of 
its products, in this case the Court ruled that Sylvania had passed the ownership of its 
products to Continental.279 Thus, under Schwinn, the Court should apply the per se rule 
unless this case fell outside the Schwinn doctrine.280 Furthermore, the Court’s language 
brought some confusion as it used the term “franchising” in this case and it was the 
franchising system that was exempt from the per se rule under Schwinn. Indeed, the Court 
did not clarify the meaning of the term “a franchising system” in both cases and it is 
arguable whether Sylvania’s system was a genuine franchising system. 
 
2) Intrabrand v. Interbrand Competition 
 
The Court observed that the restraint in question could reduce intrabrand competition and 
simultaneously stimulate interbrand competition.281 The Court recognised that intrabrand 
competition had been reduced because the number of sellers had been limited by and 
within VTR.282 This observation of the difference between intrabrand and interbrand 
competition was not discussed in Schwinn.283 In contrast to Schwinn, Sylvania held a small 
market share and its products were competing with a number of substitutive TV sets. 
Therefore, at the interbrand level, consumers were able to switch to other products easily. 
Moreover, the practice potentially promoted interbrand competition because of the small 
market share and the existence of other competitors in the competitive market.284  
 
Steiner disagrees with the Court’s arguments and explains that the restriction of intrabrand 
competition did not increase interbrand competition in this case but competition in general 
was restricted.285 Furthermore, it is questionable whether being the eighth biggest 
manufacturer of colour TV sets in the US in the 1960s creates “a small market share”. 
Nonetheless, this must be determined from the market shares of other competitors in the 
relevant market. 
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3) Justification: Providing Services, Penetrating the Market 
 
The Supreme Court listed several benefits of VTR. Firstly, the manufacturer who wishes to 
penetrate the market can use VTR to motivate retailers to sell its products and to cover 
investments. Secondly, established manufacturers can use VTR to facilitate promotion 
and/or services which influence the competitiveness of its products and eliminate free 
riders.286 
 
The Court therefore reasoned that there was no justification for the distinction between 
“sale and non-sale transactions” as introduced in Schwinn.287 The Court overruled Schwinn 
explaining that the per se rule was not justified as VTR also had pro-competitive effects, 
thus returning to the rule of reason.288  
 
Marvel, Baxter, Peritz, Gellhorn, Kovacic and Calkins believe that the effect on 
competition of both RPM and VTR is similar with an even higher probability of anti-
competitiveness than RPM and, thus, they argue that the distinction highlighted in Sylvania 
is unreasonable.289 Moreover, the Court did not explain specifically what is and what is not 
a price and/or a non-price restraint. Such differentiation was essential for making the right 
choice of the rule that the courts should have applied, for instance, exclusive territories will 
probably affect prices.290 Therefore, is this a price or a non-price restraint? This distinction 
is confusing for US courts even today, as will be discussed below.291 
 
Finally, Sylvania did not clarify how the rule of reason should apply to VTR. In the 1980s, 
after Sylvania, the courts confirmed the application of the rule of reason in cases dealing 
with territorial restraints.292 Judge Posner argued that use of the rule of reason in vertical 
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restraints was wrong and unfeasible;293 reality confirms this. Since that period, territorial 
restraints have all but disappeared, not just in public but also in private litigations. There 
are two reasons for this. Firstly, the test of the rule of reason is set in VTR in the way that 
it presumes that these restraints increase efficiency and should thus be legal.294 Secondly, 
the rule of reason litigation, including burden of proof, is too expensive and complicated 
for private parties, mainly small companies, to sue and win the case. 
  
B) First Beverages295 
 
The appellants, First Beverages and Will Norton, claimed that Royal Crown Cola, a 
producer of soft drinks, had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act because it had vertically 
imposed exclusive territories.296 Exclusive territories became typical practice for all major 
soft drinks producers after the application of the rule of reason in Sylvania.297  
 
In this case, the Supreme Court confirmed the absolute application of the rule of reason in 
VTR.298 The appellants had taken their claim to the District Court before the Supreme 
Court overruled the per se rule in Sylvania, therefore it is difficult to determine what kind 
of claim and supporting evidence they would have introduced if they had known that the 
case would have been judged under the rule of reason. In the appeal, they tried to persuade 
the Supreme Court that their case should be viewed under the per se rule and not under the 
rule of reason; if decided under the rule of reason, the appellant required a new trial. Both 
claims were refused by the Supreme Court.299 
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C) Business Cards Tomorrow300 
 
1) Test for Exclusive Territories 
 
The Court of Appeals set the test for the determination of a violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act based on vertical exclusive territories. This test consisted of three elements, 
which includes the importance of intention as well as the actual restriction:  
1. The existence of an agreement; 
2. Intention to harm or restrict competition; 
3. Actual restriction or injury of competition that had an impact upon competition in a 
relevant market.301 
 
The plaintiff argued that the exclusive territories had caused some prices to be artificially 
high.302 The Court did not find this allegation sufficient to prove that this franchising 
system affected the competitiveness of the entire wholesale thermography market. The 
court was of the opinion that it only showed that the franchising system was in Business-
Cards-Tomorrow and his franchisees’ economic interests. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not 
prove the cause of an anti-competitive effect.303 It could be deemed necessary that, 
generally, this practice increased prices and prices would be lower without such practice, 
and for this reason the practice violated antitrust law. Moreover, it should not be a 
legitimate argument if, for instance, a monopolist claims that it is in its interest to charge 
monopolistic prices. 
 
2) Importance of Interbrand Competition 
 
Analysing the restrictive effect, the Court of Appeals stated that the effect on intrabrand 
competition was irrelevant. The plaintiffs themselves agreed that interbrand competition 
was intense and faced substantial competition with low barriers to entry in the local 
wholesale thermography market. Thus, there was no significant restriction on 
competition.304 However, as argued above, it is difficult to prove that the conduct in 
question influenced competitors’ prices, particularly in private litigation, because it can be 
complicated, costly and maybe even impossible to ask for information from other 
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competitors who are not part of the litigation so as to compare and evaluate the necessary 
and relevant data. 
 
4.3.5. The Rule of Reason Era: the 1990s and New Millennium 
 
4.3.5.1. Background 
 
Throughout the Clinton and most notably Bush presidencies, antitrust policy and its 
possible changes were not considered top priorities and presidential elections did not 
highlight antitrust policy on their list of discussion points.305 Baker explains that this 
decline in political interest in antitrust policy was caused by creating a balance between 
consumers’ and producers’ interests throughout the development of antitrust law.306 
Clinton’s newly appointed officials were inspired by “Post-Chicago” economic concepts 
and began to increase their investigation and improve their antitrust enforcement by 
adopting the leniency policy, for example.307  
 
The recent situation of antitrust law and policy could be considered more soundly-based. 
Nevertheless, the law of vertical restraints has remained unsettled and the rules have 
continued to change.308 The 1980s were the last decade when VTR reached the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals. Rather, both the DOJ and the FTC have been dealing with 
“more serious” restraints than VTR. Furthermore, in the case of Consulting,309 the Court of 
Appeals stated that exclusive distributorships were “presumptively legal”; however, the 
presumption of legality of VTR is based on a lack of studies in this matter.310 
  
The FTC and the DOJ began to be more active in RPM cases. In 1991, the FTC and the 
DOJ brought their first RPM cases after a decade.311 In 1995, the DOJ issued new 
Guidelines explaining the meaning of resale price maintenance as any vertical collusion 
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when independent entities “agree to fix, raise, lower, maintain or stabilize the price at 
which goods or services will be resold”.312  
 
In 1997, the per se approach to RPM was changed when the Supreme Court overruled 
Albrecht in the case of Khan,313 stating that the rule of reason applied when the maximum 
price was maintained. Horizontal agreements among manufacturers imposing maximum 
prices on their dealers remained within the application of the per se rule.314 
 
During a short period before judgment was given in Leegin,315 the FTC and the DOJ were 
very active in dealing with RPM cases.316 However, the case of Leegin in 2007 changed 
the approach to vertical restraints dramatically. The Supreme Court overruled the Dr Miles 
per se rule with five justices agreeing and four dissenting stating that vertical price 
restraints are to be judged under the rule of reason because RPM, including minimum price 
setting, stimulates interbrand competition. The rule of reason won completely against the 
per se rule in both VTR and RPM. 
 
When analysing vertical chains, buyer power became one of the most important aspects to 
observe. For instance, buyer power was a significant element in the case of Toys ‘R’ Us.317 
In this case, the FTC challenged the purchasing practices of Toys ‘R’ Us as preventing 
price competition and its comparison. The allegation was based, among others, on direct 
evidence of vertical collusion between the retailer and at least 10 toy manufacturers. Toys 
‘R’ Us, the largest toy retailer in the US, was free to dictate which toys were not allowed to 
be sold to chain discounters and club stores, and which could not even be sold at all.318 The 
                                                 
312
 The Guidelines, issued on March 27, 1995, reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) P 13,400; Section 
605 of Public Law No. 99-180,99 Stat. 1169 (Dec. 13 1985), at 2.1. 
313
 State Oil Company v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
314
 See, Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Kiefer-Stewart; Areeda, 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, 361. 
315
 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc, DBA Kay’s Kloset…Kays’ Shoes, 551 U.S. 877 
(2007). 
316
 DOJ cases:  United States v. Brush Fibres, Inc., 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,915 (E.D.Pa.1996); United 
States v. Anchorshade, Inc., 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,640 (S.D.Fla. 1996); United States v. Playmobil 
USA, Inc., 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71000 (D.D.C.1995); United States v. California SunCare, Inc., 1994-2 
Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,843 (C.D. Cal. 1994); United States v. Canstar Sports USA, Inc., 1993-2 Trade Cas., 
(CCH) 70,372 (D. Vt. 1993); FTC cases:  In re Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., File No. 971 0070, Docket 
No. C-3971 (F.T.C. 2000); In re Nine West Group, Inc., File No. 981 0386, Docket No. C-3937 (F.T.C. 
2008); In re American Cyanamid Co., 123 F.T.C. 1257 (1997); In re New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 122 
F.T.C 137 (1996); In re Reebok International, Ltd., 120 FTC 20 (1995); In re the Keds Corp., 117 F.T.C. 389 
(1994); In re Kreepy Krauly USA, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 777 (1991); In re Nintendo of America Inc., 114 F.T.C. 
702 (1991).  
317
 Toyes “R” Us, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) P 24, 516 (FTC 1998); Toyes “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 
928 (2000). 
318
 Toyes “R” Us, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) P 24, 516 (FTC 1998), at 24, 383-85. 
Barbora Jedličková            Chapter 4: Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
 101
FTC applied the rule of reason to vertical collusion and found that these practices restricted 
price competition between Toys ‘R’ Us’s holding market power and its competitors – the 
discounters.319 It could be assumed that the manufacturers concerned were driven by the 
threat that the retailer would stop purchasing from them based on significant bargaining 
power.  
 
Since Microsoft,320 the courts have begun to regularly apply Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
in cases of vertical restrictions. The courts have been dealing with several cases where 
exclusionary contracting at the vertical level has been ruled under Section 2321 and also 
with cases where vertically imposed power played a role.322 In 2006, in the case of 
Dentsply, the Court stated that vertical exclusive contracting arrangements violated Section 
2 of the Sherman Act.323 In this case, the manufacturer with a monopoly power wished to 
deal with dealers exclusively. This meant that dealers were not allowed to distribute its 
rivals’ products. The dealers agreed with the manufacturer. Surprisingly, the Court did not 
consider it an agreement but “a series of independent sales” because of the economic 
pressure used by the monopolist against its dealers and, following the Colgate doctrine, its 
interpretation of the term “agreement” was not easy to understand. 
 
4.3.5.2. Maximum Price Setting  
 
A) State Oil v. Khan:324 The Rule of Reason and the Protection of Interbrand Competition 
 
The Supreme Court overruled Albrecht concluding that there was not sufficient economic 
justification for the application of the per se rule in vertical maximum price fixing.325 It 
explained that the rule of reason applies to most antitrust claims because only unreasonable 
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restraints are illegal; only some types of restraints which have predictable uncompetitive 
effects are analysed under the per se rule.326 The Court further explained that there was no 
obvious reason to believe that vertically imposed maximum prices could “harm consumers 
or competition”.327 This statement does not seem to be exact as harming consumers can 
also mean harming competition. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court considered the 
protection of interbrand competition as the primary objective.328 
 
The Supreme Court acknowledged the criticism of Albrecht.329 For instance, Lopatka 
argued that the Court’s claim in Albrecht if maximum prices are set too low it could restrict 
essential services. He said that it was not in the manufacturer’s interest to set prices too 
low as it could lose its distributors. However, if the price is low in a way that limits only 
some distributors, then the consequence of limiting inefficient distributors does not harm 
competition or consumers. Additionally, if there was a negative impact on competition in 
the particular case, there is no reason why it should not be recognised under the rule of 
reason. These impacts can also include the Court’s concern in Albrecht that maximum 
price fixing can de facto be minimum price fixing.330  
 
One could argue that if the set maximum price is too high, then normal competition exists, 
unless there is something else that could indicate coordination and a secret price fixing or a 
minimum price fixing. If it is too low, distributors will not be able to conduct business. 
These are the extremes of maximum price fixing. There is nothing else which would harm 
competition if it is only maximum price fixing. Pitofsky believes that the ruling in Khan 
was also correct because maximum price fixing can hardly facilitate a cartel.331 Finally, as 
Hovenkamp highlights, setting maximum prices can eliminate the negative effects of 
double marginalisation in double-monopoly situations.332 
 
If the theory of ownership applies, then it is obvious that the dealer’s freedom to determine 
his retail prices was restricted by the setting of maximum prices. However, if the aim of 
                                                 
326
 Ibid., at 10. 
327
 Ibid., at 15. 
328
 Ibid., at 15. 
329
 Ibid., at 16-17. 
330
 State Oil v. Khan, at 17; Lopatka, Stephen Breyer and Moredn Antitrust, “A Snug Fit” (1996) 40 Antitrust 
Bulletin 1, 60; Albrecht, at 390. 
331
 R. Pitofsky, “Are Retailers Who Offer Discounts Really ‘Knaves’?: The Coming Change to the Dr. Miles 
Rule” (Spring 2007) Antitrust 63. 
332
 H. Hovenkamp, “Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis” (2010) 55 
Antitrust Bulletin 639-640. 
Barbora Jedličková            Chapter 4: Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
 103
antitrust law is to protect effective competition, then setting maximum prices did not 
restrict trade.  
 
4.3.5.3. Minimum Price and Price Setting 
 
A) Euromodas333 
 
The plaintiff, Eoromodas, Inc., and defendant, Clubman, Inc., were both retailers of men’s 
clothing competing in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The other defendant, Zanella, Ltd., was an 
Italian manufacturer of fine men’s clothing who sold products to both Euromodas and 
Clubman until 1997.334 
 
Euromodas accused Clubman, who operated several stores in Puerto Rico and had a 
significant market power there, that it had pressured Zanella to apply minimum resale 
prices.335 According to Euromodas, Clubman conspired to maintain artificially high prices 
for trousers and managed to persuade Zanella to stop selling to Euromodas, who had been 
cutting the minimum prices.336 This violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.337 
 
1) Business Electronics Doctrine 
 
Citing Business Electronics, the Court of Appeals held that the termination of a price-cutter 
and its subsequent replacement with another dealer was not per se a violation of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act.338 The Court did not recognise any of the evidence presented as a 
direct confirmation of an agreement.339 The Court summarised that showing that Clubman 
pressured the manufacturer to deal with the under-cutting retailer was not proof enough 
that there was illegal multilateral conduct. This could be nothing more than Zanella’s 
unilateral decision not to supply the plaintiff.340 
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The Court made no comment on the fact that no justification was introduced, stating 
simply that it was not necessary.341 Moreover, the Court considered the fact that the 
manufacturer took sides between the two distributors as a legitimate business decision.342 
However, the Court did not acknowledge the fact that if Zanella had not been pressured, it 
would most likely have maintained its relationship with both retailers. 
 
Interestingly, although the Court applied Section 1 of the Sherman Act which requires the 
existence of multilateral conduct, it said that the per se illegality would be proved only if 
there was an agreement on price. With no such agreement, the case must be analysed under 
the rule of reason.343 However, firstly, if the potential restriction is based only on unilateral 
conduct, Section 1 does not apply at all. Secondly, the form of multilateral conduct is not, 
and should not be, the reason for the application of a different rule, as it does not lessen the 
potential effects. 
 
B) Leegin344 
 
The Supreme Court overruled the Dr. Miles doctrine, which set the per se rule for 
minimum price vertical collusions, because vertical price restraints can have pro-
competitive effects according to “[r]espected economic analysts”. 345 The Court went even 
further by announcing the application of the rule of reason to all vertical price restraints 
including vertical price fixing.346  
 
Leegin, a manufacturer, designer and distributor of leather goods and accessories, started 
to sell women’s belts and other products under the brand name “Brighton” across the US in 
1991, selling to independent small boutiques and specialised stores. Leegin’s policy was 
based on promoting better and more personal treatment, more services and a satisfactory 
experience for consumers. Leegin believed that smaller retailers were more suitable for its 
policy rather than large stores such as Wal-Mart.347 
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In 1997, Leegin wrote letters to its retailers announcing a new policy, which included 
minimum price fixing, refusing to sell to retailers such as PSKS who would sell below the 
prices. In December 2002, Leegin found out that PSKS was selling its products at 20% 
below the minimum prices. PSKS explained to Leegin that other nearby retailers were 
doing the same, therefore, it had dropped their prices in order to compete.348 PSKS refused 
to increase its prices of Brighton products and thus Leegin terminated the contract.349 
 
Losing its sale, PSKS sued Leegin for a violation of the Sherman Act. Leegin claimed at 
the District Court that it had acted unilaterally under the Colgate doctrine; however, the 
jury found the existence of an illegal agreement. Leegin appealed and rather than basing its 
claim on Colgate’s unilateral conduct, it contended that the rule of reason should be 
applied to this agreement. The District Court and the Court of Appeals applied the per se 
rule in accordance with Dr Miles.350 
 
1) Overruling Dr. Miles 
 
The Supreme Court explained that the Court had applied the common law rule in Dr. 
Miles,351 therefore its justification was based on a “formalistic” legal doctrine rather than 
the real economic analysis in Dr. Miles.352 The Court confirmed that the old common law 
was irrelevant to vertical restraints.353 
 
The Court further claimed that it recognised in Dr. Miles that the restraint in question was 
the horizontal interest of competing distributors.354 However, when analysing Dr. Miles, 
one could argue that the Court was actually discussing the ownership of dealers in that 
cited part of the Dr. Miles decision.355 It is not clear from the case of Dr. Miles who had 
the interest in facilitating RPM.  
 
Simultaneously, and in contradiction with its own aforementioned criticism, the Supreme 
Court criticised Dr. Miles for not analysing the possible motivations for using vertical price 
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restraints.356 One could argue that Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not require the 
analysis of the intentions of persons and it is thus understandable that the Court did not 
analyse intentions 100 years ago. 
 
The Court based the overruling of Dr. Miles on two reasons. Firstly, the per se rule means 
that minimum resale price agreements always, or almost always, restrict competition and 
decrease output, however this is contradicted by the economic pro-competitive theories and 
justifications regarding RPM and by the limited amount of empirical evidence that 
suggests the efficient use of minimum resale price agreements is not hypothetical. The 
second reason was the Court’s stare decisis analysis. 
 
2) Justifications based on Effects and Theories 
 
The Court recognised three pro-competitive justifications for overruling the per se rule: 
1. The “free riding” theory; 
2. Providing services; and 
3. Increasing interbrand competition including “new entrant” justification. 
 
The Court confirmed the importance of an economic analyse of the effects of vertical 
minimum price restrictions, as previously recognised in Business Electronics.357 The Court 
stated that economic literature offers pro-competitive justifications for RPM based on the 
promotion of interbrand competition and consumer-welfare-enhancing efficiency. The 
practice is unlikely to have any anti-competitive effect.358  
 
a) Empirical Studies and Providing Services 
 
The Court mentioned two, in its words “recent”, empirical studies from 1983, which 
should prove the competitive effects of RPM: Overstreet’s study and Ippolito’s study.359 
Ippolito concluded that the majority of RPM cases could be explained by the services 
theory, stating that between 42% and 50% concerned “complex products” which, 
according to the author, are products where quality and information are important 
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attributes. However, it can be surmised that between 42% and 50% is not a majority and 
simply using RPM for quality products where some kind of explanation is necessary is not 
enough to conclude that RPM was used in these cases to increase services or drive out free 
riders.360 As Brunell said:  
This can hardly be described as “evidence” that free riding was involved in any of these cases; at 
most it suggests that free riding could not be ruled out.361 
 
Overstreet assumed in his study that 80% of the analysed cases did not involve distributor 
collusions due to the high number of distributors in those cases. Moreover, he claimed that 
it is not likely that the cases included anti-competitive intentions where the market was 
structurally competitive with small rivals.362 However, there does not have to be a high 
concentration and/or manufacturers do not have to have a high market share for a cartel to 
exist or for anti-competitive intentions to occur, as recognised by Overstreet himself in 
1985.363 Nonetheless, these arguments do not exclude that RPM in these cases simply 
restricted competition without any pro-competitive effect, as the existence of a cartel is not 
the only explanation for the anti-competitive effect of RPM.364 
 
More recent studies show that RPM increases prices.365 In 2000, the FTC estimated that the 
restriction of the resale prices of CDs had brought an extra $480 million in 3 years for 85% 
of US music companies.366 The Supreme Court did not include this study in its decision. 
Furthermore, Justice Breyer dissenting pointed out a few more facts from Overstreet’s 
study. He stated that empirical studies also support the assumption that vertical minimum 
price fixing increases prices. By the time Congress repealed the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade 
Act367 and the McGuire Act,368 36 states had permitted minimum resale price maintenance 
and 14 states had not.369 Throughout that time, prices raised from 19% to 27%.370 The FTC 
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study from 1983 concluded that resale price maintenance led to higher prices in most 
cases.371 
 
b) Promotion of Interbrand Competition 
 
The Court claimed that RPM may increase interbrand competition by decreasing 
intrabrand competition.372  
A single manufacturer’s use of vertical price restraints tends to eliminate intrabrand price 
competition; this in turn encourages retailers to invest in tangible or intangible services or 
promotional efforts that aid manufacturer’s position as against rival manufacturers.373  
 
On the other hand, the Court stated that  
Resale price maintenance also has the potential to give consumers more options so that they can 
choose among low-price, low-service brands; high-price, high-service brands; and brands that fall in 
between.374 
 
This contradicts the first statement of the Supreme Court. Indeed, RPM can increase non-
price intrabrand competition but this does not involve offering more options for consumers 
because it does not give the option of lower prices and, thus, competition is restricted.  
 
c) Prevention of Free-Riding 
 
The Court believed that the prevention of free riding was also an example of a pro-
competitive effect of RPM.375 However, one should note that a manufacturer can select its 
distributors without using RPM. If such selection is based on distributors providing 
services, they should also be free to decide the price they wish to sell the product for and 
whether they want to discount or sell to discounters.376 
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d) Penetrating the Market 
 
Another of the Court’s examples of a pro-competitive effect of RPM is that RPM can assist 
new companies in entering the market and thus increase interbrand competition, as 
previously expressed in Sylvania.377 It can also be said that it can attract new companies to 
penetrate the market if intrabrand RPM increases prices in interbrand competition. 
Depending on the market structure and vertical competition, this is possible if other 
manufacturers and their distributors decide to follow the manufacturer and its distributors 
to maintain and/or increase their prices. For instance, in First Beverages, exclusive 
territories became common practice after the per se rule had been changed to the rule of 
reason for VTR, in short, other manufacturers followed the first one. 378 
 
3) Anti-competitive Effects 
 
On the other hand, the Court acknowledged some forms of potential anti-competitive 
effects of RPM. The primary reason for the existence of RPM is to obtain monopoly 
profits, because, for instance, particular price fixing facilitates and assists a manufacturer 
cartel or a retailer/distributor cartel.379  
 
However, the Court argued that the increase of prices can be justified by the increase of 
other pro-competitive effects or even a decrease of prices within interbrand competition.380 
Peeperkorn disagreed with this part of the judgement stating that any form of competition 
that is of benefit to consumers, including intrabrand competition, should be protected.381  
 
One could argue that the decreasing of prices in interbrand competition is highly 
speculative and illogical. Firstly, if one or more competitors increase prices using RPM, 
others, who maintain the same prices, will likely attract more consumers and sell more 
products. Decreasing their own prices can result in less profit per product without an 
increase in output. A more profitable scenario could be to increase prices while keeping the 
same output and without increasing production. This means, generally, that RPM 
maintained by one manufacturer and his distributors can increase prices within interbrand 
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competition. However, even if the market structure is such that there is any likelihood that 
competitors would decrease prices if the manufacturer maintaining RPM increased its 
prices, it would be illogical to maintain RPM as that could cause the manufacturer and its 
distributors a dramatic decrease of output and hence a loss. The market structure is 
essential in predicting the possible results when facilitating RPM. 
 
The Court stated that:  
A retailer cartel is unlikely when only a single manufacturer in a competitive market uses resale 
price maintenance. Interbrand competition would divert consumers to lower priced substitutes and 
eliminate any gains to retailers from their price-fixing agreement over a single brand.382  
 
This statement contradicts the statement that RPM can increase pro-competitive effects and 
confirms what was said previously because it means that RPM can never work as it would 
be always loss-making. However, in practice, the situation is different as it shows that 
RPM has been used to advantage.  
 
The Court also argued that there are other practices that increase the price of products or 
services, such as advertising and increasing quality, but they are not illegal under antitrust 
law.383 This is true, however the main difference is that these practices are in the interest of 
effective competition and consumers, and their first and main purpose is not to increase 
prices. On the other hand, RPM’s primary aim is to set prices without any guarantee of a 
positive impact on effective competition.  
 
The Court further stated that the administrative advantages of the per se rule, costs and 
minimising of burdens on litigants and the judicial system, do not in themselves justify the 
application of the per se rule.384 
 
Pitofsky argued that pro-competitive justifications are only theoretical but the anti-
competitive results of minimum price fixing are “virtually certain” and, therefore, the per 
se rule should remain.385 Justice Breyer dissenting stated that the ultimate question is not 
whether distributors free ride on services nor is it a question of the quality or reputation of 
another distributor, but how often free riding occurs and how often the possible benefits 
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outweigh the potential harms. This is difficult to determine.386 He based his analysis on 
three groups of arguments: “(1) potential anticompetitive effects, (2) potential benefits, and 
(3) administration”.387 He argued that the Sherman Act’s objective was to “maintain a 
marketplace free of anticompetitive practices … [which] will tend to bring about the lower 
prices, better products, and more efficient production process that consumers typically 
desire”.388 In circumstances where a particular practice is seriously anti-competitive with 
only a few possible justifications, the courts apply the per se rule instead of applying the 
rule of reason.389 
 
The anti-competitive danger of RPM has two main forms: the restriction of intrabrand 
competition and also the restriction of interbrand competition if more than one 
manufacturer facilitates RPM. Manufacturers can be driven by collusion among 
themselves in concentrated industries where they can easily observe their prices and RPM 
can be a useful tool in such a matter. The anti-competitive effect of RPM itself is based on 
high prices, for instance, preventing dealers from responding to price-demand changes thus 
restricting more efficient dealers. 
 
In this case, PSKS and others were able to decrease prices and thus compete on price, 
while still promoting Leegin’s products. The Supreme Court did not analyse the needs of 
consumers. Mr. James Donehau, who managed to buy a discounted Leegin product prior to 
the final decision, argued that, in the case of Leegin, there was no benefit for consumers in 
facilitating RPM because retailers did not repair or offer any other important services. The 
applied RPM only had a negative impact, which was the price increase of Leegin products 
and the restriction of intrabrand competition.390 
 
4) Power and Motivation 
 
The Court highlighted that the market power of a manufacturer or retailer is important in 
RPM because both parties can abuse their power to pressure others to facilitate RPM.391 
The Court stated that the interest of retailers is different from that of consumers and 
                                                 
386
 Leegin, at 917. 
387
 Ibid., at 911. 
388
 Ibid., at  910. 
389
 Ibid., at  910. 
390
 The American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, “The Antitrust Fall Forum” (November 13, 
2009) Washington D.C. (Mr. James Donahau – Chief Deputy Attorney General of the Antitrust Section). 
391
 Leegin, at 885, 893-894. 
Barbora Jedličková            Chapter 4: Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
 112
manufacturers. Consumers generally desire lower prices,392 while the manufacturer wants 
to minimise distribution costs and not overcompensate retailers, who are the ones that gain 
from higher retailer prices.393  
 
In partial contradiction to the Court’s aforementioned argument, the Court held that using 
the manufacturer’s or retailer’s power to introduce RPM need not concern the courts, as 
there are still other competing retailers and manufacturers, unless the power is seriously 
monopolistic.394 The Court did not discuss this issue further. As Chapter 3 “Vertical 
Competition and Structure” explains, however, power is important and should be 
considered, in terms of bargaining power and not only horizontal market power. 
 
The Court also discussed the importance of the initiators of RPM. If the initiator is a 
powerful retailer (or retailers), it can constitute evidence of the abuse of a dominant 
position or the facilitation of a retailer cartel, which is anti-competitive conduct. On the 
other hand, a manufacturer would most likely use RPM to increase services.395  
 
The existence of a retailer cartel is not as important as the potential retailers’ interest for 
using RPM, which is to increase their profits. This is not primarily in the interest of the 
manufacturer, however, this does not mean that the manufacturer has no reason for 
introducing RPM. For example, if fixed prices mean that there are more retailers interested 
in selling its products, even if this does not directly increase its profits by an increased 
price, it can increase output, which would therefore increase profits.  
 
Another example of this is when a manufacturer faces a situation where it could lose one of 
its important but less efficient retailers. Although, in the end, this can lead to bigger sales 
from its remaining retailers once the market is settled, the first effect of losing a big retailer 
can and probably will lead to a decrease in manufacturing output. At least until the 
manufacturer finds a new retailer and/or its consumers use the new retailer, provided they 
do not switch to competing products.  
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Justice Breyer observed that it is difficult to recognise who, the manufacturer or dealer, 
initiated RPM in this particular case.396 As he rightly highlighted, even if a retailer is a 
strong company with a large market share at the horizontal level, a small producer can 
initiate RPM to motivate the retailer to obtain the best space on its shelves.397 
 
Moreover, in context with the facts of the case, unfortunately the petitioner did not address 
the fact that Leegin was a dual distributor of its own products and was thus horizontally 
competing with the petitioner.398 This indicates the existence of intrabrand horizontal 
conduct, not just a vertical one. However, although this could provide Leegin with a reason 
for fixing retail prices, increasing the wholesale price could be a more efficient and 
profitable way, as discussed in Chapter 3 “Vertical Competition and Structure”.399 In dual 
distribution, it is more probable that the manufacturer will use RPM for reasons that follow 
from its vertical relationships rather than their horizontal ones. 
 
5) Vertical v. Horizontal Effects 
 
The Supreme Court refused analogous treatment between vertical and horizontal 
combinations because vertical restraints are more defensible than horizontal restraints.400 
The Court confirmed that price fixing among manufacturers or among retailers (at the 
horizontal level) is per se illegal; however, if parties collude vertically to fix prices, the 
case must be ruled under the rule of reason.401  
 
The Court did not differentiate between an intrabrand horizontal agreement among retailers 
with just the one brand and retailers’ horizontal collusion covering more than one brand. 
Although this distinction between horizontal agreements among dealers and vertical 
agreements was obvious in previous cases,402 one could argue that intrabrand horizontal 
agreements can have the same effect on competition and the same purpose as a vertical 
agreement. For instance, Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Albrecht, said that the form is 
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not important when determining the effect of the conduct on competition.403 Areeda and 
Hovenkamp also recognise that vertical or horizontal intrabrand agreements can have the 
same intentions and the same effects but they are treated differently in case law.404 
 
6) Litigation 
 
Justice Breyer pointed out that the law differs from the economy. Litigation is an 
administrative system applying rules and precedents and, as such, must be balanced to be 
workable for parties.405 Proving market share is highly costly, highly technical and time-
consuming in litigation. This is true even more so for RPM over a major monopoly or 
merger case because such cases can include a lot of parties.406  
 
The Supreme Court did not give much guidance for litigation for subsequent RPM cases. It 
stated generally that the scope of operation and the existence of the agreement were 
important elements. However, it noted that future practice would provide more specific 
rules for how to use the rule of reason in RPM cases.407 
 
Justice Breyer disagreeing with overruling Dr. Miles summarised the decision in the 
following, and arguably correct, way: 
The only safe predictions to make about today’s decision are that it will likely raise the price of 
goods at retail and that it will create considerable legal turbulence as lower courts seek to develop 
workable principles.408 
 
Areeda and Hovenkamp recognise three difficulties in applying the rule of reason in RPM:  
1. Little guidance from the Supreme Court;  
2. Complexity of economic understanding of RPM; and  
3. Dr. Miles doctrine’s baggage.  
 
They believe that the courts should determine whether the restriction caused by RPM led to 
“higher prices resulting from lower output”.409 There is a pro-competitive reason for using 
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RPM in situations when RPM causes prices increases and output does not decrease or even 
increases as well. This means that RPM resulted in an increase of services or in the quality 
of products.410 However, if the output did not decrease or did not decrease adequately, it 
can also mean that the brand was so popular or so dominant that the increase in price did 
not have an obvious impact on customer choice, or that RPM of one brand had an impact 
on the whole of interbrand competition and the competitors or some of them also increased 
their prices. As discussed in Chapter 3 “Vertical Competition and Structure”, there is a 
wide range of factors which should be analysed to make the correct conclusion in each 
case. 
 
4.3.6. Post-Leegin Development - Obama Presidency 
 
4.3.6.1. Background 
 
The recent economic crises have raised the question as to whether some areas of US 
antitrust policy and its law have been soundly based. Generally, Obama’s presidency has 
increased interest in antitrust enforcement and on antitrust issues.411 The Department of 
Justice’s Antitrust Division has started to focus on economic freedom, fairness, 
transparency and legal certainty within antitrust law and policy.412 The FTC attempted to 
introduce a structural approach to RPM, including burden shifting between two parties.413 
The DOJ seems to be of the same opinion as the FTC in thinking that it is necessary to 
create alternatives to the traditional rule of reason.414 
 
Indeed, the case of Leegin aroused significant controversy in the US sparking intensive 
discussions on the application of the per se rule.415 Even though there are no exact figures, 
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it appears that RPM has increased in the US since the delivery of the Supreme Court’s 
decision on Leegin.416  
 
Federal cases on RPM would clarify the rule of reason in respect to RPM; however, to date 
these have proved elusive. Additionally, the courts have the tendency to follow the rule of 
reason under state law.417 The Court of Appeals delivered its decision in Leegin 2,418 which 
not only further explained the application of the rule of reason, but also confirmed the jury 
award of $3,975,000 to PSKS. This increased the threat of establishing the rule of reason 
de facto legality in RPM cases.  
 
Nevertheless, as the future may reveal, there is still some hope left that Leegin commenced 
the process of establishing a new approach to the rule of reason within RPM.419 However, 
there also remains the possibility that the US will re-establish the per se rule in relation to 
RPM. Several states have overturned or lessened the impact of Leegin by statutes 
reintroducing per-se illegality, primarily because retailers had been complaining that it was 
impossible to win a case if the rule of reason was applied.420 Since this change, the Federal 
Government has tried to overturn the rule of reason in the US Congress; however, thus far, 
it has not succeeded.421 The FTC has continued investigating and prohibiting RPM in 
industries, albeit with a more benevolent approach to RPM respecting ruling in Leegin.422 
 
On a positive note, although bargaining power and vertical competition have not been 
properly reflected in US antitrust law and its policies as yet, there are some signs that such 
an approach could be changed in future. As discussed previously, the courts have recently 
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been discussing buyer power.423 Generally, this issue has been receiving more attention in 
the US.424 
 
4.3.6.2. Price Fixing and Territorial Restrictions: Mack Trucks425 
 
In this case, the Court of Appeals dealt with a combination of RPM and territorial 
restrictions; however, it did not discuss territorial restraints as vertical non-price restraints 
but applied Leegin. 
 
The company Mack Trucks had “significant power” in the market of heavy trucks in the 
US. Its distribution system was based on a network of authorised dealers, with each dealer 
being assigned its own territory.426 In this case, a potential customer called one of the 
dealers giving it specifications and requirements for a product. The dealer submitted a list 
of these specifications to Mack Trucks who informed the dealer of the price, which usually 
included a discount called “sales assistance”. The sales assistance was calculated based on 
different factors, such as the amount of ordered trucks or potential competition in the 
market.427 If the dealer did not agree with the amount of sales assistance, it could ask a 
Regional Vice President for further sales assistance and then ask the controller for a further 
discount.428 The sales assistance was offered only if the product concerned was sold within 
its own territories.429 Toledo had aggressively focused on a low price policy for its 
customers since 1982  and had, therefore, been competing on price against other Mack 
Trucks dealers.430 
 
1) Violation and Evidence 
 
Toledo claimed that Mack Trucks and its other dealers violated Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act because they illegally conspired which resulted in artificially high prices. Firstly, in the 
middle of the 1980s, individual Mack Trucks dealers concluded a horizontal “gentleman’s 
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agreement” not to compete with each other on price. Secondly, in 1989, Mack Trucks and 
its dealers vertically agreed that Mack Trucks would delay or deny sales to dealers who 
wished to sell outside their territories to protect dealers selling in their own territories. This 
de facto arrangement created exclusive territories.431 Both arguments were supported by 
several pieces of evidence, such as witness testimonies, Mack Trucks bulletins and various 
telephone conversations.432  
 
It appears that in this case the producer was partly pressured by the other dealers and that 
the restrictions in question were in the interest of dealers. A telephone conversation 
between Mack Trucks and Toledo illustrates this point.  
“…there are certain dealers that are sending glider kits in other people’s backyards and we are getting calls 
on it.” 433  
 
Examples of further telephone conversations follow:   
If there is ever a manufacturer that protected their distributor organisation… It’s the Mack Trucks Company, 
to a fault.434 
Dealers ‘constantly want Mack to get involved in these territorial disputes… and to protect them from one 
another’.435 
 
The presented bulletin included this statement: 
The express purpose of the policy [to protect its own territory] was to create ‘increased profit margins for 
Mack distributors as well as the Company’.436 
 
The last quotation suggests that the applied restraints were in the interests of both the 
manufacturer and his dealers. 
 
2) Horizontal Agreement among Dealers 
 
The Supreme Court qualified the first restriction as a horizontal agreement among dealers 
controlling price, which is illegal per se.437 As discussed previously, one could argue that it 
is not important whether the conduct concerned is a form of vertical agreement or 
horizontal intrabrand agreement because the effect on competition is the same in both 
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cases. However, when the per se rule is applied, the effect is not analysed and the paradox 
of applying two different rules for the same conduct but in different forms occurs. If the 
rule of reason had been applied here it is possible that the Court would have found this 
restriction legal. 
 
3) Leegin and Territorial Restraints 
 
The Supreme Court analysed the second conduct of establishing territories as a vertical 
restriction, stating that Mack Trucks supported dealers’ illegal conspiracy to control prices 
which caused a de facto ban on out-of-territory sales and price competition.438 This was a 
vertical agreement and, therefore, the Supreme Court applied the rule of reason. However, 
instead of analysing any VTR cases, the court cited the case of Leegin, a vertical price 
restraint case.439  
 
Areeda and Hovenkamp explain that both vertical non-price and price restraints can affect 
price and be used for the same purpose, for instance, to prevent free riding.440 Shores adds 
that exclusive territories, in particular, eliminate intrabrand competition but can also 
influence interbrand competition. In contrast to RPM, territorial restraints have an indirect 
impact on prices.441 Thus, the application of RPM case law on territorial restraints because 
of its impact on prices is incorrect. Territorial restraints are not exactly the same as RPM. 
One of the possible restraints on competition of VTR, and probably the most common, is 
price restriction. However, VTR can restrict competition in other ways: it can have an 
impact on both quality and innovation. 
 
The Supreme Court highlighted two extra factors essential for the consideration of vertical 
price restraints under Leegin.442 Firstly, evidence such as the interest of dealers, can lead to 
the assumption of the existence of a retailer cartel rather than that of a vertical restraint.443 
One could argue that the form is not important as a retailer-intrabrand cartel and a vertical 
restraint have the same impact on competition. Secondly, a vertical restraint concerns the 
Court if there is market power of conspired entities.444 Unfortunately, this statement does 
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not explain the minimum of market power, the boundaries and when the Court should be 
concerned with market power and when it should not. 
 
The Court explained that there are several ways to prove anti-competitive effects. For 
instance, it can be demonstrated that “the restraint is facially anticompetitive or that its 
enforcement reduced output, raised prices or reduced quality”.445 In Gordon,446 the Court 
recognised that it could be very difficult to prove these effects; therefore, it stated that, 
alternatively, it could be proved that defendants had sufficient market power.447 As noted 
previously, aside from not explaining further what was meant by the statement that the 
participants of a cartel must hold market power, it does not clarify the meaning of 
“sufficient market power”. 
 
4.3.6.3. Maximum Price Setting: Leegin 2448 
 
PSKS’s second complaint against Leegin alleged that Leegin, as a producer and a retailer, 
colluded horizontally and vertically with some of its retailers to set minimum retail prices. 
The horizontal conspiracy was a new complaint that was not included in the first allegation 
in Leegin. In this context, PSKS claimed that Leegin was the largest single retailer of its 
products. The petitioner highlighted the existence of horizontal intrabrand collusion and 
the importance of Leegin’s intrabrand competition on consumers.449 
 
1) The Relevant Market 
 
PSKS identified two relevant markets: the intrabrand market for Brighton’s women’s 
accessories and the interbrand wholesale brand-name women’s accessories to independent 
retailers. The Court of Appeals refused the petitioner’s determination of the relevant 
product and geographic markets and thus granted a motion to dismiss without any further 
detailed analysis of other aspects of the case.450 The Court disagreed with PSKS’s belief 
that the aforementioned market constituted a single-brand market and that the Brighton 
brand constituted a submarket within broader markets, however no clear explanation as to 
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why was offered.451 Therefore, it could be argued that the Court failed to apply Steiner’s 
analysis, as discussed in Chapter 3 “Vertical Competition and Structure”. 
 
In relation to the second relevant market as defined by the petitioner, the Court rejected 
such a definition, as well as legal insufficiencies caused by a lack of product focus. It did 
not clarify this further. On one hand it refuted the fact that a relevant market could focus 
solely on wholesale and on the other hand it considered the product market of “women’s 
accessories” as being too broad.452 Arguably, there is no sufficient reason as to why 
wholesale on its own could not establish a market as it forms one whole part of the vertical 
chain and is thus one horizontal market. Although “women’s accessories” may appear to 
be quite a vague product market, the relevant explanation was missing in the case.  
 
2) Market Power and Anti-competitive Harm 
 
The issue of proving sufficient market power with relation to the rule of reason applicable 
to RPM was opened but not explained in the case of Leegin. The Supreme Court only 
expressed its concerns in the case that market power was seriously monopolistic.453 The 
Court of Appeals had previously mentioned the sufficient market power in the case of 
Mack Trucks. In this case, it stated that rather than proving any anti-competitive effects, 
which could be complicated and even impossible for the plaintiff, the plaintiff could only 
prove that the defendant(s) had sufficient market power.454  However, the case of Leegin 2 
does not appear to be consistent with Mack Trucks, although both cases were decided by 
the Court of Appeals. In this case, the Court indicated that the plaintiff must always prove 
that the defendant possesses sufficient market power to allege a vertical claim 
successfully.455  
 
The Court noted that the plaintiff did not consider interbrand competition, which 
overcompensates for any possible anti-competitive harm as it assures competition in both 
services and price.456 Firstly, minimum price setting within the Brighton brand did not 
enhance but, rather, restricted price competition possibly even at the interbrand level. 
Secondly, the nature of Brighton’s products being women’s accessories presumes zero 
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demand for genuine consumer services. Therefore, interbrand competition and competition 
in services had not increased.457 Steiner argued that retailers selling Brighton’s products 
did not face vigorous competition because they specialised in the Brighton brand. The lack 
of interbrand competition and the importance of intrabrand competition were also obvious 
from the fact that the petitioner went out of business after Leegin stopped its supplies and 
Leegin’s confirmation that Brighton consumers would switch retailers to find Brighton 
products rather than switch products.458 Furthermore, Steiner highlighted that Leegin did 
not argue that PSKS were free riding nor did they refuse to furnish presale services.459 This 
argument was introduced by the Court itself but was not supported by the facts or reality. 
 
The Court refused the allegation of the existence of a horizontal cartel as this argument 
was not introduced in the case of Leegin.460 Furthermore, it explained that any potential 
anti-competitive effects were illogical; Leegin, as the strongest retailer of the Brighton 
brand and simultaneously a dual distributor, could have achieved a higher profit by 
increasing wholesale prices and not by using RPM.461 This presumption would be correct 
only if Leegin did not face the risk of losing its retailers if it had increased its wholesale 
prices. Moreover, this ruling was in contradiction with the recent Court of Appeals case, 
Mack Trucks, where the Court found it sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the existence of 
horizontal conspiracy through the application of the per se rule, and found such conduct to 
be anti-competitive and in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.462 
 
3) The Rule of Reason 
 
The Court of Appeals avoided resolving the question of a potential modification of the rule 
of reason with respect to RPM because PSKS failed to sufficiently define the relevant 
market. However, it simultaneously quoted older cases which supported the traditional and 
strict rule of reason.463 
 
To summarise, in contrast to another recent Court of Appeals case, Mack Trucks, Leegin 2 
followed the Sylvania rule of reason rather than establishing a new approach and 
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explaining some aspects that were not clarified in both Leegin and Leegin 2, such as the 
definition of “sufficient market power”. Leegin 2 increased the risk of establishing de facto 
legality for RPM based on the traditional rule of reason. Moreover, it increased the legal 
uncertainty as the same court, the Court of Appeals, had recently delivered two cases on 
RPM, Leegin 2 and Mack Trucks, with different approaches. Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court may rule differently in the future. 
 
4.4. Procedural Rules 
 
Throughout the existence of the Sherman Act, the courts have introduced two main 
approaches: the per se rule and the rule of reason. The approach and application of the rule 
of reason or the per se rule differ depending on the particular restraint in question.464 The 
per se rule is used for naked restrictions. When applying the traditional rule of reason both 
parties must include all information about themselves, the market and their businesses. The 
test was set by Chicago Board,465 which named several factors that must be considered in 
each case:  
[T]he court must ordinarily apply: its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, the 
nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed 
to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained … 
[T]he rule of reason does not support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is 
unreasonable.466  
 
Therefore, everything is relevant and for that reason some cases are monstrous and cost 
millions of dollars, as was the case in Matsushita.467  
 
4.4.1. Current Rule of Reason Analysis in Vertical Territorial and RPM Cases 
 
Leegin introduced the rule of reason for all forms of RPM in 2007. The plaintiff can 
improve its position if it proves the existence of a horizontal distributors’ agreement rather 
than a vertical restraint. In this case, the court would apply the per se rule.468 One of the 
important aspects for the differentiation between horizontal and vertical arrangements is 
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the interest of both the distributors and the manufacturer.469 If competition was restricted 
vertically through the use of RPM, then, firstly, the manufacturer and their distributor must 
be separate entities;470 the distributor cannot be the manufacturer’s agent.471 Secondly, 
multilateral conduct must be proved. A simple announcement of price policy and its 
enforcement by the manufacturer without any collusion is unilateral conduct and is, 
according to Colgate, legal.472 The plaintiff must provide direct or circumstantial evidence 
which would exclude the possibility that one or both parties, the manufacturer or the 
distributor, were simultaneously acting independently.473 Evidence must show activities 
towards collusion on the part of both parties.474 Finally, cancelling distribution with a price 
cutter based on an agreement between the manufacturer and its second distributor without 
the existence of an agreement on price or minimum price is a non-price vertical restriction 
and would probably not demonstrate a restriction of competition.475 
 
After the plaintiff proves the existence of multilateral collusion to maintain retail prices, it 
must show the anti-competitive effect of the action concerned.476 It can demonstrate that 
the price setting caused the reduction of output, a raising of prices or a reduction of quality 
in a relevant product and geographic market.477 The impact on interbrand competition is 
more important than on intrabrand competition;478 however, this can be very difficult to 
prove. Therefore, the anti-competitive effect can be reflected by the existence of significant 
market power. The question is whether this is enough for establishing an anti-competitive 
effect, as stated in Mack Trucks and in Gordon,479 or whether it is an important aspect of 
restriction only if the power is seriously monopolistic, as expressed in Leegin.480 
Moreover, after the ruling of the Court of Appeals in Leegin 2, it is possible that the courts 
will apply the traditional rule of reason and would require evidence of both a sufficient 
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market power and an anti-competitive effect.481 On the other hand, if the product that is 
subject to the restriction does not create a significant market share, the courts are unlikely 
to find the restraint unreasonable and illegal.482 The final stage should consider any 
possible justifications by balancing proven anti-competitive effects against an increase of 
possible pro-competitive effects caused by the RPM.483 
 
The rule of reason approach to VTR is strict and is similar to that of RPM, as applied in the 
case of Leegin 2. Firstly, in VTR, it is only interbrand competition which should be 
examined.484 Secondly, aside from the restrictive effect, the restriction must be based on an 
anti-competitive intention,485 a requirement that is not included in the approach to RPM. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff must always prove a significant market power, which is an 
indication of the potential of an anti-competitive effect and can be proved if the defendant 
possesses a significant market power and the competitiveness of the market is lessened 
based on an examination of the market shares of competitors.486 In McDaniel,487 43% of 
the market share was deemed insufficient market power because the market was highly 
competitive. The approach appears to be so strict that the point of whether the plaintiff has 
any real chance to prove illegality of vertical territorial restraint is moot. Moreover, the 
question remains open as to whether the approach of VTR would change if a case dealing 
with this kind of restriction reached the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, this kind of issue 
has not been discussed at the Supreme Court since Sylvania. Finally, approaches to both 
RPM and VTR do not respect the existence of vertical competition and the nature of 
vertical restraints, which involve bargaining power rather than horizontal market power, as 
discussed in Chapter 3 “Vertical Competition and Structure”. 
 
4.4.2. New Rules 
 
After the case of Leegin, the intensity of the scholarly debate on the right approach to RPM 
has dramatically increased. Most notably, suggestions involve different forms of a 
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structured rule of reason.488 Kovacic states that the per se rule was and still is popular 
because the traditional rule of reason is unmanageable. If the rule of reason means that the 
courts must examine everything, then the plaintiff almost automatically loses because such 
a task can be impossible in practice. However, if there are alternatives, the case is better 
balanced.489  
 
Scholarly discussions have begun to be reflected in current cases. Although the recent 
cases of Leegin 2 and of Twombly490 placed heavy burdens on the plaintiff,491 other cases 
indicate that some changes have already appeared as the courts have moved away from the 
rigid application of the rule of reason. The first attempts to change the rule of reason are 
obvious in California Dental Association,492 decided by the Supreme Court, who still used 
an “open-ended” approach. In this case, the Court explained that the plaintiff had to prove 
that the practice concerned significantly restricted competition. This included the definition 
of the relevant market and proving the significant market power of the defendant. If the 
defendant could argue that the practice was enforced for a legitimate business purpose, the 
plaintiff must show that the practice failed to serve this purpose or there existed less 
restrictive alternatives which were not more costly than the practice used, while the benefit 
of the conduct concerned was smaller than its anti-competitive effects.493  
 
Both the DOJ and the FTC recognised the need for the change of the rule of reason and 
began to modify it, lobbying for a structured rule of reason.494 The FTC approach was used 
by the Court of Appeals in the case of Polygram,495 which was based on a horizontal 
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agreement: a joint venture. The Court also recognised the “quick look” approach used in 
the case of NCAA v. Board of Regents.496 However, the Court of Appeals refused officially 
to confirm the existence of a new, structured rule of reason. Instead, it claimed that it is 
still the same rule of reason,497 which thus made it possible for the same Court to apply the 
traditional rule of reason to RPM in Leegin 2 in 2010. 
 
Current cases, Polygram and Leegin 2, indicate that the rule of reason used within 
horizontal arrangements not only differs from RPM’s rule of reason but also that this 
difference will remain in the future. Nevertheless, the question of the courts’ approach to 
RPM remains open and only future cases will unveil a, hopefully, more modern approach 
to RPM and potentially to VTR in the US. The change of the rule in Leegin has re-opened 
highly intensive discussion among scholars on what is the right approach to vertical 
restraints in the US, most notably RPM, which has confirmed the lack of knowledge and 
research in this matter and the complexity of this area of competition law.498 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
The approaches to RPM and VTR have been constantly changing and evolving since the 
first Supreme Court case, Dr. Miles, in 1911. The development and cases of both types of 
restrictions are full of paradoxes. Firstly, the VTR approach is based on a distinct lack of 
knowledge of its effects. The cases include mainly theoretical arguments and are not based 
on proper studies for the simple reason that these kinds of studies did not and do not exist. 
This led to the final and settled conclusion in Sylvania that VTR were not usually 
sufficiently anti-competitive. This conclusion was based primarily on the assumption that 
VTR could increase interbrand competition and, thus, the application of the per se rule was 
wrong. The application of the existing rule of reason means de facto the legalisation of 
VTR, as is obvious from First Beverages.499 The FTC and the DOJ have not been 
investigating actions that just include VTR because they are not seen as restrictive or 
seriously restrictive.  
 
                                                 
496
 468 U.S. 85, 100, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 82 L.Ed.2d 70 (1984). 
497
 Polygram, at 35. 
498
 There have been numerous articles published discussing RPM in the US in last 4 years, most notably in 
2010, for example, Antitrust Bulletin: Vol. 55 No. 2/Summer, No. 1/Spring – both issue are dedicated to 
RPM. 
499
 First Beverages, at 1166. 
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The theory of ownership in Dr. Miles explained that the manufacturer should be free to do 
whatever it pleases with the products it owns. However, once it sells these products to 
distributors, it is subsequently the distributors who are free to deal with the products, as 
they now own them and not the manufacturer. This approach appears to be correct from a 
jurisprudential and ethical perspective. However, the Colgate doctrine shifted the Dr. Miles 
arguments as it allowed manufacturers to determine retail prices as part of their policies. 
This doctrine, therefore, restricts distributors’ freedom to determine their own business. 
Further developments in the Colgate doctrine led to the paradox that legalised 
arrangements between a distributor and a manufacturer to terminate a contract with a price-
cutting distributor, as ruled in Business Electronics and Euromodas. Indeed, is this not de-
facto price-maintaining multilateral conduct? 
 
The case of Leegin changed the approach to RPM significantly by introducing the rule of 
reason to all forms of RPM. The analysis of the court’s arguments for changing the rule 
reveals some contradictions and finds most of them to be hypothetical or even illogical. 
The paradox of the results of the latest development of RPM and VTR was concluded in 
Mack Trucks, which does not clearly differentiate between these two forms of vertical 
restraints but applies Leegin to territorial restraints and, moreover, finds horizontal 
intrabrand agreements among retailers illegal per se. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals 
contradicted some aspects of its rulings from Mack Trucks in Leegin 2 and thus increased 
legal uncertainty in the matter of RPM. 
 
The application of the rule of reason in maximum price fixing, as set in Khan, seems to be 
correct considering that maximum prices can primarily lead to lower prices and, thus, only 
efficient distributors can benefit from this. On the other hand, price fixing and minimum 
price fixing lead to situations from which less efficient competitors can benefit as 
efficiency is suppressed.  
 
Recently, discussion on the importance of market power, including buyer power, and its 
interest has occurred. However, only the cases of Euromodas and Mack Trucks show that 
the interests of distributors influenced the existence of vertical restraints. One of the 
explanations could be that, in contrast to the past where manufacturers used vertical 
restraints, recent retail market developments have shifted the bargaining power to retailers 
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who have begun to impose vertical restraints, as argued in study of Office of Fair Trade 
from 1997 in the UK.500 
 
Logic dictates that RPM based on setting prices or setting minimum prices and even VTR 
can be against the manufacturer’s interests because high retail prices will likely decrease 
output and the manufacturer’s profit.501 However, facts of the presented cases show that, 
for the most part, manufacturers applied them as part of their distribution systems. 
However, their reasons for applying such restraints differed. They used them to persuade 
powerful distributors to distribute for them and to maintain and/or increase their market 
share, as in Sylvania.  
 
Another reason is that manufacturers want to succeed over other competitors in interbrand 
competition, as was claimed by the manufacturers in Albrecht and White Motor. Simply, if 
retail prices are set, it can be easier for a manufacturer to predict the situation on the 
market and to adjust its future business strategies, including a correct assumption of future 
output, the most profitable retail prices in relation to the output and the conditions in the 
market. For instance, in Dr. Miles, Park & Sons, Colgate, Parke, Davis, the manufacturers 
simply claimed that they had the right to maintain retail prices without any further and 
possible pro-competitive justifications. Most notably in Park & Sons, it was obvious that 
the distributors did not generally agree with RPM. Finally, the manufacturers can be 
motivated to use vertical restraints to create a reputation for luxury products and to 
improve services, as manufacturers did in Leegin, Schwinn and Bausch & Lomb.  
 
It was always the manufacturers who were found guilty of violation of the Sherman Act in 
the presented cases, although Section 1 prohibits multilateral conducts. This is logical 
because, in private litigation on damages, the party usually sues only one and not 
everybody for a violation of antitrust law: the one who caused the direct damages. This 
must have an impact on the courts’ ruling as is obvious in the wording used in older cases. 
One could argue that the arguments of the parties at the beginning of the application of the 
Sherman Act are the most truthful as they had not been influenced by any theories and 
doctrines developed later. However, as such, they did not reveal that RPM and/or VTR 
would be used to increase customer welfare through the improvements of services, for 
example.  
                                                 
500
 Office of Fair Trading, Competition in Retailing, Research Paper No. 13 (1997, London Economics, 
London, UK). 
501
 See Gellhorn, Kovacic, Calkins, Antitrust Law and Economics, 342, 344. 
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Chapter 5: Development of the EU Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter analyses the EU law of vertical territorial and price restraints from a broad 
perspective. It puts EU competition law and policies in context with EU developments, 
including politics, the economy and the social environment. It explains and discusses the 
interaction and the influence of these aspects. Finally, the most significant cases are 
analysed. Their doctrines and legal theories, with developments are explained, logically 
arranged and argued in the context of the facts of the cases, while some aspects are 
compared with US case law and the US approach. The chapter ends with a survey of the 
current EU procedural legal system on vertical territorial and price restraints. 
 
5.2. EU Competition Law within the Process of Market Integration 
 
5.2.1. The Origin of EU Competition Law 
 
The current existence of European Union competition law and the existence of the 
European Union itself (originally, the European Economic Community) were arguably two 
significant consequences of World War II. The ideas to prevent wars and conflicts in 
Europe and to create an economically strong and unified Europe were not being discussed 
for the first time but they appeared more significant after the end of the World War II.1  
 
The beginning of EU competition law was influenced by the US and US antitrust law, as 
well as by different European competition law systems and theories. In the 1950s, 
following World War II, there was a strong need for governments to control and regulate 
their economies with an increased social and socialist influence. The War also increased 
the influence from the US. At the time, the US assisted European countries by providing 
loans,2 and US antitrust law was one of the most dominant competition laws in the world. 
Additionally, the EU market included some similarities with the US market. The influence 
                                                 
1
 The EEC Treaty of Rome, Preamble: “preserving and strengthening peace and liberty”; D.G. Goyder, J. 
Goyder, A. Albors-Llorens Goyder’s EC Competition Law, Fifth Edition (Oxford University Press, 2009), 
24-25; D. Chalmers, et al European Union Law: Text and Materials, Second Edition (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 7-9; N. Green, T.C. Hartley, J.A. Usher The Legal Foundations of the Single European Market 
(Oxford University Press, 1991), 199, 334, 343. 
2
 Primarily, the Marshall Plan, 1948; Goyder, Goyder, Albors-Llorens Goyder’s EC, 24-25; D. Gerber Law 
and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protection Prometheus (Clarendon Press, 1998), 166-168. 
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of the US was arguably at its strongest at the outset of the EU system, when the originators 
needed to establish a new European competition law system and were thus influenced by 
the US antitrust experience. 
 
The origin of EU competition law was also affected by other European states and their 
competition theories, legislations and policies. Some of the European ideas on competition 
policy and competition law appeared during the French Revolution. The period from the 
French Revolution to the mid-1870s was characteristic of the ideas of government 
restraints on economic actors, which ensured economic wealth and growth. This resulted in 
a new theory, the theory of European liberalism, Ordoliberalism. It included the first idea 
of a competition law statute based on the administrative protection of public interests. This 
idea was developed in Austria in the 19th century; however, it was not put into practice at 
the time.3  
 
After World War I, in 1923, Germany introduced its written competition law statute. It was 
a tool assisting the post-war, German economy to avoid a deepening economic crisis that 
recognised industrial production as a key element to military success and recognised the 
economy as a means to serve the interests of society. Cartelisation was recognised as a 
positive process because the government found these easier to control than small firms. 
The German statute was later changed due to a Nazi ideological influence.4 
 
A new German competition law system came into force in the same year as the Treaty of 
Rome and is still in an amended form, in force today. This German system was required by 
the US, as one of the conditions for German sovereignty, thus reflecting that competition 
affects not just the economy, but also other socio-political aspects. As history shows, the 
concentrated and heavy cartelised pre-war German industry helped to consolidate military 
power throughout World War II.5 
 
Some differences between Continental Europe and UK competition law and policy existed 
then and still exist today. The legal systems and origin of competition laws are also 
different. Competition law in Continental Europe has its origins in Austrian and German 
                                                 
3
 M. Vatiero, “The Ordoliberal Notion of Market Power: An Institutionalist Reassessment” (2010) 6 
European Competition Journal 689-691; D.J. Gerber, “Europe and the Globalization of Antitrust Law” 
(1999) 14 Connecticut Journal of International Law, 15, 26; Gerber, Competition in Twentieth Century 
Europe, 6, 16, 43-44. 
4
 Gerber, Competition in Twentieth Century Europe, 7-8, 115-164. 
5
 H. Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, The Law of Competition and Its Practice 3rd Edition. (Thomson 
West, St. Paul, 2005), 30; Gerber, Competition in Twentieth Century Europe, 7-8. 
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ordoliberalism, which is based on free competition and the protection of the freedom of its 
participants and which has continued to influence EU competition law.6 On the other hand, 
UK competition law was regulated mainly by common law, which had an impact on the 
origin of US antitrust law.7 Some similarities still remain between the UK and the US 
systems;8 however, the UK, as an EU member, has at least partially harmonised its 
competition law with other EU members.9 
 
5.2.2. From Common Market to Internal Market 
 
In 1951, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the 
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (“the ECSC Treaty”), with 
economic integration in the relevant sectors as its main objective. It recognised and 
highlighted rivalry, a large part of the competitive process, as necessary for a strong 
European economy.10 The Treaty expired in 2002.  
 
The Treaty of Rome from 1957 constituted the European Economic Community 
(“EEC”).11 The main objective of the EEC was to establish a common market, which 
required a supranational, decision-making framework. The creation of the common market 
by the EEC contained a number of elements. The basic element consisted of establishing a 
customs union with a common external tariff. Other elements were the free movements of 
goods, persons, services and capital, including harmonising relevant national laws; 
competition law and policy; regulation of state intervention in the economy, such as state 
aids; and others.12 
 
Therefore, the existence of the EEC was based on economic integration with the main, but 
not only, objective of establishing a common market with undistorted competition and an 
                                                 
6
 A. Weitbrecht, “From Freiburg to Chicago and Beyond, the First 50 Years of European Competition Law” 
(2008) 29 ECLR, pp. 81-82; D. Gerber, “Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, 
Competition Law and the ‘New Europe’ ” (1994) 42 American Journal of Competition Law p. 25; see also R. 
Van den Bergh, P. Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics, A Comparative Perspective 2nd 
Edition (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006), 65; European Commission, XV Annual Report on Competition 
Policy 1985 (1986). 
7
 See above. 
8
 Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 32. 
9
 Compare the current UK Competition Act 1998, with Articles 101 and 102 and EU legislation on 
competition law; See Goyder, Goyder, Albors-Llorens Goyder’s EC, 26-27. 
10
 ECSC Treaty, Preamble; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm#other (10/07/2010); See Goyder, 
Goyder, Albors-Llorens Goyder’s EC, 28-30. 
11
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm#other (10/07/2010); see Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome. 
12
 The Treaty of Rome, Principles: Articles 2 and 3, Part Two: “Foundations of the Community”; for further 
discussion see Chalmers,  European Union Law, pp. 12-13. 
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efficient use of resources.13 Integration not only had an economic dimension, based on free 
trade, but also a political dimension that meant that Member States made decisions 
collectively. This is confirmed by the principles of supremacy and direct effect, and by 
provisions on common rules and policies.14 
 
The Community shifted its focus from market integration to policy integration in the 
second half of the 1980s. This new process started with the "White Paper Completing the 
Internal Market".15 The White Paper was a tool for establishing an internal market and was 
followed by the Single European Act in 1986, 16  which identified its main aim in Article 
13 as the establishment of the internal market by the end of 1992. The internal market is 
defined in Article 13 as an area without boundaries that includes the free movement of 
goods.17 The aim included a reformation of EEC institutions and also the establishment of 
a legal basis for other policies.18 
 
In 1993, Member States ratified the Treaty on European Union.19 The Treaty on European 
Union was the result of the aims contained in the Single European Act.20 The Treaty 
established the European Union with the new Community’s competences including 
education, environment, consumer protection, public health, industry and culture. The 
previous name, “The European Economic Community”, changed to “The European 
Community”.21  
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam22 amended the objectives of the European Community, 
elaborating on the integration of Member States, and focused on more than just pure 
economic integration. The Treaty of Amsterdam had two additional main objectives, aside 
                                                 
13
 The Treaty of Rome, Principles: Articles 2, 8; Korah, Guide to Competition 2-3; A. Jones, B. Sufrin, EU 
Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Fourth Edition (Oxford University Press, 2011) 1-18; D. 
Barounos, D.F. Hall, J. Rayner James, EEC Antitrust Law, Principles and Practice (London, Butter Worths, 
1975), 1. 
14
 See Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 95 (see “II - 
the first question”); Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585; Gerber, Competition in Twentieth Century 
Europe, 347-348; R.B. Bouterse, Competition and Integration – What Goals Count?: EEC Competition Law 
and Goals of Industrial, Monetary, and Cultural Policy (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1994), 3-4. 
15
 White Paper on completing the internal market from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 
310, 28 and 29 June 1985; see Bouterse, Competition and Integration, 8. 
16
 Official Journal L 169 of 29 June 1987. 
17
 Article 8a of the consolidated version of the Treaty of Rome (1987). 
18
 See the provisions of the Single European Act. 
19
 Official Journal C 191 of 29 July 1992. 
20
 See above. 
21
 Further see: Maastrich Treaty on European Union; Chalmers, European Union Law, pp. 23-25. Korah, 
Guide to Competition, 2-3; Bellamy, Child, European Community, 4-5; Bouterse, Competition and 
Integration, 9-10. 
22
 Treaty of Amsterdam, Official Journal C 340 of 10 November 1997. 
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from the establishment of the single market; namely, establishing an economic and 
monetary union and implementing common policies or activities. While the objective of a 
harmonious, balanced and sustained development of economic activities remained,23 the 
objectives of a continuous and balanced expansion and an increase in stability were shifted 
to a high level of employment and social protection, equality between the sexes, 
sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and a 
convergence of economic performance.24  
 
After the success of new Treaties and a short period of time within which the previous 
treaties had been adopted, the process of changes and the adopting of binding treaties 
slowed down. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union having no legal 
power was proclaimed by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission in 
2000.25 A right of a fair trial and the right of defence on matters of privacy were also 
applicable to competition law.26  
 
In December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon27 came into force. It is recognised as a treaty 
similar to the Amsterdam Treaty and the Nice Treaty from 200128 amending the founding 
treaties.29 It merged the European Community with its three pillars into the European 
Union and recast the existing treaties into two treaties, the Treaty on the European Union 
and the TFEU. The basic process of creating an internal market has arguably been 
finalised. The existence of the internal market reflects that the EU market had become even 
more integrated including further objectives of the EU.30 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Articles 1.5, 2.2. 
24
 Articles 1.5, 2.2, 2.3, 2.19, 2.22; also see other objectives as introduced in Articles 1.2, 1.10., 2.2, 2.4, 2.17, 
2.22, 2.34. 
25
 OJ 2000 C364/1; currently OJ C83 of 30 March 2010. 
26
 §§12-118. 
27
 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, O.J. C 306 of 17 December 2007. 
28
 Treaty of Nice, Official Journal C 80 of 10 March 2001. 
29
 Compare: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm#other (10/07/2010); Chalmers,  European Union 
Law, pp. 23-30. 
30
 Article 3 of the Treaty of the European Union, which repealed Article 2 of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Union, discussed objectives of the EU. It is obvious that the TFEU broadened its policies as it 
included six paragraphs where the old Article had only one. Additionally, in its opening paragraph it states 
that “[t]he Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.” Among others, it 
also includes an international relations policy in Paragraph 5, Article 3(2) TFEU and protectes cultural and 
linguistic diversity as discussed in Article 3(3); Article 4(2) TFEU. 
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5.2.3. Articles on Competition 
 
The key EU competition-antitrust rules can be found, as of 2011, in Articles 101 and 102 
of the TFEU. These articles were first enacted as Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome 
in 1957, and then recast as Articles 81 and 82 in the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community as renumbered by the Treaty of Amsterdam.31 For the sake of simplicity and 
consistency, throughout the rest of this Chapter the current terminology as applied in the 
TFEU and the Treaty on the European Union will be employed. 
 
Article 101 prohibits forms of multilateral conducts which restrict competition in the EU 
market and also includes exceptions to this prohibition. Article 102 prohibits the abuse of 
dominant power in the EU market. These actions are incompatible with the internal market 
and are illegal. Article 101 also regulates vertical multilateral conducts and Article 102 
includes primarily unilateral but also multilateral restrictions. Both forms of conduct may 
influence the behaviour of suppliers and distributors, for instance a dominant undertaking 
can abuse its position towards the distributors, exemplified by the action of tying. 
Moreover, a manufacturer and its distributor can abuse their dominant positions 
collectively.32 Although Article 102 has never been used in respect of RPM and VTR, 
theoretically it is possible in situations when such restraints are forced upon the other party 
by a monopolist(s) or a monopsonist(s). 
 
Vertical restraints, as for any other multilateral conducts, are subject to two steps of 
examination under Article 101 TFEU. Firstly, it must be decided whether a particular 
vertical restriction takes the form of a multilateral conduct (an agreement, concerted 
practice or decision of an association), and has its object or effect in the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the EU, thus affecting trade between 
Member States. If the answer is yes, then it must be decided whether this restriction might 
benefit from a block or individual exemption under Article 101(3).33 
 
 
                                                 
31
 The term “the common market” was replaced with the term “the internal market” in Articles 101 and 102 
of the TFEU. 
32
 See Chapter 4 “Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints”. 
33
 See below. 
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5.3. The Beginning of Integration: Stability and Growth in the 1950s through  
        the mid 1970s 
 
5.3.1. Background 
 
The economies of member states were in reconstruction at the beginning of the existence 
of the EU (originally, EEC) in an attempt to secure political and economic stability and 
economic growth.34 This period began the process of European integration assisting 
Europe and European firms to become stronger and more competitive with a better 
perspective to increase European productivity and, thus, stability.35 
 
The beginning of EU competition law was influenced not only by US antitrust law and the 
German ordoliberal view, with a strict legal form of competition law supported by 
Netherlands, but also by the French administrative-political approach supported by Italy. 
Therefore, some Member States, such as France, had a tendency to interpret EU 
competition law (originally, EEC competition law), Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, as 
political and policy terms rather than enforceable law. However, gradually, EU 
competition law became an essential and enforceable part of the EU and European 
integration.36 
 
The Commission was empowered as the central executive enforcer of EU competition 
rules (originally, EEC competition law) in 1962.37  The Court of Justice of the European 
Union (“CJEU”)38 was already established in the ECSC Treaty in Paris in 1951, among 
others, as a judicial-review body for competition law.39 
 
The Preamble of the Treaty of Rome stresses the importance of “steady expansion, 
balanced trade and fair competition”. The Community policies were set out in Articles 2, 3, 
4 of the Treaty of Rome also referring to the principle of free competition. The first goal of 
EU competition law was to ensure competitiveness on the EU market. This was based on 
an idea that the protection of competition interferes with free trade, including economic 
                                                 
34
 Gerber, Competition in Twentieth Century Europe, 168. 
35
 Goyder, Goyder, Albors-Llorens Goyder’s EC, 31-32. 
36
 See, e.g., Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 95; 
Gerber, Competition in Twentieth Century Europe, 343-347. 
37
 The Council Regulation 17/62/EEC [1959] OJ Spec. Ed. 87. 
38
 Originally, “the European Court of Justice”. 
39
 EEC Treaty, Article 164. 
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integration, and assists in providing a self-regulating economic system ensuring the most 
efficient use of resources. The second goal of EU competition law was to aid in the 
creation and maintenance of the common market to ensure that undertakings did not 
undermine the prohibitions on state barriers by setting private market barriers such as 
VTR. Vice versa, the existence of the common market was essential for the creation of fair 
and efficient competition and its competition legislation.40 This objective prevailed in the 
beginning, for example, the vertical restraint case of Consten & Grundig41 in 1966 
highlighted that the objective of EU competition law was single/common market 
integration.42 
 
5.3.2. First Cases and Legislation 
 
At the beginning of the EU competition law’s existence, both the EU (originally, EEC) and 
national authorities applied the EU competition rules.43 This changed with Regulation 17,44 
which introduced a notification system with centralised enforcement and policy-making 
power within the Commission. The Court of Justice played a central role in court 
judgements to minimise the different influences of Member States.45 The notification 
system overburdened undertakings, as well as the Commission, which was also criticised 
when ruling on vertical agreements.46 Regarding vertical restraints, Hawk pointed out that 
the notification system was inconsistent with CJEU's judgements and Article 101(1) was 
overly and broadly applied. It brought about and maintained legal uncertainty, legal 
formalism and analysis by categories rather than an economic approach.47  
 
EU competition law emphasised vertical relationships in comparison with both US 
antitrust case law and the Member States’ traditional horizontal agreement focus. This was 
due to the fact that vertical restraints were the most obvious relationships in trans-border 
                                                 
40
 Goyder, Goyder, Albors-Llorens Goyder’s EC, 34-35; Bouterse, Competition and Integration, 5; Gerber, 
Competition in Twentieth Century Europe, 334-335 Barounos, Hall, Rayner James, EEC Antitrust Law, 2-3. 
41
 Case 56/64, 58/64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the 
European Economic Community, [1966] ECR 299 (“Consten & Grundig”). 
42
 Consten & Grundig, p. 340. 
43
 EEC Treaty, Articles 87, 88, 89; for further discussion see Gerber, Competition in Twentieth Century 
Europe, 349. 
44
 Regulation 17/62, 1962 OJ 204. 
45
 For more see Gerber, Competition in Twentieth Century Europe, 6, 349-353. 
46
 D. Deacon, “Vertical Restraints under EC Competition Law: New Directions” [1995] Fordham Corp L 
Inst p. 307; B.E. Hawk, “System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law” [1995] 32 CMLRev 
p. 973; see below. 
47
 Hawk, “System Failure”, pp. 974 – 986; also see A. Jones, “Competition of the Revolution in Antitrust 
Doctrine on Restricted Distribution: Leegin and Its Implications for EC Competition Law” (2008) 53(4) 
Antitrust Bulletin 935-937. 
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trade used between manufacturers and distributors to separate and protect national markets 
from parallel imports and to create other boundaries which hindered the main objective of 
the Community: the creation of the single market.48 
 
In the first vertical restraint case of Grosfillex,49 the Commission found that an agreement, 
where a distributor had obtained an exclusive territory outside the common market, did not 
violate EU competition law as the product had been re-exported to the common market. 
The first CJEU case on vertical restraints, Consten & Grundig, discussed the exclusive 
territories based on trademarks. The CJEU agreed that maintaining the exclusive territory 
and preventing parallel imports of the product protected by its trademark had infringed 
Article 101TFEU . This case was the first that assisted the Commission in establishing a 
policy on vertical restraints.50 Furthermore, not only using trademarks but also the use of 
patents to protect national markets and prevent parallel imports were found to be 
inconsistent with the Treaty of Rome by the Commission and this was confirmed by the 
CJEU in the case of Parke-Davis v. Probel.51 
 
The case of Minière v. Maschinenbau 52 held that an exclusive distribution agreement was 
not illegal if it had been necessary for penetrating a new territory. The case also stated that 
EU competition law included two main objectives: integration and competition. At the 
time, exclusive distribution systems were common in Europe,53 therefore, the Commission 
introduced a block-exemption regulation in 196754 and updated it in 198355 confirming that 
exclusive distributions could have a positive impact on the market in the form of 
distribution improvement, international trade, promotion of products, stimulation of 
interbrand competition and effectiveness.56 
 
 
                                                 
48
 Consten & Grundig, pp. 343, 349; Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, Executive 
Summary, COM (96) 721, paragraphs 1,2; Jones, “Leegin and Its Implications for EC” 936; Gerber, 
Competition in Twentieth Century Europe, 354-355. 
49
 64/233/CEE, Grosfillex Sàrl (Re the agreement of), Official Journal 58, 09/04/1964 p. 915 [1964] CMLR 
237. 
50
 Goyder, Goyder, Albors-Llorens Goyder’s EC, 55-56. 
51
 See Case 24/67, Parke-Davis v. Probel [1968] ECR 55 (patents); Case 40/70, Sirena v. Eda [1971] ECR 69 
(trade marks). 
52
 Case 56/65, Société La Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH [1966] ECR 235, [1966] CMLR 
357, CMR 8047. 
53
 Green, Hartley, Usher, The Legal Foundations, 241. 
54
 Regulation 67/67 applying Article 85(3) to exclusive dealing agreements [1967] O.J. 57/849. 
55
 Regulation 1983/83 applying Article 85(3) to exclusive distribution agreements [1983] O.J. L 173/1; 
Regulation 1984/83 applying Article 85(3) to exclusive purchasing agreements [1983] O.J. L 173/7. 
56
 Regulation 1983/83, recitals 5, 6. 
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5.3.2.1. VTR 
 
A) Consten & Grundig57 
 
1) Vertical Conduct 
 
In this case, the CJEU discussed the application of Article 101 to vertical agreements. It 
held that neither Article 101 TFEU nor Article 102 TFEU excluded infringements in the 
form of vertical conducts as the Treaty did not make any distinction between horizontal 
and vertical conduct. Therefore, similarly, the court or any other body applying the Treaty, 
could not make a distinction and exclude conduct which is not excluded in the Treaty.58 
However, Article 101 TFEU does not apply to conduct within one undertaking that creates 
an integrated distribution network.59 
 
2) Test on Restricting Trade 
 
The Commission decided that the applicants had created absolute territorial protection 
which had restricted trade between the Member States.60 The applicants and the German 
government subsequently claimed that the Commission had not proved that trade would 
have been greater without the existence of the agreement concerned. The Commission, 
argued that once trade had been established in France, the agreement had restricted trade 
between the Member States primarily because it had restricted exports from and imports 
into France. The Commission explained that the test was based on the constitution of “a 
threat, direct or indirect, actual or potential, to freedom of trade between the Member 
States in a manner which might harm the attainment of the objectives of a single market 
between the states”.61 
 
It does not matter whether the agreement increased trade as long as the threat to restrict 
trade or its actual restriction existed. In this case, trade was restricted by prohibiting 
Consten from exporting and by establishing Consten as the only distributor for the French 
                                                 
57
 C-56/64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v EEC Commission [1966] ECR 
299. 
58
 Consten & Grundig, p. 339. 
59
 Ibid., p. 340. 
60
 Ibid., p. 346. 
61
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market via the trademark.62 The Court agreed with the Commission and stated that it was 
obvious from the agreement that the aim of some of the clauses was to create absolute 
territorial protection, which was thus an infringement of Article 101 TFEU.63  
 
3) Interbrand v. Intrabrand Competition 
 
The applicants and the German government claimed that the test should have been aimed 
at interbrand competition, arguing that the agreement had increased interbrand 
competition. The Court disagreed. It explained that if intrabrand competition was 
restricted, the effect on interbrand competition did not have to be examined. It also stated 
that if the restrictive object was proven, the effect did not have to be analysed.64 
 
4) IP Rights 
 
The Court stated that it was obvious from the agreement that the aim of some of the 
clauses was to create absolute territorial protection.65 The Court further explained that it 
was not by virtue of the trademark itself but the agreement with Grundig that had affected 
trade.66 Therefore, it is the agreement, or clauses of the agreement, and not the trademark 
that restricted competition.  
 
This issue was also discussed and the boundaries between IP rights and illegal vertical 
restraints were established in the first US cases on RPM. However, the first US cases still 
involved an assessment based on the common law and the right of ownership. The 
Supreme Court strictly differentiated between statutory IP rights, such as patents and 
copyrights, where the manufacturer, the owner of the IP rights, was free to set the 
conditions for retail sale. This was in contrast to non-statutory IP rights, such as trade 
secrets, where the manufacturer was not excepted and could not restrict trade.67 Similar to 
the case of Consten & Grundig, where the court stated that the trademark did not entitle the 
parties to restrict competition in certain forms such as absolute territorial restriction, the 
                                                 
62
 Ibid., p. 341. 
63
 Ibid., p. 344. 
64
 Ibid., p. 342. 
65
 Ibid., p. 344. 
66
 Ibid., p. 345. 
67
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Supreme Court explained that the existence of the trade secret did not restrict trade as such, 
but it allowed for the protection of the secret manufacturing process.68 
 
5) Article 101(2) 
 
The Court of Justice confirmed that Article 101(2) applied only to the parts of the 
agreement which restricted competition if they were able to be separated from the 
agreement itself. In this case, only the restrictive clauses of the agreement should have 
been annulled under Article 101(2).69 
 
6) Article 101(3): Test  
 
This case introduced a test on Article 101(3) which still applies although with some more 
recent additions. The Court explained that, although the applicants were responsible for 
introducing the arguments for the application of the exemption under Article 101(3), the 
Commission had to examine the available evidence to consider the fulfilment of Article 
101(3). Furthermore, the Commission must evaluate “economic matters”.70 Any pro-
competitive improvements that the restriction in question introduced must show 
“appreciable objective advantages” that sufficiently compensate for any anti-competitive 
effects caused by the restriction.71 The Court explained that the Commission had to 
consider whether the restriction concerned was necessary for such pro-competitive 
improvements in the production and distribution of the goods by evaluating the 
effectiveness of any possible justifications.72 
 
7) Business Tool – Justification 
 
The applicant claimed that absolute territorial protection assisted Consten’s ability to plan 
its business in advance. The Court stated that risks, including parallel imports, were 
commonplace in competition and in all commercial activities and, therefore, this was not a 
reasonable justification.73 Despite the accuracy of the explanation,74 it does offer an 
                                                 
68
 Park & Sons, at 29; Dr Miles, at 400-403. 
69
 Consten & Grundig, p. 344 (“Ruling”, paragraph 1). 
70
 Consten & Grundig, p. 347. 
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explanation for a motivation to introduce VTR, and potentially RPM, not only of the 
distributor but also of the manufacturer in some cases.75 
 
8) Services and Reputation – Justification 
 
The applicant complained that the Commission had not considered whether it would have 
been possible to provide guarantees, such as the protection of the Grundig name and after-
sales services, without introducing absolute territories in the market. Consten would have 
had to refuse to provide after-sales services, in particular, repair of the machines – products 
imported by Consten’s competitors if the parallel import had existed which is against 
consumer interest.76 
 
The Court did not find this fear justified because consumers could only demand the 
aforementioned services from the company from which they purchased their products’ 
Moreover, the main competitor of Consten also offered after-sale services, therefore, the 
non-existence of absolute territorial restraint would not have led to such a situation.77 
 
9) Penetrating the Market – Justification 
 
The applicants also claimed that the Commission had not considered the necessity of the 
absolute territorial protection to penetrate the market, including bearing the risks of 
penetrating a market. The Court found this justification unfounded because this statement 
was not disputed by the defendant. The Court also ruled that such penetration did not 
influence improvements in distribution.78 Although the Court did not examine this 
justification, it cannot be claimed that the Commission did not consider the penetrating 
argument as the Commission claimed that the conduct had been illegal only after trade had 
been established in France.79 
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 See below; see Chapter 3 “Vertical Competition and Structure”; Chapter 4 “Development of the US Law 
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10) The Main Objective: Market Integration 
 
Although this case concerned private entities, the Court applied the main objective of the 
Treaty, creating common trade without barriers, explaining that the Treaty could not allow 
certain undertakings to create barriers on trade between Member States.80 
 
Jones and Sufrin argue that the market integration objective overruled competition 
efficiency in this case.81 This statement appears accurate as, firstly, the court stated that 
market integration was the main objective of EU competition law.82 Secondly, although it 
required economic, or rather objective proof, of positive effects under Article 101(3), it 
ruled that it was enough to prove a threat to or object of in the restriction of competition 
under Article 101(1).83 Furthermore, Goyder highlighted the importance of this case at that 
time because it provided a sound basis for future policy in this area of competition law 
focusing on the maximum protection of a single market.84 
 
B) Minière v. Maschinenbau85 
 
This preliminary ruling case concerned a vertical agreement, which granted an exclusive 
right of sale. However, at the same time, it allowed the distributor to freely re-export the 
goods and distributors from other Member States were free to sell to the market concerned: 
the French market. Dealers and consumers were allowed to buy from wherever and 
whomever they wished, including parallel importers. Moreover, if the manufacturer had 
agreed, the distributor concerned would have been allowed to distribute the products of the 
manufacturer’s competitor.86 
 
1) The Object and the Effect on Competition and on Trade 
 
This case set a test and some important explanations on the restriction of trade and 
competition in object or in effect, which have applied in cases since. The Court explained  
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 Consten & Grundig, p. 340. 
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 Jones, Sufrin, EU Competition Law, 653-654; G. Monti, “Article 81 EC and Public Policy” [2002] 
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 Consten & Grundig, p. 340. 
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 Ibid., pp. 341, 347. 
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 C-56/65 Société Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH [1966] ECR 235. 
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that an agreement containing a clause “granting an exclusive right of sale” may have 
fulfilled the condition to be notified and was thus possibly illegal.87 
 
The Court further discussed the effects on trade between Member States explaining that 
this meant that the agreement was “incompatible with the common market”.88 The test, 
which still applies, is as follows:  
[I]t must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set objective 
factors of law or of fact that the agreement in question may have an influence, direct or indirect, 
actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between the Member States.89 
 
The Court explained that the part of Article 101(1) that states “object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market” involved 
alternative and not cumulative requirements. Therefore, firstly, the purpose of the 
agreement or some clauses in the agreement must be analysed “in the economic context”. 
It follows from the Court’s ruling that this is necessary as this first step determines the 
effect on competition.90 If analysing the purpose of the clauses does not reveal the effect, 
the consequences of these clauses must then be considered. It must be shown that “the 
competition has in fact been prevented or restricted or distorted to an appreciable extent”.91 
 
The Court listed aspects which should be considered in deciding whether the agreement 
restricted competition either in object or in effect:  
the nature and quantity, limited or otherwise, of the products covered by the agreement, the position 
and importance of the grantor and the concessionaire on the market for the product concerned, the 
isolated nature of the disputed agreement or, alternatively, the position in the series of agreements, 
the severity of the clauses intended to protect the exclusive dealership or, alternatively, the 
opportunities allowed for other commercial competitors in the same products by way of parallel re-
exportation and importation.92 
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2) Penetrating the Market – Justification 
 
The Court discussed penetrating the market as a possible justification. It went further than 
in the case of Grundig & Consten as it explained that competition was not restricted if the 
agreement was necessary to penetrate the market.93  
 
3) Some Clauses v Whole Agreement 
 
With regards to Article 101(2), the Court confirmed the ruling in Grundig & Consten when 
it stated that this Article had to be interpreted in relation to Community Law. Only the 
clauses which are illegal under Article 101(1) are nullified. In the situation where these 
clauses are not separable from the agreement itself, the entire agreement is nullified.94 
 
5.4. Crisis and Changes – the mid 1970s through the 1980s  
 
5.4.1. Background 
 
After the first oil shock in 1973, an international economic crisis began, which led to 
widespread inflation and unemployment. Economic growth in Europe stopped for the first 
time since the end of World War II. Furthermore, Japanese firms began to emerge as major 
competitors. The European economic policy of the time reflected this situation. The 
response to the crisis was to strengthen and move forward with the integration process.95  
 
At the beginning of the 1980s, there was almost no positive news relating to the 
achievement of community goals.96 To overcome the crisis, the CJEU maintained its role 
as “the momentum of integration” relying mainly on the competition law system and 
strengthening its power. For instance, it began to apply Article 102 TFEU  to mergers. It 
also started to demand more sufficient evidence. Similarly, the Commission became more 
active in competition law and policy to protect European national economies, primarily by 
strengthening the competitiveness of European undertakings. In the 1980s, the 
Commission started to focus on the efficiency of competition. Vertical restraints remained 
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at the centre of competition policy; however, at the end of the 1980s, the Commission 
increased its focus on horizontal agreements.97 
 
The CJEU emphasised the importance of the common market in EU competition law (in 
that time EEC competition law) in the cases of Metro v. Commission98 and Polydor Ltd et 
al. v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd et al.99 Following Consten & Grundig, it repeated that 
one of the objectives of the Treaty of Rome was the creation of a single market with 
similar conditions to a unified domestic market. The significance of the objective of the 
internal market is also obvious in the vertical restraint case of Nungesser & Eisele.100 
 
Importantly, Decision 88/591/ECSC/EEC101 established the General Court (originally, the 
Court of First Instance) to judge cases in competition and employment. This Court began 
operation in 1989.  
 
5.4.2. Cases and Legislation 
 
In this era, the Commission and the CJEU broadened their vertical cases to include other 
forms of vertical restraints and distribution mechanisms, such as RPM, franchising systems 
and selective distribution systems. In the 1980s, based on these vertical cases, the 
Commission issued new regulations, including three vertical restraint block exemptions: 
Regulation on Exclusive Distribution Agreements 1983/83102, Regulation on Exclusive 
Purchasing Agreements 1984/83103 (including special provisions on beer supply and petrol 
agreements) and Regulation on Franchising Agreements 4087/88.104  
 
The case of Metro105 introduced a basic rule for selective distribution systems. It stated that 
distributors should not be chosen according to the quantitative restrictions of distributors, 
rather they should be chosen according to “objective non-discriminatory, qualitative 
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 Green, Hartley, Usher, The Legal Foundations, 203-204; Gerber, Competition in Twentieth Century 
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criteria relating to the technical qualifications and the suitability of trading premises”.106 
The CJEU highlighted that price competition should never be eliminated. Nevertheless, it 
also stated that price competition was not the only form of competition.107  
 
In the case of Schmidt,108 the CJEU further ruled that a manufacturer had no duty to supply 
all distributors who fulfil the objective criteria.109 In the case of AEG Telefunken,110 in 
1985, the CJEU acknowledged that the system of selective distribution was legal if it was 
required for specialised handling and sophisticated products.111 
 
In the case of Binon,112 the Court stated that any price fixing, including the fixing of 
newspaper and periodical prices, infringed Article 101(1).113 However, this could be 
exempted under Article 101(3). At that time it was the Commission who was responsible 
for granting exemptions under Article 101(3). As this was a preliminary ruling, the Court 
did not discuss this issue further.114 
 
Franchising was introduced into Europe in the 1960s after a long existence in the US.115 
The case of Pronuptia116 set the rules for franchising systems. It confirmed that franchising 
systems did not generally restrict competition, with the exception of restrictions on RPM 
and absolute territorial protections. In several cases, the Court confirmed the 
Commission’s opinion that an agreement that set minimum prices or fixed prices had an 
illegal object and infringed Article 101(1). However, despite this approach, a franchisor or 
other suppliers were able to provide their distributors with price guidelines.117  
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In the case of Nungesser & Eisele,118 the CJEU confirmed that absolute territorial 
protection was prohibited. Nevertheless, the CJEU ruled that exclusive licences were 
justifiable on the basis that investment was necessary to penetrate the market and to protect 
intellectual property rights. Also, the case of single branding in Delimitis,119 clarified that 
vertical restrictions were allowed if difficulties in penetrating a new market existed.120 In 
the case of Remia,121 the CJEU ruled that territorial restrictions protecting goodwill did not 
infringe Article 101(1). 
 
The Commission and CJEU started to develop a doctrine which differentiated between 
multilateral and unilateral conducts. They confirmed the existence of illegal agreements in 
situations where suppliers announced restrictive policies and their distributors generally, 
and in various forms, followed.122 For example, in the case of Sandoz,123 the CJEU 
confirmed the Commission’s decision that sending invoices by the supplier with the 
wording “export prohibited”, which were then followed by non-exporting distributors 
constituted an agreement that restricted competition. In another case, Eco 
System/Peugeot,124 the Commission stated that it was not necessary to prove that written 
instructions sent by a manufacturer had been accepted by its distributors, as such 
instructions created an agreement within the meaning of Article 101.125 However, later, the 
newly established General Court started to change this broad approach to the meaning of 
“the agreement”, requiring further evidence of an offer and an acceptance.126 
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5.4.2.1. VTR 
 
A) Nungesser & Eisele127 
 
This case discussed the breeding of a new plant variety, regulated by national law and 
requiring a registration of the plant variety.128 The case concerned exclusive dealership in 
the Federal Republic of Germany which, at the time, constituted one geographic market.129 
A French company assigned its breeders the rights of its new plant variety to be registered 
under its exclusive distributor in Germany.130 In this case, the only entity allowed to enter 
the German market was the exclusive distributor and the French producer but only on the 
proviso that it did not cover more than one third of German consumer demand.131  
 
As in Consten & Grundig, the Court analysed whether IP protection had caused the 
restriction of competition or whether the restriction had resulted from the agreement 
between the producer and the distributor. In addition to this, the Court used the principle of 
proportionality when applying both Articles 101(1) and 101(3) and concluded that, 
although absolute territorial protection could not be justified, an open exclusive licence 
could be proportionate and thus justifiable under Article 101(3). 
 
1) Territorial Protection: the Principle of Proportionality in IP Rights and 
Competition Law 
 
The first question discussed by the CJEU was whether the relevant German legislation 
legalised territorial restrictions to protect the new plant variety.132 The Court observed that 
the legislation in question did not require exclusive production; the applied territorial 
restriction was merely based on contractual arrangements between the French producers 
and the German distributor.133 The Court applied the principle of proportionality, stating 
that absolute territorial protection that did not allow parallel import when exercising 
intellectual property rights could infringe Article 101.134  
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2) Justification in General: the Principle of Proportionality 
 
The Court highlighted that the collusion in question needed to improve the production or 
distribution of goods or promote technical progress to satisfy the conditions set out in 
Article 101(3). The restriction could not go beyond what is necessary for these pro-
competitive effects to be realised.135 Among others, the seeds concerned were used by a 
large number of farmers and, thus, absolute territorial protection went beyond what is 
necessary, as technological innovation does not offer a reason for other distributors not 
competing once the seeds were available for purchase.136   
 
The principle of proportionality is the correct approach when two legal interests, two areas 
of law such as competition law and IP law, meet. If the restriction of one interest is 
reasonably based on the second interest, it must be also proportionate to ensure the right 
balance and the protection of both interests. 
 
3) Penetrating the Market – Justification 
 
The applicants argued that the Commission should have granted them an exemption based 
on the fact that the agreements concerned, including absolute territorial protection, assisted 
in penetrating a new market and launching new products in that market. The purpose of the 
agreement was to penetrate a new market and exclusivity did not go beyond what was 
necessary for this purpose and for the improvement of the production and distribution of 
goods.137  
 
The Court explained that the agreement that had constituted the exclusive distribution was 
signed because the French producer did not have the capacity to distribute to a new market 
itself.138 However, the agreement in question constituted an absolute territorial protection 
including a ban on parallel imports from third parties.139 Following older cases and 
applying the principle of proportionality, the Court concluded that it would have been 
reasonable if the seeds in question, with their technological and innovative aspects, were 
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protected with “an open exclusive licence” without the ban on parallel imports.140 
Moreover, the Court highlighted several times that the prohibition of parallel imports by 
any kind of licensee would be in contrary to the objectives of the Treaty.141 
 
5.4.2.2. Selective Distribution System  
 
A) AEG-Telefunken:142 RPM with Partial Territorial Protection 
 
In this case, the applicant was a German producer and distributor of electronic products, 
selling its products through its branches and subsidiaries in Europe.143 It introduced a 
selective distribution system, called the “Five-Point Programme”.144 The Commission 
suspected that the selective distribution system had not been applied according to the 
scheme outlined to the Commission but that, in reality, it had involved RPM and other 
non-notified practices, such as non-written selective criteria. It found evidence that 
confirmed this suspicion and imposed a fine.145 
 
1) Selective Distribution Systems 
 
The Court explained that it had already stated several times that although a selective 
system affected competition in the common market, it could be legal in some 
circumstances, such as a necessity to provide specific services regarding high-quality and 
high-technology products. These products could even justify a reduction in price 
competition in so far as it improved non-price competition.146 Such a limitation is only 
acceptable if the selective distribution leads to an improvement of competition. Otherwise, 
the only effect would be a reduction of price competition.147  
 
As explained in Metro, a selective distribution system is permissible if the distributors are 
chosen based on objective qualitative criteria that do not discriminate against any other 
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distributors. Any other criteria infringe Article 101(1). Therefore, RPM, as part of a 
selective distribution system, is unlawful.148 
 
2) Multilateral Conduct 
 
The applicant, AEG, claimed that influencing and setting retail prices were unilateral 
conducts.149 The Court disagreed. It explained that a situation where it is advisable for 
distributors to engage in certain conduct did not in itself prove the existence of multilateral 
conduct. However, it agreed with the Commission in that this could indicate that the 
distributors concerned had not taken excessive risks by maintaining high prices because 
they had known about the price policy and had been willing to follow it.150 
 
The Commission observed and assumed that a great majority of distributors had followed 
the policy and, thus, they had opposed low prices. Their willingness assisted the producer 
in maintaining prices and threatening others who were against the policy.151 
 
RPM, as part of selective distribution, does not constitute a manufacturer’s unilateral 
conduct but is based on a contractual relationship between the manufacturer and its 
distributors. Distributor approvals, which can be tacit or expressed, were required by the 
manufacturer as a condition to join the selective distribution system.152 Furthermore, 
refusals to accept distributors who fulfilled the objective qualitative criteria but did not 
wish to follow the price policy prove the existence of RPM.153 
 
The Commission ruled in its decision that the applicant had maintained high prices through 
an improper application of its selective distribution system and had therefore infringed 
Article 101(1) TFEU.154 Non-acceptances or terminations of distribution contracts with 
distributors who fulfilled the conditions of the objective quantitative criteria were not just 
sporadic mistakes but deliberate and systematic actions based on RPM.155 
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The Commission’s inspections of the applicant’s premises showed that the applicant, the 
producer, had deliberately maintained a high profit margin to provide “the very expensive 
services associated with the specialist trade”.156 In some cases, AEG also used territorial 
protections to motivate its distributors to join the network.157 For example, the Commission 
found that in the Federal Republic of Germany, the applicant did not accept a German 
undertaking to sell its products because it was a discount store.158 Another distributor 
would not provide a guarantee to the applicant that it would not supply discount stores and 
would not export to other Member States and for these reasons the applicant banned it 
from its distribution network.159 One distributor promised not to sell under the lowest price 
on the market but to sell somewhere between the average retail prices.160 
 
In France, the applicant issued a memorandum where it promoted fixed prices and required 
an assurance of compliance with the price policy.161 The applicant asked one of its 
distributors to increase its prices for the applicant’s products in their promotional 
catalogue.162 Two distributors asked the applicant to indicate minimum retail prices.163 
Another distributor promised the appellant that they would not use an obtained 
promotional discount to decrease their retail prices.164 
 
The Court confirmed that the aforementioned examples, as well as other conduct, proved 
the improper application of the selective distribution system and an infringement of Article 
101.165  
 
It is questionable whether this case would be recognised as involving unilateral or 
multilateral conducts if it was judged in the US. One could assume that the US Federal 
Court would have found some actions as unilateral under the Colgate doctrine, given the 
fact that manufacturers in the US are free to determine retail (sale) prices, announce them 
and choose their distributors based on whether the distributors follow the announced prices 
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or not. Similarly, they are free to terminate distributorship contracts if they charge different 
prices.166  
 
However, the actions that went beyond the Colgate doctrine, as they involved further 
cooperation between AEG and its distributors, could be also considered as multilateral in 
the US.167 In general, the exact boundaries between unilateral and multilateral conducts are 
difficult to establish under the Colgate doctrine and subsequent cases.168 
 
3) The Justification of Higher Prices Including the Theory of Services 
 
The applicant also argued that the higher prices were justified by the higher cost of the 
specialised trade which increased prices. A distribution system should offer distributors an 
assurance of the enjoyment of a minimum margin. Furthermore, it claimed that the system 
was beneficial for consumers as it preserved continuity in the distribution channel, which 
was in accordance with both Article 101(1) and 101(3).169 
 
The Court explained that, contrary to Metro, which had not included direct price 
restrictions but the system had influenced price competition only indirectly, this case 
included RPM. It stated that RPM could be justified only up to a certain level and only in 
some circumstances, such as obtaining an appropriate profit margin to ensure the quality of 
services. This is lawful only if the system in question performs the functions assigned to it 
by the Treaty. Therefore, the system must improve competition.170 
 
However, RPM in the selective distribution system was generally unjustified because it did 
not motivate distributors to keep fulfilling objective qualitative criteria to remain in the 
network but was a reason to stop supplying to distributors who did not want, or were not 
able, to maintain the prices. Therefore, RPM in this selective distribution system was 
illegal and restricted competition.171 However, this does not eliminate the producer’s right 
to observe whether discounting distributors were capable of providing the required services 
based on the selective distribution system.172 
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5.4.2.3. RPM and VTR in Franchising Systems 
 
A) Pronuptia173 
 
This preliminary ruling dealt with the application of Article 101(3) based on a franchising 
agreement, including exclusive dealing arrangements.174 The franchising agreement was 
concluded between Pronuptia de Paris, a French franchisor, and a German franchisee to 
distribute wedding dresses and other wedding articles of clothing protected by the 
trademark “Pronuptia de Paris”. The products were distributed via franchisees and other 
non-franchising distributors in the Federal Republic of Germany.175 
 
The franchisee signed three franchising agreements with the franchisor for three different 
locations.176 Among others, the agreements included granting an exclusive territory, the 
exclusive use of the trademark for marketing and promoting the goods and services and the 
restriction to resell to third retailers/distributors. The franchisor undertook to assist the 
franchisee with commercial aspects such as staff training and promoting and disclosed its 
know-how on improving the franchisee’s turnover and profitability.177 
 
1) Franchising Systems - RPM and Territorial Restrictions 
 
In contrast to US cases on vertical restraints in antitrust law, where the US Federal Courts 
applied the term “franchising” without further determination of its meaning and without 
strict differentiation between franchising and non-franchising systems,178 the EU courts 
clearly explained the term “franchising” and established the boundaries between justified 
and illegal franchising under competition law.179  
 
The CJEU highlighted the diversity of franchising agreements as franchising systems 
themselves differ strongly. There are franchising systems that offer services, as well as 
producing franchising systems under which the franchisee manufactures some products, 
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and a distribution franchising system under which a franchisee sells the franchisor’s 
products.180 
 
In the distribution franchising system, a franchisee benefits from, and does not have to 
invest its own capital in an already-existing successful business name and business 
methods. Therefore, franchise agreements differ from dealerships or selective-distribution 
agreements because, with the exception of selling products, the distributors do not profit 
from the success, the business name and the business methods of the producer.181 
 
In this particular case, the Court applied the principle of proportionality when discussing 
the different conditions of franchising systems. It recognised two conditions that had to 
apply to guarantee the same quality for the public.182  
  
First, the franchisor must disclose its know-how to the franchisee and provide its assistance 
so that the franchisee can start and maintain its business and bear any risks associated with 
the business. On the other hand, the franchisee is not allowed to compete with the 
franchisor for a reasonable period after the termination of the franchise agreement. The 
franchisee is also not allowed to transfer its business to another party. This does not 
constitute restrictions on competition under Article 101(1) as its intention is to protect 
know-how.183 
 
Second, any provision which necessarily controls the maintenance of the identity and 
reputation of the franchisor’s business and network, including decorating the shop 
according to franchisor’s instructions and other promotional conditions, does not infringe 
Article 101(1).184 
 
On the other hand, any RPM and market differentiation, including territorial restrictions, 
go beyond what is necessary within a franchising system and thus infringe Article 101(1). 
Such actions restrict competition and do not serve the purpose of protecting know-how.185 
However, if this serves the purpose of penetrating the market by motivating an undertaking 
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to become a franchisor, this must be considered and analysed as an exemption to Article 
101(3).186  
 
Market sharing within a franchising system has the potential to affect trade between 
Member States, even though the market is shared within one Member State, in so far as 
such a provision prevents franchisees from establishing themselves in another Member 
State.187 As this was a preliminary-ruling case, the question remains whether territorial 
restraints in this case could be exempted under Article 101(3). 
 
5.5. The Beginning of the European Union and the Monetary Union – the 1990s 
 
5.5.1. Background 
 
Competition and its policies have strengthened since their inception and have become the 
central goals of the Community.188 The Maastricht Treaty states that Member States should 
create economic policy based on the principle of an open-market economy with free 
competition.189 The single market remains the fundamental political objective.190 Indeed, 
the importance of the market integration continued to be emphasised in EU competition 
case law (in that time, after the Maastricht Treaty, EC competition case law).191 
 
The Commission, being aware of a lack of a vertical framework, published the Green 
Paper on vertical restraints in 1996.192 The Commission observed that distribution had 
been changing due to developments in information technology and new distribution 
systems, which had resulted in an ongoing greater concentration and integration, and the 
decline of traditional distribution channels (manufacturers-wholesalers-retailers).193 
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The Green Paper stressed the integration of the different economic systems of the Member 
States and the creation of a single market as the main objective of EU competition policy 
(in that time, EC competition policy), placing singular importance on market penetration 
without the barriers that could be created by vertical agreements.194 Moreover, it 
highlighted the importance of the existence and protection of parallel trade in the 
Community market.195 On the other hand, the Green Paper stated that a review was also 
important because the single market legislation was largely in place and the methods of 
distribution had changed.196 
 
Economic efficiency and a full economic assessment began to be central to Commission’s 
decisions and policies. The Commission recognised that vertical restraints could promote 
objective efficiencies; “efficiency” and “fairness” of competition were the primary 
objectives of EU competition law.197 This is also reflected in the Green Paper, which 
stressed that the form of conduct is not important but the impact on the market is essential. 
Vertical restraints can be allowed for a certain period when they are being used to expand 
or penetrate the market. Vertical restraints can promote objective efficiencies.198 It 
observed that the previous system was criticised mainly for a lack of analysis of economic 
impacts, a lack of flexibility resulting in a strait-jacket effect, over-regulation and 
discrimination against the plurality of distribution systems.199 It analysed the relationship 
between and the importance of intrabrand and interbrand competition, the market structure 
and the structure of distribution.200 
 
In Van den Bergh Foods Ltd.,201 the General Court acknowledged that economic 
understanding and market analysis were essential in competition cases.202 Furthermore, the 
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jurisdiction of the General Court broadened in the 1990s including, for instance, 
trademarks and state aid.203 
 
There are several other issues that the Green Paper addressed. For example, distinguishing 
between the pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects of restrictions, facilitating market 
integration, permitting new and innovative distribution systems, consumer welfare and 
market share thresholds, legal certainty, decentralisation and a possible need for 
substantive legal changes, to name a few.204  
 
5.5.2. Cases and Legislation 
 
Based on the Green Paper, the Commission adopted a new block exemption on vertical 
restraints, Regulation 2790/99 (“Regulation 1999”), 205 with guidelines on vertical 
restraints (“Guidelines 1999”) in December 1999. 206 These replaced the three previous 
vertical regulations. In comparison with the older regulations, the new ones introduced 
significant changes recognising the possible benefits of vertical restraints and heralding a 
more economic approach to vertical restraints.207  
 
Generally, Regulation 1999 lightened the burden of individual exemptions on vertical 
agreements by introducing a system where parties were responsible for determining 
whether their vertical agreements and arrangements fulfilled the conditions of the block 
exemption.208 Both documents covered all forms of vertical restraints for products and 
services and were applied to vertical restraints in general for the first time. The block 
exemption applied only if the supplier’s market share was below 30%. The Regulation 
reflects the fact that the Commission had to merge different interests and opinions. One of 
the Commission’s main concerns was that territorial restrictions imposed on distributors 
contradicted the single market objective.209 Simultaneously, case law highlighted the 
benefits of territorial restrictions when making investments to launch new products or 
penetrating new markets.210 These aspects were included in Guidelines 1999.211 
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Further regulations and guidelines were introduced tackling issues such as technology 
transfer agreements, joint ventures, research and development.212 In 1998, guidelines on 
fines213 were issued and other regulations were adopted.214  
 
The case of Leclerc v. Commission discussed the position of a selective distribution system 
based on luxury criteria. In particular, if a manufacturer selected only those resellers who 
provided luxury goods or services, this was considered to be legal as far as the criteria 
were necessary and also included hypermarkets.215 In the case of 
Novalliance/Systemform,216 the Court argued that conduct based on an agreement that did 
not explicitly include an absolute territorial protection or an export ban on a distributor but 
whose purpose was such a restriction infringed Article 101(1). The case of Delimitis 
explained that even a small, relevant market such as Frankfurt in Germany could have an 
impact on the trade between Member States. 
 
5.5.2.1. Territorial Restrictions with Partial RPM:  Novalliance/Systemform217 
 
Systemform GmbH was a German undertaking who, among other activities, manufactured 
equipment for processing computer printouts. The company was sold to ECV Edition 
Cantor Verlag in 1995.218 Novalliance, the complainant, was a French dealer who sold 
office equipment, primarily in computer-printing and post-handling systems. Novapost, a 
Greek undertaking, distributed for Systemform. Both Novalliance and Novapost formed 
one economic entity with Eurinvest.219 
 
The relevant product market was created by devices for handling and processing large 
computer printouts of medium-volume applications.220 The geographic market could be 
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considered to be the whole EU; however, the Commission left this question open as the 
restriction was not affected by the market size.221 
 
1) Agreements including Territorial and Price Restraints and Export Ban 
 
Systemform concluded agreements with exclusive distributors outside of Germany and 
with several distributors inside Germany.222 Both the exclusive and German distribution 
systems included territorial restrictions,223 in that the distributors agreed not to sell to any 
undertaking passively or actively outside their own territories.224 The Commission stated 
that the aforementioned agreements infringed Article 101(1) in both their anti-competitive 
object and effect.225  
 
Novalliance complained that Systemform had imposed a ban on exports by delaying 
supplies.226 The Commission further explained that the territorial restrictions prohibiting 
selling to any undertaking with an office outside the contractual territory was an export 
ban. Moreover, some agreements also included a prohibition to sell to undertakings inside 
the territory but who intended to export the products.227 This restricted the freedom of 
distributors to choose their own customers.228 
 
The agreements also included price restrictions. Systemform fixed retail prices for the 
territory concerned with each of its distributors and some distributors agreed to inform 
Systemform if prices changed.229 Systemform claimed that those clauses fixing prices were 
not enforced.230 However, the Commission found that the agreements restricted the 
freedom of distributors to determine their own resale prices.231 
 
The Commission highlighted that distributors should have the freedom to conduct their 
business, which includes freedom of choice of price and customers. This complemented 
the understanding of ownership rights as explained by the Supreme Court in the previous 
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US case of Dr Miles.232 It is also further discussed and advocated in Chapter 6 “Theories of 
Pro-Competitiveness v. Anti-Competitiveness”. 
 
2) The Effect on Trade 
 
Both territorial restrictions and RPM had their effect in restricting competition in the cases 
where Systemform did not enforce these restrictions. When they were enforced, 
competition was restricted by object.233 The effect on trade between the Member States 
was appreciable because of the market share of Systemform, the nature of the restrictions 
and the fact that restrictions occurred in several contracts during that time in the EEA.234 
 
3) Pro-Competitive Effects 
 
The Commission confirmed that even exclusive distribution could have possible benefits if 
the excusive distributions lead to technical and economic progress by improving the 
distribution of goods. However, the agreements in question contained such restrictions on 
competition which completely prohibited distributors from selling outside their territories 
or to other customers and this harmed consumers. Therefore, the conditions for an 
exemption were not met.235 
 
4) Interbrand Competition – Market Shares 
 
The Commission also discussed the possibility of the effect on interbrand competition. 
However, it simply stated that interbrand competition was likely not to be affected because 
Systemform did not have a sufficient market share.236 It could be argued, however, that a 
lack of market share on its own does not prove the non-existence of an impact on 
interbrand competition in vertical restraints and does not even determine whether vertical 
competition was restricted significantly.237 
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Although it can be enough to find a restriction on intrabrand competition under the EU law 
of vertical restraints,238 the differentiation between interbrand and intrabrand competition 
plays a rather important role in the US approach. The US courts generally presume that a 
decrease in intrabrand competition increases interbrand competition. Such situations are 
typical not only for VTR but also for RPM and such “restraints” would be legal because 
interbrand competition is economically more valuable than intrabrand competition under 
US antitrust law.239 However, the approach and understanding differ when horizontal 
intrabrand restrictions are included, which are illegal per se.240 
 
5.6. The Beginning of New Millennium 
 
5.6.1. Background 
 
The Commission has been very active in reviewing and issuing new legislation. Since 
2002, the Commission has reviewed and changed several regulations and has issued a 
number of new guidelines and regulations in new areas.241 In June 2010, the new 
Regulation and Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (“Regulation and Guidelines”)242 came 
into force and will be valid until 2022. Furthermore, the economic crisis, which started in 
2008, changed the competition-policy focus to crucial areas such as state aid, the banking 
sector and the automobile sector. The Commission has also acknowledged the importance 
of simplifying and communicating competition law and policy to the public by issuing best 
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practices for proceedings under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, merger controls and the 
submission of economic evidence.243  
 
In the 2000s, discussion on assisting consumers to obtain redress for the damage caused 
through cartels began with support from the Commission.244 In December 2005, the 
Commission adopted the Green Paper on Damages Actions245 together with a Commission 
Staff Working Paper on the topic. In April 2008, the Commission presented its White 
Paper on private damages actions246 and, in June 2011, the Commission asked the public 
for consultation of its draft. The main aim was to increase the level of private enforcement 
in order to help victims of infringements to obtain compensation.  
 
One of the objectives of the Community was to establish a “system ensuring that 
competition in the internal market is not distorted” as stated in Article 3(1)(g) of the EC 
Treaty. The Treaty of Lisbon repealed this Article and replaced it with Protocol 27 which 
links the system of undistorted competition with establishing a fully-effective internal 
market. Lisbon’s Protocols have the same legal status as the treaties; therefore, this 
objective remains with the same legal power. 
 
For the first time, Article 3(1)(b) TFEU ensured the exclusive competence of the EU to 
establish competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market. Article 120 
of the TFEU requires that the EU and Member States act in accordance with the “principle 
of an open market economy with free competition”. 
 
Pivotal legislation, Council Regulation 1/2003,247 became effective in May 2004 and was a 
result of the Commission’s White Paper from 1999.248 It included changes in enforcement 
based on the direct applicability of Article 101(3) and empowered both national 
competition authorities and national courts to apply the EU antitrust rules (in that time, EC 
antitrust rules) directly and in an effective manner. A cooperative competition network 
with national competition authorities, the European Competition Network, was created to 
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control who decides what, informing each other about their cases and other issues. The 
Commission’s power was strengthened to investigate possible infringements more 
effectively.249 
 
On 29th of April 2009, the Commission published the “Report on the Functioning of 
Regulation 1/2003”. The general conclusion of the report was that Regulation 1/2003 had 
contributed to more efficient and effective enforcement of EU competition law and the 
modernised enforcement of EU antitrust rules had come into force. However, the report 
also highlighted a few problems, such as the problematic cooperation with national 
courts.250 
 
At the beginning of the existence of EU competition law, the importance of and strict 
opinions on vertical restraints were formed. The situation slowly changed from the 
previous era when the Commission had started to concentrate more on cartels, including 
criminalisation of cartels, and mergers assuming that vertical restrictions were not as 
harmful as horizontal restrictions and illegal mergers.251  
 
However, the public interest in vertical restraints increased after 2007 as this year was an 
important milestone for US policy on vertical restraints, most notably RPM. That was the 
year that the US Supreme Court changed the per se rule to the rule of reason for all RPM 
forms in Leegin.252 This also shifted the focus of RPM in the EU. Nevertheless, the 
Commission confirmed the existing approach in its new Regulation and Guidelines.253 
 
In 2009, the Commission published a draft of new Regulations and Guidelines on vertical 
restraints and invited the public to take part in discussions on the matter. The documents 
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did not change the policy of vertical restraints dramatically and passive sale, minimum 
resale maintenance and retail price fixing remained as the hard core restrictions. 
 
Logically, consumers appealed to the Commission to keep the protective approach and to 
take it even further, as they believed there was no justification for the 2-year protection of 
new products to penetrate the market.254 On the other hand, businesses represented by law 
firms welcomed this period for starting a new distribution and/or penetrating a new 
market.255 Consumers agreed with the Commission’s view on keeping the hard core 
approach to RPM in the EU, which differed from the US case of Leegin.256 They explained 
that free riding is of benefit to society and consumers as it decreases prices, improves 
innovation and adapts to consumer demand. The message was very strong urging the 
Commission to protect free riding and freedom of choice.257 
 
Generally, the main change in the new Regulation and the new Guidelines was the 
introduction of a 30% threshold of buyer power.258 This was recognised as a further burden 
on companies by the public. The practical side of this change was questioned based on the 
difficulties of estimating the market share regarding the length of time, obtaining and 
possessing data, the market structure including its concentration and the existence of the 
same vertical agreements with a number of buyers, or a vertical network. The Commission 
was asked to abandon this change.259 The public demanded further explanation of the 
analysis of buyer power as provided in paragraph 112 of the Guidelines.260 It was 
suggested that, instead, the Commission should provide the public with a list of the types 
of vertical restraints where the market share of the buyers is relevant.261 Specifically, the 
AMCHAM EU believed that only exclusive supply contracts should be concerned with 
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buyer market power.262 The ICC explained that some forms of concentration among buyers 
can establish illegal horizontal agreements and, therefore, analysis of horizontal actions in 
such cases would be more appropriate than the 30% threshold of buyer power in vertical 
arrangements.263 
 
Logically, consumers were concerned and disagreed with any possibility of a weakening of 
hard core restrictions.264 Additionally, they welcomed the protection of the freedom of 
distributors’ internet-advertising, asking for even more freedom for distributors with 
regards to, among others, exclusive distribution systems.265 On the other hand, businesses 
and the ICC welcomed a weakening of further limitations to the hard core restrictions, for 
instance, paragraph 225 of the Guidelines allows franchisors to fix resale prices, to 
organise a coordinated short-term low price campaign for a duration of up to 6 weeks, and 
recognises other efficiencies of RPM.266 
 
AMCHAM EU, EFPIA and the ICC criticised the proposed Regulation for prohibiting 
some active sales in VTR and urged the Commission to keep only the prohibition of 
passive sales as hard core restrictions.267 AMCHAM EU pointed out that suppliers could 
be driven by this policy to choose more restrictive distribution systems, such as exclusive 
distribution, because that would be the only way they could legally apply active sales 
restrictions. Furthermore, it appealed to the Commission to extend the recognition of the 
efficiencies of restrictions on active sales beyond exclusive distribution agreements, as it 
did not recognise any reason why such efficiencies should not apply to other distribution 
systems as well.268  
 
The Commission accepted some of the suggestions from the public and made adjustments 
accordingly. For instance, Article 4(b)(iii) of the proposed Regulation originally stated “in 
the markets where such a system is operated”. However, in the published Regulation, it 
says: “The restriction of sales by the members of a selective distribution system to 
unauthorised distributors …”, which was at the suggestion of the legal firm LAWIN.269  
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Nevertheless, some criticisms remained. For example, Dethmers and Posthuma de Boer 
highlighted that, under Guidelines 1999 and Regulation 1999, the system of vertical 
restraints was not clear; it lacked legal certainty and was inconsistent.270 Among others, 
they argued that it was not obvious whether the list of hard core restrictions were 
exhaustive as paragraph 23 in Guidelines 1999 stated that it was not, but the nature of 
Regulation indicated the opposite.271 Furthermore, it was not clear whether Article 101(3) 
also applied to hard core restrictions and paragraph 135 in the Guidelines 1999 stated that 
it was not applicable to dominant undertakings.272 Even following the adoption of the 
revised regulations and the revised Guidelines in May 2010, the existence of hard core 
restrictions has been criticised, arguing that the same approach taken to non-hard core 
restrictions should also apply to hard core restrictions.273 Jones highlights that restrictions 
by object have expanded since the beginning of the EU (originally, EEC); however, the list 
has not been narrowed.274 Colino argues that it is even questionable whether vertical 
restraints, or at least some of them, infringe Article 101(1) in the first place.275 However, as 
this thesis argues, although RPM and VTR can have pro-competitive effects and thus can 
be, at least theoretically, justified under Article 101(3), they restrict competition in the first 
place. The key problem is the requirement of multilateral forms under Article 101(1). 
 
Although the revised Regulation and Guidelines were not so different from Regulation 
1999, they both highlight that Article 101(3) also applies to hard core restrictions;276 and 
the list of hard core restrictions is exhaustive.277 Thus, they eliminated any doubts in that 
sense. Furthermore, any presumption of applying the same approach to hard core 
restrictions in the EU as the per se rule in the US was avoided. Nevertheless, as Jones 
discusses, it will be difficult to eliminate the long-existing presumption that hard core 
restraints are illegal per se and that entities will risk the application of hard core 
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restrictions. Furthermore, it is not even clear whether the Commission will start changing 
the strict approach in practice.278 
 
5.6.2. Cases and Legislation 
 
New Regulation and Guidelines on Vertical Restraints came into force in June 2010 and 
will be valid until 2022. The main change introduced was to stipulate that for the block 
exemption, the market share of the producer as well as the market share of the buyer must 
not exceed 30%.279 This had already been changed in the technology transfer block 
exemption in 2004.280 With respect to RPM and VTR, the main policy remained the same. 
The only change was that the Guidelines added further exemptions to the main hard core 
rule and explanations, which are reflected in the difference between active and passive 
sales, internet sales, promotion and advertising.281 
 
Interestingly, the Commission started to shift its focus from the protection of competition 
to the protection of consumers in its policy and decisions since it started the process of 
reviewing the existing Regulations and Guidelines in the new millennium.282 This 
objective of competition law is also reflected in new Regulation and the Guidelines on 
vertical restraints.283 Naturally, this shift was welcomed by consumers and their 
associations.284 However, the CJEU primarily disagreed with highlighting that the 
objective of EU competition law was not the protection of effective competition and has 
refused any understanding of strict shift of the objective of EU competition law to 
consumer welfare.285 
 
Furthermore, in this last era and since the notification system has changed, the main 
interest of the Commission has been parallel imports, most notably in the car industry, 
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which is reflected in the Commission’s decisions on vertical restraints.286 Given that it was 
the Commission itself who initiated or decided to begin investigations, and not the entities 
notifying their policies, these decisions reveal the Commission’s genuine policy in 
practice. This leads to the assumption that, in reality, market integration is still the essential 
and even the main objective of the EU law of vertical restraints. This is in accordance with 
both Article 3(1)(g) of the EC Treaty and Protocol 27 of the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
This period, beginning with the new millennium, is typified by the judicial changes of the 
strict view on vertical restraints and on the existence of multilateral conducts among 
parties, as required under Article 101. The Commission’s strict approach has continued to 
be challenged by the EU Courts, particularly by the General Court.287 For instance, as 
discussed below, the Bayer case288 clarified that the mere application of anti-competitive 
policy on distributors was unilateral conduct; unless, the distributors had known about the 
policy through the manufacturer, which was qualified as an offer, and had decided to 
follow the policy, which is recognised as acceptance.  
 
The General Court’s judgment in Volkswagen II289 introduced another positive change, 
stating that distributors could not agree with any supplier’s future policy in advance, 
namely when this policy infringed the law and thus such conduct could not establish an 
agreement.290 On appeal,291 the CJEU upheld the General Court’s judgment; however, it 
did not agree that future measures of a supplier had to be foreseen by the dealership 
agreement. It further stated that the clauses of the dealership agreement had to be examined 
to determine whether they authorised RPM.292  
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In the case of Peugeot Nederland,293 the General Court confirmed that proof of a tacit 
acquiescence in relation to given unilateral behaviour was the minimum standard for 
establishing an agreement under Article 101(1). The General Court further highlighted that 
the restrictions of passive sales and parallel trade of the agreements in question constituted 
an infringement by object under Article 101(1) TFEU. Proof of the absence of anti-
competitive effects is not relevant in the rebuttal to the existence of an infringement by 
object. However, the actual impact of the infringement on the market is relevant, 
particularly where this could be measured to assess the gravity of that infringement.294 
Finally, the General Court approved the Commission's characterisation of the restrictions 
of passive sales and parallel trade as very serious infringements of EU competition rules 
since it, inter alia, contradicted the internal market as one of the most fundamental 
objectives of the EU (that time, EC).295  
 
The case of GSK296 shows that interbrand competition must be included in the analysis of 
vertical restraint cases. This is a significant change since Consten & Grundig and reflects 
the importance of the economic approach.297 The General Court’s tolerant approach 
towards parallel trade in the pharmaceutical sector is obvious here.298 It stated that GSK’s 
dual pricing did not have its object in the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition.299 Although this case introduced a few changes, most notably that the 
infringement of a vertical restriction cannot be assumed from the nature of multilateral 
conduct,300 in the appeal, the CJEU retained the traditional view.301 The CJEU endorsed 
the General Court’s ruling that the Commission had not properly examined GSK’s 
arguments for exemption under Article 101(3). However, it overturned the General Court’s 
finding that multilateral conduct could infringe Article 101(1) by its object only when it 
clearly harmed consumers. The CJEU clarified that any vertical agreement restricting 
parallel trade is restrictive by object.302 Similarly, any unilateral conduct that intends to 
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prevent parallel trade in the pharmaceutical sector can infringe Article 102 TFEU if it 
eliminates effective competition.303 
 
Significantly, the CJEU’s ruling in GSK clarified that restriction by object could require an 
economic evaluation. The object is measured by an objective standard. Furthermore, the 
intention of parties is not an essential factor and the restrictive intention itself is not illegal 
but can be taken into account.304 This approach was also confirmed in the case of T-Mobile 
Netherlands, which dealt with a horizontal restriction.305 
 
In the case of CISAC,306 the Commission found the common practice of bundling the 
copyrights and not allowing even online and broadcasting distribution among entities in 
different Member States to be an illegal territorial concerted practice. In the merger case of 
Yamaha,307 the Commission stated that an obligation on the part of the distributors to 
contact the producer if the distributors wished to export via the internet formed an illegal 
territorial restriction. 
 
In the case of Nintendo,308 the Commission fined Nintendo a large amount for a vertical 
infringement, €167,8 million for Nintendo and seven of its European distributors, which 
gave Nintendo itself a fine of €149.128 million. The Commission found evidence of 
practices to block parallel trade from low-priced to high-priced territories or Member 
States. Exclusive distributions were replaced by absolute territorial protections and all 
competition was eliminated in each territory. 
 
The case on preliminary ruling, Pedro IV,309 included recommended retail prices. The 
CJEU stated that having a supplier fix a distribution margin restricts competition.310 With 
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respect to price recommendation, the CJEU concluded that the national court must 
determine whether the price was fixed in reality.311 
 
The case of Daimler Chrysler312 was the first case of its type after the Guidelines 1999 
framed the application of competition rules on agency agreements. It showed that a 
genuine agency could be responsible for some forms of risk. The General Court stated that 
an agency was not genuine if it carried similar obligations and rights as an independent 
undertaking, and that it was economically independent if the principal did not bear all of 
the risks associated with the contract negotiated on the principal’s behalf and the agent was 
not an auxiliary integrated into the principal’s business.313 The General Court concluded 
that the agents had no actual authority to sell vehicles to customers directly, they were not 
able to conclude the final terms of the contract or set the price of the sale, nor could they 
tie the principal to discounts or rebates without its consent. Such facts would show that the 
agencies were acting on behalf of the principal.314  
 
5.6.2.1. VTR - Parallel Trade   
 
A) Nintendo315 
 
Nintendo, a Japanese manufacturer, had exclusive distributors in Europe: The Games Ltd 
in Ireland and the UK; Concentra …SA in Portugal; Linea GIG SpA in Italy; Bergsaia AB 
in Sweden; Itochu Hellas EPE (1991-1997) and Nortec AE (since 1997) in Greece; and 
subsidiaries of CD-Contract Data GmbH in Belgium, in Luxembourg and in the 
Netherlands.316 Nintendo competed with two other Japanese companies, Sony and Sega, in 
the relevant market in 1997. In 1997, Nintendo had € 2 990 million worldwide turnover, 
Sony had € 3 001 million and Sega had € 820 million.317 
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In 1996, Omega Electro BV, a company registered in the Netherlands, lodged a complaint 
that Nintendo had hindered parallel trade (territorial restriction) and maintained resale 
prices in the Netherlands.318 
 
 1) Relevant Market 
 
The Commission determined that the relevant product market involved game consoles and 
video games or games cartridges which were not substitutable with static game consoles or 
hand-held consoles because of differing user needs.319 The geographical market was 
worldwide, covering, therefore, the whole EEA. However, it was divided into sections 
depending on different standards of TV sets in different Member States.320 The prices of 
Nintendo’s products differed as a result of a limitation of parallel trade, not because of the 
existence of different geographical markets.321 
 
 2) Parallel Import 
 
The prices of Nintendo products were low in the UK, with prices between 20-31% higher 
for game consoles and 4-65% higher for game cartridges in Germany than in the UK. 
Prices were also higher in other Member States,322 which resulted in parallel imports in 
1994.323 
 
Nintendo sent letters to its distributors asking them not to sell to undertakings that intended 
to or were known to export products. Nintendo also threatened distributors in a letter 
stating that if parallel imports remained they would cease the parallel import “with all 
measurements possible immediately”. Another letter included detailed rules for limiting 
parallel trade and for coordination.324 Despite these measures, interests in parallel trade 
remained.325 
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Nintendo boycotted the business of The Games because it had not been completely 
successful in its limitation of parallel trade.326 As a response, The Games took actions to 
stop selling to parties who were exporting the products, referring to the main distribution 
agreement with Nintendo. Due to The Games’ arrangements, parallel trading significantly 
reduced during 1996.327 
 
The Games actively continued the collaboration on limiting parallel exports. 
Simultaneously, The Games also expected Nintendo to take action to eliminate any parallel 
imports to the UK.328 Nintendo set its policy to exclude parallel exports and imports from 
Spain. It also had an arrangement with its distributor in the Netherlands to limit parallel 
exports and imports, and also implemented different methods in other Member States to 
monitor parallel imports and exports.329 The Commission concluded that not even passive 
exports were allowed and that this conduct had an impact on prices.330  
 
 3) Multilateral Conduct 
 
The Games argued that its actions towards its distributors (customers) were unilateral and 
not multilateral.331 According to the Commission, the multilateral actions were based on a 
written understanding between The Games and its customers that the customers would not 
export the products and/or resell them for export but would sell them only to UK final 
customers.332 When looking at intentions, the distributors wanted to export, The Games 
announced its own policy and pressured them to comply, thus the obvious question that 
arises is whether this action can really be classified as an agreement between The Games 
and its distributors?333 
 
According to the Commission, all of the actions in question were a combination of 
agreements and concerted practices forming a single and continuous infringement between 
the producer and its exclusive distributors and others.334 
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The participants, including the exclusive distributors, were aware of the participation of 
others. This is based on several pieces of evidence.335 Similar to this case, after the Colgate 
doctrine had been introduced in the US, the Supreme Court ruled in Parke, Davis that 
anything going beyond an announcement of retail prices and a refusal to supply to 
distributors who had not followed the price policy was multilateral conduct.336 Although, 
in contrary to the US cases in question, Nintendo was based on VTR, both the US and the 
EU cases involved combinations which went beyond the mere refusal to sell and which 
included further communication and actions in mutual agreements and were thus 
multilateral conducts. 
 
The Commission even expressed its opinion that acting likewise, in other words by 
following the manufacturer’s policy, the distributors confirmed the existence of 
multilateral conduct.337 However, such an assumption could contradict the Colgate 
doctrine and, therefore, the US Supreme Court could explain this aspect differently: as the 
application of unilateral conduct rather than multilateral conduct.338 Nevertheless, the case 
of Nintendo included further actions that prove the existence of a combination, such as 
letters and a mutual expectation of actions, and, hence, in accordance with Parke, Davis 
could be interpreted in the same way in the US.339 
  
 4) Restriction of Competition – Territorial Protection 
 
The object of the agreements and/or concerted practices in question restricted competition 
and formed an infringement within the meaning of Article 101(1) as it established absolute 
territorial protection eliminating even passive sales. Due to the existence of an illegal 
object, the Commission stated that the effects upon competition did not have to be 
determined.340 Nevertheless, the Commission listed examples where the anti-competitive 
effect occurred in the form of hindering parallel trade.341 
 
When applying Article 101(3), the Commission simply stated that the actions in question 
did not qualify for an exemption because exclusive territorial protection constitutes a hard 
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core restriction and the actions did not improve the distribution of the products, nor did the 
consumers benefit from them.342 
 
Nintendo appealed to the General Court regarding just the fine itself, which the court 
reduced to a total amount of € 119.2425 million.343 One distributor, CD-Contact Data 
GmbH (currently, Activision Blizzard Germany, GmbH), appealed claiming an 
insufficiency of evidence that it was involved in this illegal collusion constituting 
restrictive agreements and/or concerted practices.344 Although, CJEU disagreed with some 
evidential aspects of the Commission’s decision, it generally approved the Commission’s 
findings of the existence of a concurrence of wills.345 
 
Nevertheless, if the applied parties had based their claims for appeals on similar reasons as 
the parties had done in GSK, one would have to ask the question as to what the ruling of 
the General Court and the CJEU would have been.346 Applying the CJEU’s ruling, the 
CJEU would probably have confirmed the restriction of competition in object.347 However, 
applying the test on Article 101(3), both the CJEU and the General Court would have not 
been satisfied with the Commission’s application of Article 101(3) if The Games and 
Nintendo had introduced a possible justification during the Commission’s proceedings.348 
 
B) Bayer349 
 
The case of Bayer followed by Volkswagen started the process of gradually challenging the 
Commission’s broad and highly flexible view on the term “agreement”, including the term 
“concerted practice”. 
 
The applicant, Bayer AG, was a pharmaceutical company selling a product “Adalat”. 
Bayer AG sold to all Member States via subsidiaries who sold the product to wholesalers. 
The price of pharmaceutical products, including Adalat, was directly or indirectly fixed by 
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the national health authorities in many Member States, which led to different prices. The 
price of Adalat was 40% more expensive in the UK than in Spain and France between 
1989 and 1993. Thus, French and Spanish wholesalers were re-exporting the product to the 
UK. Bayer AG introduced its new policy based on quotas to stop the re-exporting of 
Adalat. Bayer AG supplied its distributors with Adalat in amounts that did not exceed the 
demand on domestic markets. Prior to this policy, Bayer had supplied distributors at their 
request.350 
 
 1) Multilateral v Unilateral Conduct 
 
The CJEU highlighted that it only has jurisdiction over points of law not points of facts.351 
It confirmed that the General Court correctly noted, from the documents provided by the 
Commission, that certain wholesalers had pretended that the demand for Adalat destined 
for the national market had increased. Based on this fact, the Court argued that this 
contradicted the fact that these wholesalers had acquiesced with Bayer’s policy.352 
 
The General Court claimed that the alleged intention of Bayer to impose an export ban had 
not been proved by the Commission.353 The General Court held that the absence of a 
monitoring system and a non-demonstration of threats and penalties were two relevant 
aspects in deciding the existence of an agreement between the wholesalers and Bayer. The 
CJEU agreed with these findings.354 
 
Parties must express “their common intention to conduct themselves on the market in a 
specific way”.355 The General Court examined the intention of the wholesalers, which did 
not correspond with the ban on parallel export, and concluded that Bayer’s new policy 
could not have constituted an agreement.356 However, the CJEU argued that it was not 
necessary for the interests of the parties to correspond:  
[A]n agreement exists within the meaning of Article [101(1)] of the Treaty, even if one of the parties 
to that agreement is forced to conclude it against its own wishes.357  
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The CJEU explained that the General Court merely stated that for an agreement to exist 
there had to be an intention of both parties to conduct themselves in a specific way.358 It is 
questionable whether the CJEU’s understanding of the intentions of all parties to act in a 
certain way, based on threats, does not contradict the General Court’s ruling, as well as the 
British national contract law’s recently-established doctrine of economic duress.359 
Although the UK doctrine of economic duress is relatively new and is still developing, the 
idea of the unfairness of such arrangements on the side of an economically weaker party is 
not new. This had already been recognised by the Court in the UK in the case of Rogers v. 
Parry360 in 1963, when the Court stated that an unreasonable bond was probably enforced 
against a weaker party when this party, a joiner, promised not to trade from its home for 21 
years.361 Nevertheless, the General Court refused justification based on under-duress 
doctrine in Tréfileurope.362 
 
The CJEU further interpreted the General Court’s ruling in the following way.  Firstly, the 
General Court refused to accept that there had been a tacit acceptance of the ban on 
exports, as the Commission had not sufficiently established in law that such a ban was 
imposed or that the medicines were supplied only with the condition of not exporting 
them.363 However, one could argue that imposing the ban and/or supplying a product with 
a condition is still part of an offer and not an acceptance. Moreover, it is not clear whether 
the General Court analysed these options as part of an acceptance.364 
 
Secondly, the Court of Justice stated that, as the existence of the ban was not proved, the 
General Court examined whether the parties had intended to prevent parallel trade. Thus, 
the General Court was correct when determining the genuine wishes of the parties.365 The 
strategy of the wholesalers who pretended that they needed a higher supply for their 
                                                 
358
 Ibid., paragraph 118. 
359
 For instance, Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation (The 
Universe Sentinel), [1983] 1 A.C. 366, [1982] 2 W.L.R. 803, [1982] I.C.R. 262; also see UNIDROIT 
Principles 2010, Article 3.9 (“Threat”) and Article 3.10; the CJEU’s ruling would be in accordance with 
Czech commercial contract law: Czech Commercial Codex - Zákon č. 513/1991 Sb., podle platného znění, § 
267/2. 
360
 Rogers v. Parry,79 E.R. 278, (1613) Cro. Jac. 326. 
361
 Compare with early development: Broad v. Jollyfe , 9 E.R. 509, (1619) Cro. Jac. 596; Mitchell v. 
Reynolds, 24 E.R. 347, (1711) 1 P. Wms. 181; Roussillon v. Roussillon (1880) 14 Ch. D. 351; Mason v. The 
Provident Supply and Clothing Co. [1913] AC 724. 
362
 Case T-141/89 Tréfileurope v. Commission [1995] ECR II-791, paragraph 58. 
363
 Bayer appeal, paragraph 119. 
364
 Compare with Bayer, paragraphs, 126-129, 148, 173. 
365
 Bayer appeal, paragraph 121. 
Barbora Jedličková            Chapter 5: Development of the EU Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
 180
national market to turn Bayer’s policy to their advantage confirms that there was no 
existence of the meeting of the minds.366 
 
5.6.2.2. RPM 
 
A) Volkswagen367 
 
In this case, Volkswagen, a manufacturer of motor vehicles, sold its products through a 
selective, exclusive distribution system on the basis of dealership agreements with its 
dealers, where the dealers agreed to comply with Volkswagen’s future instructions on 
recommended retail prices and discounts.368 The Commission ruled that Volkswagen had 
infringed Article 101(1) by setting retail prices of the VW Passat.369 The Commission’s 
decision was annulled by the General Court and the Commission appealed to the CJEU. 370 
 
 1) Multilateral v Unilateral Conduct 
 
The Commission claimed that the calls and letters from Volkswagen to their German 
distributors announcing fixed resale prices for the Volkswagen Passat model had formed 
part of a dealership agreement. According to the Commission, the distributors agreed with 
the new Volkswagen policy to fix the price in advance on the signing of the dealership 
agreement.371  
 
Colino argues that both courts interpreted this conduct based on letters and calls sent and 
made by the manufacturer to its distributors as unilateral because it lacked distributor 
acceptance, as the distributors “were not considered to be in a solid bargaining position vis 
a vis the manufacturer”.372 Although, both courts ruled that the Commission had not 
sufficiently established the existence of a concurrence of wills as an important aspect of 
Article 101(1), they did not base the non-existence of the agreement or one aspect of it, the 
acceptance, on bargaining position but rather on knowledge of the offer. Although, 
bargaining power should be an important aspect of the law of vertical restraints, as 
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discussed in Chapter 3 “Vertical Competition and Structure”, it was not an important 
element in both courts’ rulings when determining the non-existence of the agreement. 
 
The General Court rejected the Commission's claim that this conduct had been part of the 
main dealership agreement because the distributors had agreed in advance to adhere to it. 
The General Court ruled that the existence of an agreement had to be established with a 
concurrence of wills, which required knowledge of the conduct that the parties should have 
agreed on at the time the agreement was concluded.373 The dealers cannot sign in advance 
a variation that they cannot foresee or which they could not refuse. This illegal act could 
not be foreseen by dealers and therefore they cannot agree to it in advance.374   
 
The General Court, citing its judgment in Bayer, stressed the importance of the existence 
of a concurrence of wills between at least two parties based on a “faithful expression of the 
parties’ intention.”375 It distinguished this from genuine unilateral conducts.376 
 
The General Court explained that an unlawful contractual variation could not be lawfully 
accepted in advance in a distribution agreement.377 Therefore, the mere fact that the 
distributors signed distribution agreements agreeing with manufacturer’s unknown future 
policy does not constitute a concurrence of wills with regards to anti-competitive 
measures.378 The concurrence of wills can only be based on conduct known to the parties 
when they accept it.379 
 
The CJEU confirmed the necessity of proving a concurrence of wills of at least two 
parties.380 This can be in a form of a clause of an agreement or other conducts of parties, 
for instance, tacit acquiescence by a distributor during a telephone call.381 
 
The Commission argued that, according to previous case law, the parties concerned had 
indeed concluded agreements.382 It claimed that the concurrence of wills existed merely 
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because of the existence of the clauses in question.383 The CJEU stated that this was not 
sufficient; there must be another aspect to claim that dealers agreed with the specific 
conduct in question.384 
 
The General Court found that the clauses of the agreement in question could not have 
authorised Volkswagen to maintain retail prices and, therefore, this did not constitute an 
agreement.385 The CJEU explained that it was not in its jurisdiction to find and assess facts 
but merely to review legal characterisation and conclusions of those facts under Article 
256 TFEU.386 Therefore, the CJEU did not analyse whether the distribution agreements in 
question were drafted in neutral terms, thus avoiding an understanding of future binding 
prices and confirming the conclusion of the General Court.387 
 
Finally, the Court found an error of law in the ruling that the agreement in question did not 
authorise calls, which is contrary to Article 101(1). However, the Court also stated that 
such an error did not affect the rightness of the conclusion that the contested decision 
should be annulled.388 
 
In 2009, due to the public response to the proposed Regulation and Guidelines, the 
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (“EFPIA”) criticised 
the Commission’s proposal for aspects that constitute an agreement, in other words, the 
concurrence of wills or joint intention.389 The Commission recognised two forms of 
acquiescence to constitute an agreement.  
 
Firstly, a distribution agreement can authorise the supplier to set future policy, for which 
the Commission referred to the CJEU’s case of Volkswagen. EFPIA objected that in its 
decision, while the CJEU explained that this on its own does not have to constitute a 
concurrence of wills but all relevant factors must be taken into account.390 However, the 
CJEU did not deny the possibility of the authorisation of the producer to introduce a 
binding future policy merely based on the main distribution agreement. This option is left 
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open and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.391 It is arguable whether the General 
Court ruled the same as it clearly stated that a clause which included unforeseeable future 
policy did not constitute an agreement on this future policy.392 However, the clauses in 
question expressly included possible future policy on recommended prices, but not on 
price fixing. Therefore, the question is whether the General Court would have ruled the 
same if the clauses in question had been general and had simply stated that distributors had 
agreed with any of the manufacturer’s future policies.  
 
Nevertheless, as the CJEU did not qualify this as an error in law, it must be concluded that 
only a clause in the main agreement which includes a foreseeable future policy could 
constitute an illegal agreement if applied for illegal restriction, this is also seen in the 
wording used in Guidelines.393 However, the question as to what constitutes “foreseeable 
policy” or, in other words and under the ruling of the CJEU, what the term “neutral clause” 
means remains open. Future cases could specify this matter. 
 
Secondly, the Guidelines explain that an agreement exists if one party requires the explicit 
or implicit cooperation of a downstream or upstream party to implement its unilateral 
policy and if the second party cooperates without finding different means to engage in the 
original situation, for instance, in parallel trade. This, according to the Commission, also 
included cases when unilateral policy is imposed on the other party with the assistance of a 
system of penalties and monitoring. Here, the Commission referred to the CJEU’s case of 
Bayer. EFPIA and AMCHAM EU disagreed. As EFPIA argued, the CJEU stated in Bayer 
that the system of penalties and monitoring did not itself constitute an agreement but it 
could be an indicator of its existence.394 However, the Guidelines do not expressly state 
that the introduced policy, the system of penalties and monitoring on their own constitute 
an agreement; however, one could understand it in the same way as EFPI, as the 
Guidelines state in paragraph 25 “…points to tacit acquiescence”.  
 
The US cases do not involve a vertical restraint case which would be based on a clause on 
a future policy such as Volkswagen and Ford. The second example is also questionable 
under the US case law as a mere announcement of policy and its following could be 
unilateral conduct according to the Colgate doctrine. However, if such conduct involves 
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monitoring systems, the US courts would probably find such conduct multilateral.395 In 
Bayer, the Commission’s decision was dismissed because not even the existence of an 
offer or of an explicit introduction of the restrictive policy had been proved.396 
 
Dethmers, Posthuma de Boer, Ablasser-Neuhuber and Plank argue that the meaning of the 
term “agreement” is too broad and that the Commission concentrated too much on the 
definition and proving its existence in vertical, parallel trade restriction cases rather than 
evaluating the pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects in each case.397 Although the 
second statement can appear to be true, this is partially a consequence of recent annulments 
and dismissals of the Commission’s understanding of this term by the EU Courts, which 
have resulted in a narrowing of this understanding. Therefore, the first statement is 
partially arguable, although this concentration is clearly obvious when analysing cases on 
vertical restraints. 
 
Finally, with respect to the wording of the Guidelines, in both instances the Commission 
used the term “unilateral policy” which is imposed upon a second party, implemented by 
the first party or agreed to in advance without the exact knowledge of the content. In 
reality, are these examples of joint intentions or simply the intentions of one party with the 
second party going along with these intentions so as not to lose a contract with the first 
party?398 And, therefore, is it in accordance with morality and justice that both parties are 
liable and potentially punished? Indeed, this doctrine of multilateral conduct appears to be 
established to capture different conducts under Article 101(1) without reflecting the real 
nature of vertical arrangements.399 
 
B) GSK400 
 
This case reflects the importance of economic analysis, including market structure and 
interbrand competition, and summarises the approach that exists in the present day.  
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The applicant was an English company, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited (“GSK”), 
who belonged to the GSK group, one of the world’s leading producers of pharmaceutical 
products. Glaxo Wellcome, SA (“GW”) was a Spanish subsidiary of the GSK group. It 
manufactured, developed and distributed medicines in Spain.401 
 
GW applied for an exemption for a document entitled “General Sales Conditions of 
Pharmaceutical Specialities Belonging to [GW] and its Subsidiaries to Authorised 
Wholesalers” (“Conditions”). The Conditions concerned 82 medicines intended for sale to 
wholesalers, who could be interested in exporting them primarily to the UK and other 
Member States, providing two different prices for home sale and export. The wholesalers 
were required to sign copies of the Conditions and return them to GW as proof of 
acceptance. Seventy-five wholesalers with sales accounting for more than 90% of the total 
GW sales in Spain signed the Conditions.402 
 
The Commission’s decision stated that GW’s agreement infringed Article 101(1) by 
charging higher prices if the medicines were exported to other Member States.403 
 
 1) Relevant Market 
 
The relevant market was divided into national markets due to different legislative 
conditions.404 The Commission did not determine the relevant market in details, as it 
believed that the mere existence of an anti-competitive object is enough to state that 
competition was restricted.405 The relevant product market was the medicine concerned 
and the medicines from other producers used for the same therapeutic purposes.406 
 
2) Agreement 
 
The Commission found that signed copies of the Conditions constituted an agreement 
between GW and the signed wholesalers.407 GW disagreed, arguing that this did not 
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constitute an agreement because a concurrence of wills to restrict competition was not 
manifested.408 
 
The General Court examined the existence of the constitution of independent will and of a 
concurrence of will on the wholesale price of medicines.409 The Court stated that Spanish 
legislation did not maintain wholesale prices of medicines, thus setting wholesale prices 
outside the Spanish sickness scheme was within the scope of the undertakings.410 
 
With regards to the concurrence of wills, the General Court argued that the case file 
showed GW had adopted the Conditions as well as a system of setting prices. Seventy-five 
from eighty-nine wholesalers signed copies of the Conditions as requested by GW. In 
doing so they accepted the offer and an agreement with GW was formed.411 
 
The General Court also observed that some wholesalers who signed the Conditions, 
“expressed doubts as to the legality of those conditions”; however, they did not withdraw 
from the agreement.412 Some wholesalers who signed the Conditions were members of 
associations who complained to the Commission about the Conditions. However, the 
General Court stated that this did not prove that all or some of the wholesalers did not 
intend to collude with GW.413 Therefore, the concurrence of wills was manifested.414 
 
3) Restriction of Competition, Including Interbrand Competition and Consumer 
Welfare 
 
The Commission argued that the Conditions had both the effect and the object of 
restricting competition in the form of limiting parallel trade.415 However, the General Court 
analysed both interbrand and intrabrand competition. It observed that despite the allowed 
restriction on price competition based on national and EU legislations, there was 
competition among the producers of medicine, between producers and their distributors 
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and between parallel traders and national distributors. Therefore, GSK had no capability to 
eliminate competition altogether but it was able to restrict competition.416  
 
This was an obvious shift in the importance of interbrand competition when compared to 
the ruling in Consten & Grundig, where the CJEU simply stated that it was enough to 
show that intrabrand competition was restricted without surveying interbrand 
competition.417 Although this shift more reflects the policy of the US, this current EU 
policy appears to be more accurate as it is not satisfied simply with an opinion that 
restrictions of intrabrand competition automatically increase interbrand competition, which 
is typified by the US case of Sylvania and repeated in the recent case of Leegin. 418  
 
The General Court confirmed that GSK intended to limit the parallel trade between Spain 
and other Member States. The General Court argued that an action which intended to 
differentiate prices and restrict parallel trade had a restrictive object.419 However, 
according to the General Court, the restriction on parallel trade on its own did not have its 
object in restricting competition. Even the existence of illegal object must be proved by 
analysis.420  
 
The General Court criticised the Commission for not analysing the market in detail,421 and 
for a random economic examination.422 The General Court analysed the effect on 
competition and stated that Member States controlled the prices of medicines in different 
ways. This and the exchange rate caused the existence of different medicine prices in 
different Member States. These price differentiations caused parallel imports of 
medicines.423 Therefore, the General Court argued that the fact that exporting distributors 
were making less profit because of double pricing did not prove the restriction of 
competition.424 Nevertheless, it is true that the freedom of Spanish distributors was 
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affected.425 However, the restriction on the freedom of action of the undertakings, or of one 
of them, was not on its own prohibited under Article 101(1).426 
 
The General Court stated that the objective of EU competition law is to protect consumer 
welfare, which could be decreased by the restrictive actions of undertakings. Therefore, for 
an action to be illegal, it must be proved that the restriction negatively affected final 
consumers.427 
 
Although the Commission confirmed several times in its decision that the Conditions 
affected the welfare of consumers in terms of the supply of price by restricting parallel 
trade,428 the General Court concluded that the Conditions themselves and their object did 
not decrease the welfare of consumers. Thus, the text itself did not prove a restriction of 
competition. However, this does not mean that the welfare of consumers did not decrease 
in its effect. For that reason, the Court found it essential, when analysing the existence of 
an anti-competitive effect, to determine whether competition was restricted.429 
 
The Commission applied Article 101(1)(d). The General Court stated that this Article 
prohibits agreements that apply dissimilar conditions to parties to equivalent transactions 
and, therefore, place them at a competitive disadvantage.430 As the Commission itself 
confirmed, the geographic market was each Member State as each Member State had 
different conditions based on its national rules.431 The General Court argued that different 
prices applied because different markets already existed. Hence, GSK did not establish the 
different markets.432 
 
The CJEU criticised the General Court’s statements regarding the existence of the 
restrictive object.433 The CJEU disagreed with the General Court that an agreement can 
have the object of restricting competition only when the agreement was likely to lead to 
negative effects for consumers and it concluded that the case concerned, including the 
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parallel trade, had its object in restricting competition.434 The aim of Article 101 TFEU 
was not just to protect consumers but to protect effective competition, which includes the 
protection of market structure.435 
 
On the other hand, the General Court confirmed the Commission’s finding of anti-
competitive effects when the Commission stated that the Conditions also reduced the 
welfare of final consumers as they could not take advantage of the reduced cost and 
prices.436 The Commission found that in some Member States the patients paid for some 
medicines. In other Member States and when purchasing other medicines, however, the 
final consumer was part of the “the national sickness insurance scheme”. The CJEU had 
already ruled that such social security institutions substituted the final consumers because 
they paid for medicines.437 The Commission also observed that some national sickness 
insurance schemes reflected in different ways whether the cost of medicines had 
decreased.438 The Conditions deprived consumers of advantages that would have existed if 
parallel export had not been limited and, thus, had an impact on intrabrand competition.439 
 
 4) Intrabrand v Interbrand Competition and Article 101(3) Analysis 
 
The General Court argued that intrabrand loss must be compared with interbrand gain in 
competition, highlighting the leading role of interbrand competition rather than that of 
intrabrand competition.440 Competition increased with an increase in GSK’s innovation.441 
Hence, the Court disagreed with the Commission’s mere rejection of GSK’s argument that 
parallel trade had prevented it from making profits, which were essential for innovation.442 
The Court missed a proper examination of this issue in the Commission’s decision, which 
should have been based on balancing the advantages against the disadvantages of 
examined conduct.443 
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Therefore, the General Court concluded that the Commission could not rule that GSK did 
not demonstrate the promotion of technical progress under Article 101(3).444 Furthermore, 
as confirmed by the Commission, the real market power of GSK had not been estimated.445 
Thus, the Commission could not conclude “that competition would be eliminated for a 
substantial part of the relevant products”.446 The Court annulled the part of the decision 
that stated that the Conditions did not fulfil the conditions for granting an exemption.447 
 
The CJEU endorsed the General Court’s ruling on Article 101(3).448 Although the 
applicants had the burden of proof, the Commission did not evaluate the applicant’s 
arguments satisfactorily as the Commission rejected evidence without explanation or 
justification.449  
 
GSK argued that parallel trade would lead to a loss of efficiency in the form of reduction 
of innovation.450 Furthermore, GSK claimed that the distribution system was improved by 
a reduction of delays in placing products on the market in some Member States and by a 
better allocation of GSK’s medicines for sale.451 
 
GSK based its argument on improvements in innovation and, thus, on an increase in 
efficiency.452 The General Court explained that innovation was paid for by the final 
consumers who were prepared to pay more due to different prices in different states.453 The 
patent protected the prices of patented products; however, the price of medicines that were 
reimbursed by the national sickness insurance schemes were maintained by a price control 
or by a control of benefits. Therefore, the UK was more profitable for GSK and allowed 
innovation to be recuperated globally not just locally.454 
 
The General Court ruled that it was enough for applicants to prove the likelihood of 
“appreciable objective advantages” which could compensate for the resulted 
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disadvantages.455 The test showed whether the conduct in question made it possible to 
obtain appreciable advantages or not.456 This must be demonstrated with “a sufficient 
degree of probability” that the possibility of obtaining an appreciable objective advantage 
existed.457 
 
The Commission criticised the General Court’s ruling that the advantage of the conduct in 
question was higher profits which promote innovation. It stated that there was no causal 
link between this advantage and the conduct itself, explaining that the conduct must 
promote technical progress such as innovation and not simply increase profits.458 However, 
the CJEU rejected this argument and affirmed the General Court’s conclusion that the 
advantage was that the increased profit could be dedicated to incremental innovation.459 
 
 5) Free Riding 
 
The General Court further stated that free riding did not concern competition law when the 
profit was transferred from the producer to an intermediary. It would be of interest to 
competition law only if the free riding caused a decrease in consumer welfare. Moreover, 
as far as the intermediary participants in competition go, parallel trade was in the interest 
of competition law and its restrictions can have an anti-competitive effect.460  
 
The importance of parallel trade in general was confirmed by the CJEU.461 The approach 
to free riding in US antitrust law was different. In general, the US Federal Courts found 
free riding to be anti-competitive when it occurred in both VTR and RPM.462 
 
 6) Summary 
 
The CJEU summarised the balancing test of Article 101(3) as established by the General 
Court as follows. Firstly, it must be shown that there was an appreciable objective 
advantage. Secondly, the Commission must analyse whether the conduct in question 
decreased efficiency. Thirdly, if efficiency was reduced, the Commission must analyse the 
                                                 
455
 GSK appeal, paragraphs 92-95. 
456
 Ibid., paragraph 94. 
457
 Ibid., paragraph 95. 
458
 Ibid., paragraph 112. 
459
 Ibid., paragraphs 118-119. 
460
 GSK, paragraph 273. 
461
 GSK appeal, paragraphs 59, 61. 
462
 Leegin, at 890, 894; Business Electronics , at 721, 727-728; Sylvania, at 55-56; Park & Sons at 45. 
Barbora Jedličková            Chapter 5: Development of the EU Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
 192
extent to which it was reduced. And, lastly, the gain in efficiency must be analysed.463 The 
CJEU agreed with the General Court that the Commission erred when it did not consider 
the gain in efficiency of the conduct in question.464 
 
As Kallaugher and Witbrecht conclude, the CJEU gave a clear message that parallel trade 
was also restrictive by its object; however, this does not necessarily establish any real 
economic harm. Article 101(3), with the analytical balance, applied in such cases. 465 
 
5.7. Application of Competition Law in RPM and VTR Cases 
 
5.7.1. Application of Block Exemption 
 
Article 101(1) of the TFEU explicitly prohibits forms of RPM in point (a) when it states 
that multilateral conducts are illegal if: “directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices 
or any other trading conditions”. It partly mentions territorial restrictions in point (c): 
“share markets or sources of supply”. When applying the legal positivism approach466 to 
this matter and considering the legal power of the TFEU, which is the primary source of 
EU law, it must be concluded that RPM is illegal unless the conduct concerned fulfils the 
terms and conditions of Article 101(3), in which case the conduct can be exempted and is 
considered to be legal. 
 
In accordance with Article 101, the current Block Exemption Regulation, which is the 
secondary source of EU law, does not exempt sale (retail) price fixing, including minimum 
price fixing,467 and some forms of territorial restrictions, such as passive sales,468 which 
restrict competition in object.469 Having as their direct or indirect object such restraints, 
these forms of vertical restraints are so called “hard core restrictions” under Article 4 of 
Regulation, which assumes that hard core restrictions have actual or potential negative 
results to such an extent that fulfilment of the conditions of Article 101(3) is highly 
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unlikely.470 Therefore, these restrictions remain on the “hard core” list.471 Nevertheless, 
Article 101(3) of the TFEU applies in such cases too. Theoretically, hard core, as well as 
any other restrictions, can be exempted under this Article.472  
 
Market power plays an important role in the EU law of vertical restraints.473 In cases other 
than hard core restrictions, the block exemption does not apply if the market share of one 
of the parties, a seller or a buyer, is higher than 30% as it is assumed that efficiency-
enhancing effects outweigh any restrictive effects in such cases.474 If there is a decision by 
an association of retailers of goods, then the total annual turnover of each member must 
exceed € 50 million in order not to apply the block exemption.475 Market power below the 
aforementioned threshold and turnover create a so-called "safe harbour".476 Although the 
law of vertical restraints should be focused on bargaining power rather than horizontal 
market power, as discussed in Chapter 3 “Vertical Competition and Structure”, EU policy 
leaves some space for such arguments as different market power on competition can prove 
its legality or illegality in individual cases.477 Additionally, the Commission or a national 
competition authority can decide that the block exemption does not apply in individual 
cases if the conditions of Article 101(1) are fulfilled but conditions of the Article 101(3) 
are not.478 
 
As discussed previously, the block exemption does not apply to minimum price fixing and 
price fixing or to passive and other territorial restrictions.479 However, the block exemption 
still applies to maximum price setting, price recommendations and some forms of 
territorial restriction.480 VTR is a hard core restriction; however, the block exemption still 
applies in the case of: 
1. Exclusive territory or customer policy, restrictions of active sales which do not 
include restrictions of customers;481 
                                                 
470
 Regulation, Preamble, paragraph 10; Guidelines, paragraphs 47, 223. 
471
 “Antitrust: Commission adopts revised competition rules for vertical agreements: frequently asked 
questions”, MEMO/138, Brussels, 20 April 2010. 
472
 Guidelines, paragraphs 47, 106-109, 223, 229; compare with Jones, “Left Behind?”649-676; for further 
discussion see below. 
473
 Regulation, Preamble, paragraph 7; Guidelines, paragraphs 6, 23, 97, 99, 106, 110-111. 
474
 Regulation, Articles 3, 7, Preamble, paragraphs 7-9; Guidelines, paragraphs 23, 87-92, 110. 
475
 Regulation, Articles 2(2), Article 8. 
476
 Guidelines, paragraph 23. 
477
 See Guidelines, paragraphs 87-92.  
478
 Regulation, Preamble, paragraphs 13-16. 
479
 Regulation, Article 4; Guidelines, paragraphs 47-64. 
480
 Regulation, Articles 4(a), 4(b); Guidelines, paragraphs 4, 50-63. 
481
 Regulation 4(b)(i); Guidelines, paragraph 55. 
Barbora Jedličková            Chapter 5: Development of the EU Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
 194
2. Restrictions of sales to end users by a buyer operating at the wholesale level of 
trade to keep the two levels of trade, wholesale and retail, separate;482 
3. Selective distribution systems, restrictions of sales to unauthorised distributors 
within the territory where the selective distribution system operates;483 and  
4. Restrictions which aim to avoid imitations of the same types of goods by potential 
competitors to avoid selling components to undertakings who would use them to 
manufacture the same type of goods as those produced by the supplier.484  
 
However, some examples, including the last one, could be classified as customer 
allocations rather than territorial restraints. 
 
Under the Guidelines, a general exemption from the prohibition of territorial restrictions 
exists in cases when a product is penetrating a new market or a new brand is introduced 
into a new market. In such cases, not only vertical agreements protecting new territories 
but also RPM are usually allowed for up to two years; in RPM, the period is only two 
weeks.485 
 
With respect to some forms of customer allocations and territorial restraints, the block 
exemption also does not apply to active and passive sales to “end users by members of a 
selective distribution system operating at the retailer level of trade”486 because distributors 
within their selective distribution system should be free to sell the product concerned and 
the system cannot be combined with an exclusive distribution system. It also does not 
apply to “the restriction of cross-supplies between distributors within a selective 
distribution system, including distributors operating at different level of trade”487 because 
selective distributors must remain free to purchase the product concerned from another 
distributor in the selective distribution system and they cannot be obliged to purchase the 
product only from the manufacturer. Finally, it does not apply to  
the restriction, agreed between a supplier of components and a buyer who incorporates those 
components, of supplier’s ability to sell the components such as spare parts to end-users or to 
repairers or other service providers not entrusted by the buyer with the repair or servicing of its 
goods.488 
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There are different forms of VTR with different approaches in EU competition law. 
Generally, VTR is based on an area within which distributors’ sales may be restricted. 
Exclusive distribution is a form of distribution that may see a distributor granted an 
exclusive territory where it is allowed to sell a product or provide a service but it is not 
usually allowed to sell to other territories.489 Selective distribution, among others, limits 
the number of distributors; the possibilities for resale are based on qualitative criteria 
and/or includes a prohibition to sell to unauthorised distributors within a certain territory. 
Anything which restricts sales beyond this and which introduces quantitative criteria could 
be part of hard core restrictions.490 
 
Dethmers and Posthuma de Boer criticise the Commission for the Guidelines being too 
extensive and both the Guidelines and Regulation for being too complicated and theoretical 
without providing any legal certainty for their practical application.491 Colino adds to this 
criticism claiming that the market share threshold is somewhat arbitrary and the approach 
to the relevant market and the market share is excessively formalistic and far from 
adequate.492  
 
Furthermore, the question remains as to whether the differentiated approach to VTR is not 
too complicated and unnecessary and whether this could be replaced with a simpler 
approach. For instance, it would be easier to differentiate between absolute territorial and 
other territorial restrictions, including any restriction on passive sales, as hard core 
restrictions and others, if differentiation was agreed to be necessary regarding the different 
impacts on competition.  
 
Monti, Jones and Sufrin argue that the Commission and the EU Courts have applied strict 
policy against restrictions which directly or indirectly divide the EU market into 
territories.493  However, it is arguable whether the policy of territorial restraints is in reality 
so strict, as the Commission differentiates among territorial restraints in its approach. For 
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instance, the strict approach involves the restriction of passive sales and absolute territorial 
restrictions, which are restrictions in object.494 In general, the Commission does not apply 
the same strict approach to some forms of active sales, such as exclusive territorial 
restrictions, as it does to price fixing and minimum price fixing. However, as this thesis 
analyses, in some cases, the negative impact of territorial restraints can be even greater 
than that of RPM.495 
 
In comparison, the US approach to VTR is arguably more liberal, as the practical effect of 
the rule of reason in VTR has caused the non-existence of cases in this matter in the US. 
This means the legalisation of VTR in practice, although the possibility of violation of the 
Sherman Act exists in theory and under the rule of reason.496 
  
In all EU vertical restraint cases, parties are allowed to apply Article 101(3) to justify their 
restrictions. Therefore, the per se rule does not exist in EU competition law. The US per se 
rule, which applied to RPM before Leegin, was stricter than the EU approach to RPM as 
the per se rule did not allow any possibility for justification. The authorities and courts 
applying EU competition law must take into account any justification. Nevertheless, 
although Article 101(3) can apply in RPM, under new and also older Vertical Restraints 
Block Exemption Regulations and Guidelines, the EU Commission assumes that RPM and 
some forms of VTR, in the form of multilateral conduct, have “actual or likely negative 
effects” with no positive effects, or that RPM is not indispensable for creating positive 
effects on competition.497 As Jones highlights, such an approach is extremely hard for 
accused entities of RPM to challenge in practice.498 The existing cases do not indicate the 
existence of the successful application of Article 101(3) by the entities concerned. 
Simultaneously, it is difficult to determine how often the Commission’s investigation has 
been stopped because of the proven existence of a justification prevailing the negative 
effects on competition under Article 101(3) in hard core restrictions. However, it can be 
observed that even in the latest cases on hard core restrictions, the Commission did not 
analyse the pro-competitive justifications under Article 101(3) in detail. Both EU courts 
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criticised this in the case of GSK,499 which will hopefully lead to positive changes in the 
practical application of Article 101(3) on vertical hard core restrictions and its detailed 
analysis of justifications in future decisions of the Commission. 
 
5.7.2. RPM and VTR – Application of Article 101 
 
Block exemptions do not apply to hard core restrictions. Therefore, hard core restrictions, 
as well as other vertical restrictions, must be analysed under the Article 101 test which 
involves four general steps. 
  
Article 101(1): 
1. It applies to multilateral or bilateral conducts (agreements, concerted practices, 
decisions of associations) which do not include agency agreements. 
2. It must appreciably affect competition and trade between Member States (indicators 
are market shares and turnover). 
3. There must be a restriction in a) object, or b) effect. 
4. If there is a restriction under Article 101(1), Article 101(3) can apply and then a 
balancing test of effects must be used. 
 
1. First, it must be proved that the restriction in question is formed by multilateral conduct 
not by unilateral conduct,500 which also includes agency agreements.501 Some conditions of 
subcontracting agreements are also exempted.502 If one of the parties is a manufacturer or a 
distributor with a dominant position, Article 102 can apply on its own or in parallel with 
Article 101, and only on its own if there is no multilateral conduct.503 
 
2. Second, there must be an appreciable effect on both competition and trade between 
Member States.504 There is a presumption that there is no appreciable effect on trade 
between Member States and on competition when the market share is below de minimis 
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15% threshold.505 It is also presumed that vertical agreements among small and medium-
sized undertakings rarely affect trade between the Member States appreciably.506 However, 
in individual cases, and primarily in hard core restrictions, Article 101(1) applies 
sometimes even when the market share is below the 15% threshold.507 Similarly, there 
does not have to be an appreciable effect even if the market share is above de minimis 15% 
threshold in a particular case.508  
 
3. Third, the restriction must restrict competition directly or indirectly509 in its object or 
effect. The conduct in question must have actual or likely restrictive effects.510 A particular 
form of restrictions is restricting competition by its object if competition is “almost” 
always restricted, irrespective of economic circumstances.511 Agreed and/or enforced 
minimum and price fixing and VTR and “any” restriction of parallel import restrict 
competition in their object.512 Moreover, when the restriction by object applies, there does 
not have to be a direct link between the conduct in question and the restrictive 
consequence, such as the increase of consumer prices.513 Intention is not essential but the 
potential to have a negative impact on competition is;514 at least, such potential must be 
determined. Such impacts should be measured to assess the seriousness of the infringement 
in question.515 
 
When a restriction by object is present, it is not necessary to analyse the restrictive effect 
as it is presumed that such a restriction restricts competition.516 As Loozen explains, both 
restrictions by effect and object require a restrictive object. However, the restrictive object 
is restrictive per se being restrictive in its nature; therefore, it is assumed that it causes an 
“increase of allocative inefficiency” and it is obvious from the object itself that it will 
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trigger deadweight loss.517 On the other hand, restriction by effect requires further analysis 
which will lead to the conclusion of deadweight loss to prove a restriction of 
competition.518 Nevertheless, both forms of restrictions can be exempted under Article 
101(3). 
 
The aim of restriction by object is to increase competitive constraints, such as price 
increases. On the other hand, a restriction by effect does not necessarily aim to lessen 
competition; however, it leads to such results by its effect.519 Restriction by effect means 
that competition has been restricted or there is a potential for a restriction, which is 
expected with a reasonable degree of probability and to an appreciable extent.520 
 
Horizontal restriction by object, or even by effect, can appear to be simpler than a vertical 
restriction as the strengthening of market power of the participants of a cartel indicates the 
existence of a restriction by object.521 On the other hand, the enhanced market power of 
participants of a particular vertical conduct can be caused by aspects other than the 
restriction itself. Therefore, the whole situation in the market should be considered. 
 
Even the existence of a threat, direct or indirect, actual or potential, to restrict trade 
between Member States could be enough to apply Article 101(1).522 If the restrictive object 
is proved, such as an absolute territorial protection, the effect does not have to be 
analysed.523 However, even the existence of an illegal object must be determined based on 
an analysis.524 For instance, the CJEU ruled that a sole distributorship, including granting 
an exclusive right to sell, could have a restrictive effect.525 It introduced a test which 
determines whether the effect is restrictive: 
[I]t must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of 
objective factors of law or of fact that the agreement in question may have an influence, direct or 
indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between the Member States.526 
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The question remains open as to whether the conducts that restrict competition in their 
effect have the same approach as the US rule of reason in vertical restraints.527 Firstly, it 
must be highlighted that the US rule of reason has different forms and is not absolutely 
unified for different restrictions. Moreover, its form is not definitely settled for RPM yet. 
Secondly, the EU approach under Article 101 differs from the US rule of reason. Briefly, 
under Article 101(1) the Commission must prove that the conduct in question restricted 
competition in fact. If there is restriction under object, certain forms of conducts, such as 
RPM, must be proved. If the restriction in effect is proved, the party that restricted 
competition can show that pro-competitive benefits overweighed the anti-competitive 
restriction under Article 101(3). In contrast, the rule of reason applies the aspects from 
both 101(1) and 101(3) at once and focuses on interbrand competition. 
 
4. Fourth, the Commission or a national competition authority must examine the available 
evidence to determine whether there is a justification under Article 101(3). The evidence 
must show in a convincing manner that the restrictive action in question caused 
“appreciable objective advantages”, either actual or potential.528 
 
The application of Article 101(3) is based on an economic evaluation of the available 
evidence, which must determine an improvement of competition in distribution and 
production and/or whether the conduct in question promotes technical and or economic 
progress, showing “appreciable objective advantages” that outweigh the disadvantages of 
the restriction concerned.529 Therefore, the principle of proportionality must apply, 
meaning that the restriction cannot go beyond what is necessary to use a certain positive 
effect in the market under Article 101(3).530 Moreover, for Article 101(3) to apply, the 
vertical restriction in question should not eliminate a substantial part of competition.531 
 
In contrast with US antitrust policy and in conformity with Steiner’s theory,532 the 
Commission must examine both intrabrand and interbrand competition.533 Usually in 
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vertical restraints, the intrabrand loss must be compared with interbrand gain, with the 
interbrand competition taking the leading role rather than intrabrand competition.534 
 
It is enough for applicants to prove the likelihood of “appreciable objective advantages”, 
which can compensate for the resultant disadvantages.535 The test should show whether the 
conduct in question makes it possible to obtain appreciable advantages or not.536 This must 
be demonstrated with “a sufficient degree of probability” that the possibility of obtaining 
an appreciable objective advantage exists.537 
 
To summarise, the balancing test of Article 101(3) contains the following. Firstly, it must 
be shown that there was an appreciable objective advantage. Secondly, the Commission 
must analyse whether the conduct in question decreased efficiency. Thirdly, if so, it must 
decide the extent to which efficiency was decreased. Lastly, the gain in efficiency must be 
analysed.538 If the gain is greater than the loss of efficiency, then the conduct will be 
justified under Article 101(3). 
 
Consumer welfare is a determining, essential, efficiency factor of the appreciable objective 
advantages and of the restrictions under the Commission’s Guidelines on the application of 
Article 101(3), which states that Article 101(3) applies if the conduct enhances consumer 
welfare.539 However, the CJEU ruled rightly only a few years after the Guidelines had been 
issued that Article 101 protected effective competition.540 Therefore, the enhancement of 
consumer welfare is only one aspect. The second aspect is the positive effects on the 
competitive market structure. Similarly, Article 101(1) applies when effective competition 
is restricted and not just when consumer welfare decreases.541 The question is whether the 
Commission will apply the second aspect in practice, although it should under this recent 
judgement and under law. It can be assumed that the Commission will continue to analyse 
vertical restraints from the perspective of consumer welfare as this approach appears in the 
recently issued Guidelines on vertical restraints.542 
 
                                                 
534
 Ibid., paragraph 296. 
535
 GSK appeal, paragraphs 92-95. 
536
 Ibid., paragraph 94. 
537
 GSK appeal, paragraph 95. 
538
 GSK, paragraphs 263-303; GSK appeal, paragraph 128. 
539
 Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3), paragraph. 13. 
540
 GSK appeal , paragraphs 55-64; see discussion in Chapter 3 “Vertical Competition and Structure”.  
541
 GSK appeal, paragraph 63. 
542
 Guidelines, paragraphs 7, 101-102, 122. 
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5.8. Conclusion 
 
In comparison to the US development, the EU approach to vertical territorial and price 
restraints seems to be more consistent, and has been without sudden fluctuations. However, 
this is well-founded and logical considering the differences in the two legal systems. The 
US legal system involves precedents and private litigations, as well as certain 
circumstances that influenced its development, including the fact that the US Sherman Act 
was already issued at the end of 19th century.  
 
In line with the development in the US, although not in the same way, the EU law of 
vertical territorial and price restraints has gradually shifted from a strict approach with 
theoretical and economical considerations, when the mere threat of restriction on 
intrabrand competition would infringe Article 101(1), to a more balanced test based on 
concrete economic and factual evaluations, when intrabrand and interbrand competition 
could be analysed under both Article 101(1) and Article 101(3). Although, it can be 
observed that justifications under Article 101(3) have not been analysed sufficiently 
enough by the Commission, this can improve in the future. 
 
It can be concluded from an observation of the current approaches, that the US and the EU 
laws of vertical territorial and price restraints have followed their own paths. This message 
is clear when the EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints and the US case of Leegin are 
compared. 
 
The objective of EU competition law has also been changing and developing. In the early 
days, Consten & Grundig showed that the creation of a single market had been essential 
and, thus, it was also the aim of competition law. Although, in practice, the Commission 
still concentrates on the protection of an integrated market, in analysis of the effects in 
individual cases, the focus has been shifting to consumer welfare, as is obvious in Metro, 
which ended with the Commission’s conclusion that the objective of competition law was 
consumer welfare. However, in 2009, the CJEU stated in GSK that the main aim was the 
protection of competition, explaining that consumer welfare was only one aspect of such 
an objective. 
 
Barbora Jedličková            Chapter 5: Development of the EU Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints 
 
 203
Although the courts and the Commission have not found it necessary to analyse the 
motivations for introducing vertical restraints in most of the cases discussed, it can be 
observed that it has been manufacturers who, on their own initiatives or together with their 
distributors, have introduced vertical restrictions on competition. In comparison with the 
previous chapter, which discussed US cases, the EU cases do not include situations where 
distributors or distributors and their manufacturer pressured by the distributors would 
restrict competition. In contrast to the US, the EU cases are typical of parallel-trade 
restrictions and of using vertical restrictions to penetrate the new markets of other Member 
States. 
 
In the cases of Consten & Grundig, Minière v. Maschinenbau and Nungesser & Eisele, it 
was the manufacturer who wished to penetrate a new market, and to do so it had to offer 
something “special” to find a new distributor. Although, the distributors had some 
bargaining advantage, the manufacturers, the distributors, their consumers and competition 
in general profited from the vertical territorial restraints in question. 
 
Interestingly, in the case of Consten & Grundig, the parties introduced a one-off 
explanation for the application of the absolute territorial restraint. This explanation was 
that vertical restraints could be used as business tools to assist the distributor in planning 
its business in advance. Although the Court rightly refused such a justification and it has 
not appeared in cases on such restraints since, it can explain the introduction of vertical 
restraints when this cannot be logically determined or proved based on the evidence. The 
same explanation could be used at the supplier level. Such an explanation could have 
applied in AEG Telefunken, Pronuptia, Novalliance/Systemform and Volkswagen. 
Although, AEG Telefunken and Pronuptia also had another and more obvious explanation: 
the improvement of distribution systems. However, can RPM and strict territorial restraints 
be justified simply by improving distribution? Clearly, in these cases, it was the complete 
franchising and selective systems that involved such a justification. However, if these 
systems included RPM and strict territorial restraints with a restriction of passive sales, 
these elements would likely not have been justified under the explanation that it improves 
distribution.  
 
Selling under different prices occurs in the EU, particularly this is common conduct in the 
pharmaceutical market where producers sell their products at different prices in different 
Member States. Therefore, a producer can have a higher profit per unit in one Member 
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State than it has in others. Territorial restrictions which avoid parallel trade, such as the 
cases of GSK, Bayer and Sandoz, are usually in the producers’ interests, although, this can 
be in the interest of some distributors also. In all probability, the same motivations played 
their role in the case of Nintendo. Therefore, some EU cases clearly show that the vertical 
restraints in question are in the interest and for the benefit of manufacturers and suppliers. 
 
The analysis of both the US and the EU cases raises questions of liability and punishment. 
In other words, should we punish distributors who act under economic duress and against 
their interests? It is arguable whether the first sense of injustice of such liability was not an 
aspect of morality for establishing the US Colgate doctrine. However, determining the 
boundaries of unilateral and multilateral conducts and basing vertical restrictions on 
multilateral conducts does not tackle the problem and are not necessarily the best 
approaches. 
 
Vertical restraints differ from horizontal restraints not only in their impact on competition 
but also in their nature. Vertical relationships are essential on the market and are based on 
different forms of distribution agreements. Parties usually need one another to do their 
business or, in other words, to exist; however, the bargaining power of parties differs. 
Trying to determine the existence of multilateral conducts and then make liable and punish 
all parties of such conducts could be the wrong approach. The following chapter discusses 
the anti-competitiveness and/or pro-competitiveness of RPM and VTR and thus assists 
with the determination of whether such restrictions should be illegal and, if they should be, 
when and in what forms.  
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Chapter 6: Theories of Pro-Competitiveness v. Anti-Competitiveness  
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter tests existing theories against the nature of vertical interactions as surveyed in 
Chapter 3 and the objective of competition law as set in Chapter 2. It further shows 
whether the theories applied in case law and policy are sufficient and are the right ones and 
whether the criticism of the existing law and policy as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 is 
well-founded. 
 
Economic theories have always influenced antitrust policy and law. Nevertheless, the 
understanding of different aspects of the law of vertical restraints, such as its objective, is 
not the same under economic theories, law and policy. Williamson observed in the late 
1980s that even economists themselves did not share the same basic opinion on vertical 
restraints.1 As this chapter will partially show, this still remains an issue. Indeed, not only 
law and policy but also antitrust economic theories have been changing and this has had an 
impact, not necessarily immediately, on the law of vertical restraints. 
 
This chapter analyses pro-competitive and anti-competitive explanations of the law of 
vertical territorial and price restraints. Throughout the existence of US antitrust law and 
EU competition law, different pro-competitive and anti-competitive theories, mostly 
relating to RPM, have been introduced, but there has been a lack of deep and sustained 
analysis of both forms of restraints. This chapter shows that some theories and ideas which 
apply to RPM can be used for the analysis of territorial restraints. It introduces new 
explanations, analyses old theories and finds new counterarguments to identify weaknesses 
in each theory and to determine which ideas are closest to the realities of RPM and VTR. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 O. Williamson, Antitrust Economics: Mergers, Contracting, and Strategic Behaviour, (Basil Blackwell, 
New York, 1987), 123; also see M. Bennett, A. Fletcher, E. Giovannetti, D. Stallibrass, “ Resale Price 
Maintenance: Explaining the Controversy, and Small Steps Towards a More Nuanced Policy” (2010) MPRA 
Paper No. 21121, posted 4 March 2010/18:02, (at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21121/), p. 1; T.R. Sass, 
D.S. Saurman, “Mandated Exclusive Territories and Economic Efficiency: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Malt-Beverage Industry” (1993) 36 J.L.&Econ. 153-154; F.H. Easterbrook, “Vertical Arrangements and the 
Rule of Reason”, (1984) 53 Antitrust L.J. 145. 
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6.2. Schools and Theories 
 
The roots of pro-competitive theories can be found in the Chicago School, which 
originated in the early 1950s. The central argument of the Chicago School was that the free 
market has the ability to regulate itself and maintain competition2 and that vertical 
restraints, including RPM and territorial restraints, have a positive impact on competition, 
in particular acting as the strategic tools of manufacturers to create the best conditions for 
manufacturers, their distributors and consumers.3  
 
In contrast, exponents of the Harvard School argued that vertical restraints result in 
restrictions of competition. The Harvard School theory is based on the relationship 
between structure, conduct and performance. The market structure influences firms’ 
conduct, which determines market performance thus explaining how certain markets lead 
to certain types of conduct and performance. The founder of the Harvard School, Mason, 
along with others, studied industrial organisations. According to them, profit-making is at 
the centre of organisations and it is the market structure that determines price behaviour.4  
 
An economic perspective from the New Institutional Economics, represented by, for 
example, Coase5 or Williamson,6 widens this understanding of competition into transaction 
costs, including social and legal rules in the relevant economic analysis and reasoning. As 
Williamson points out, a transaction cost aspect is a missing piece in the Harvard 
approach: “if transaction cost economies are unimportant, the suspicion that novel business 
practices are motivated by anticompetitive purposes is easy ...”7 
 
                                                 
2
 W.A. Cann, “Vertical Restraints and the ‘Efficiency’ Influence – Does any Room Remain for More 
Traditional Antitrust Values and More Innovative Antitrust Policies?” 24 American Business Law Journal 
(1986) 487; R.A. Posner, “The Chicago School of Antitrust” (1979) 127 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, 928; also see H. Hovenkamp, “Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust 
Analysis” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 631. 
3
 Hovenkamp, “Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost” 617; N. Vettas, “Developments in Vertical 
Agreements” (2010) 55(4) Antitrust Bulletin 858; B. Durand, “On the Efficiency of VTR” (thesis, Boston 
College, The Department of Economics, U.S.A., May 2000), pp. 3-4; J.W. Burns, “Vertical Restraints, 
Efficiency, and the Real World” (1993) 62 Ford. L. Rev. 597, 597-598; Easterbrook, “Vertical 
Arrangements” 135. 
4
 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, “Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost” 615-616; A. Jones, B. Sufrin, EU 
Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Fourth Edition (Oxford University Press, 2011) 22-23; J.S. 
Bain, Essays on Price Theory and Industrial Organization (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1972); 
H.M. Mann, “Seller Concentration, Barriers to Entry, and Rates to Return in Thirty Industries, 1950-1960” 
(1966) 48 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 296. 
5
 R. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1; R. Coase, “The Nature 
of the Firm” (1937) 4(16) Economica, 386–405. 
6
 Williamson, Antitrust Economics. 
7
 Ibid., p. 156. 
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In continental Europe, a new competition theory was introduced at the beginning of, and 
even before, the existence of competition law and unfair competition law as found today in 
several continental European countries, such as Germany, the Czech Republic, Austria and 
Slovakia. The idea of using the law to protect and enhance competition was propagated by 
Carl Menger and Eugen Bohm-Bawerk in Austria in the 19th century.8 In the 1930s, the 
economist Walter Eucken and two lawyers, Franz Böhm and Hans Großmann-Doerth, 
established the Freiburg School, which expounded the ordoliberalism approach. This 
theory was based on the idea that an economic constitution promoting the common interest 
would achieve a desirable economic order protecting, watching over and giving order to 
individual economic freedom.9 
 
The schools and theories are still evolving and include other general theories and 
approaches.10 Posner sees the existence of the Chicago School as opposing the older 
Harvard School.11 However, this understanding does not consider the ongoing formulation 
of new ideas and theories on anti-competitive effects that originated from both the Harvard 
and the Chicago School and also from Williamson’s theory on transaction cost economics 
and others.12 Indeed, the previously discussed schools have been influencing scholars and 
policies since their establishment. 
 
6.3. Pro-Competitive Theories 
 
Several theories that offer reasons for the legality of RPM exist; however, these theories 
are also applicable, sometimes partially or in different forms, to VTR. Indeed, Justice 
White stated that price and non-price vertical restraints have essentially the same economic 
effects.13  
 
                                                 
8
 D.J. Gerber, “Europe and the Globalization of Antitrust Law” (1999) 14 Connecticut Journal of 
International Law, 15, 26. 
9
 M. Vatiero, “The Ordoliberal Notion of Market Power: An Institutionalist Reassessment” (2010) 6 
European Competition Journal 690; R. Van den Bergh, P. Camesasca, European Competition Law and 
Economics, A Comparative Perspective 2nd Ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) 65f; W. Eucken, The 
Foundations of Economics, History and Theory in the Analysis of Economic Reality (William Hodge, 
London, Edinburgh, Glasgow, 1950); see also H. Großmann-Doerth, Selbstgeschaffenes Recht der Wirtschaft 
und Staatliches Recht (Wagner’sche Universitätsbuchhandlung, Freiburg, 1933). 
10
 For example see: http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/philosophies; see Chapter 2 “Objective of the 
Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints”. 
11
 Posner, “Chicago School” 925. 
12
 Hovenkamp, “Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost” 613, 617-618; R.P. Nelson, “Comments on a 
Paper by Posner” (1979) 127 University of Penn. L.R. 949; see below. 
13
 Continentl T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), at 69-70. 
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Silcock was arguably the first economist to discuss the pro-competitive explanation of 
RPM in 1938. He expressed the idea that RPM increased consumer services.14 In the UK, it 
was Yamey who discussed the pro-competitive effects of RPM in his book in 1954, 
although he did not use the term “free riding”.15 However, it could be argued that the free 
riding theory was first introduced by the Court of Appeals in the RPM case of Park & Sons 
in 1907.16 The theory of services was discussed in the cases of Leegin,17 Business 
Electronics,18 Sylvania,19 Schwinn,20 White Motor,21 Albrecht,22 and in the EU cases of 
AEG-Telefunken23 and Consten & Grundig.24 Nevertheless, it could be argued that there is 
no real evidence that RPM or VTR have been used to provide services in practice.25 
 
6.3.1. Theory of Services, Quality Certification and Product Differentiation 
 
6.3.1.1. Theory of Services 
 
An American theorist from the University of Chicago, Telser, discussed the pre-sale 
services theory in 1960 to justify the existence of RPM for products unfamiliar to 
consumers, such as new products or products that are purchased infrequently. He stated 
that RPM encourages retailers to promote manufacturers’ products and protects them from 
free riders who benefit from the promotional services of other retailers while charging low 
prices. If RPM sets the minimum price at such a level that includes the manufacturer’s 
price, retailers’ profits and services’ expense, then no retailer can benefit from the services 
of other retailers while charging low prices.26 In general, it can be said that discounting 
retailers or distributors free ride, in other words, steal profits from the manufacturer and 
other dealers or distributors.27  
                                                 
14
 T.H. Silcock, “Some Problems of Price Maintenance” (1938) 48 Econ. J. 42. 
15
 B.S. Yamey, The Economics of Resale Price Maintenance (1954, Sir Isaac Pitman, London), 52-56. 
16
 Park & Sons, at 45. 
17
 Leegin, at 890-892. 
18
 Business Electronics, at 727-728. 
19
 Sylvania, at 55. 
20
 Schwinn, 370-371. 
21
 White Motor, at 269. 
22
 Albrecht, at 152-153. 
23
 Case 107/82 Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft AEG-Telefunken AG v Commission of the EC [1983] 
ECR 3151, paragraphs 33-34, 41-42, 75. 
24
 C-56/64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v EEC Commission [1966] ECR 
299, p. 349. 
25
 See Chapter 4 “Development of the US Law of Vertical Territorial and Price Restraints”; D.F. Shores, 
“Vertical Price-Fixing and the Contract Conundrum: Beyond Monsanto” (1985) 54 Ford. L. Rev. 377, 402. 
26
 L.G. Telser, “Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?” (1960) 6 Journal of Law & Economics 86. 
27
 K. Kelly, “The Role of the Free Rider in Resale Price Maintenance: The Loch Ness Monster of Antitrust 
Captured” (1988) 10 Geo. Mason U.L.Rev. 327, 338. 
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The theory of services can apply only if the pre-sale services are necessary and if there are 
retailers free riding on this promotional cost. Similarly, it can be stated that guaranteeing 
exclusive territories to retailers prevents free riding and helps promote manufacturers’ 
products or services.28  
 
Free riders can take advantage not just of others’ investments into pre-sale services, but 
also into after-sale services and innovation. Following this reasoning, other theorists have 
developed pre-sale services, after-sale services, quality certification, and the output and 
consumer welfare theories.29 These theories discuss the same process but from different 
perspectives and angles. 
 
6.3.1.2. Quality Certification, Product Differentiation 
 
The quality certification theory is based on the idea that RPM assists a manufacturer to 
create and maintain brand image and, hence, differentiate its product from others.30 
Retailers who hold quality certifications, sell the most fashionable and the highest quality 
products (or services), which are usually new in the market. If a free rider sells the same 
product or products, it can benefit from the reputation established by retailers with quality 
certifications.31  
 
This theory can be used with respect to VTR, which can also protect retailers with quality 
certifications against free riders. In general, pro-exclusive territory explanations claim that 
exclusive territories are an important part of providing incentives for creating and 
maintaining reputation.32 This is typical of franchises.  
 
                                                 
28
 H.P. Marvel, “Resale Price Maintenance and Resale Prices: Paying to Support Competition in the Market 
for Heavy Trucks” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 79-99; H. Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle 
and Execution (Harvard University Press, London, 2005), 184; P.E. Areeda, H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: 
An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, 2nd Edition, Volume VIII (Aspen Publishers, 
2004), 247, 407, 418-422; E. Gellhorn, W.E. Kovacic, S. Calkins, Antitrust Law and Economics 5th Edition 
(Thomson West, St. Paul, 2004), 360; Sylvania, at 55. 
29
 See below. 
30
 W.F. Baxter, “Vertical Practices – Half Slave, Half Free” (1983) 52 Antitrust L.J. 743, 748; see the US 
case of Leegin, at 882. 
31
 M. Kneepkens, “Resale Price Maintenance: Economics Call for a More Balanced Approach” (2007) 12 
E.C.L.R. 657-658; Areeda, Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, 12-13; Gellhorn, Kovacic, Calkins, Antitrust Law and 
Economics, 344-345; H.P. Marvel, S. McCafferty, “Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification” 
(1984) 15 Rand Journal of Economics 347; see also the US case of Bausch & Lomb, at 728. 
32
 P. Rey, J. Stiglitz, “The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers’ Competition” (1995) 26 Rand Journal 
of Economics 446. 
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However, in order to apply the theory, some conditions must be fulfilled. Firstly, 
consumers must link the product with retailers who have quality certifications and the 
quality certification must matter to the consumers. It must be noted here that price is not 
the only motivating factor for consumers to buy a particular product from a particular 
seller. In this case, it is the quality.33 Secondly, there are free riders who do not have the 
same certifications.34  
 
In other words, this theory is based on an assumption that a high quality certification 
creates useful and essential information for consumers who will buy this product based on 
this information, but from a dealer with the lowest price: a free rider. Elzigna, Peritz, 
Pitovsky, Posner and Telser offer two possibilities as to how to prevent free riders from 
selling the product. The first is to refuse to sell to discounters and the second involves 
imposing RPM, which guarantees that dealers receive compensation for the quality 
certifications.35  
 
Naturally, there are obvious and important drawbacks to the discussed theories. Firstly, the 
theories can apply only if all conditions are fulfilled, as is the necessity for services, and it 
can apply only to some products and only in some markets. Secondly, RPM is not the only 
way to protect and/or ensure the provision of services, innovation and the maintenance of 
reputation. The obvious question is whether there exists a more efficient and pro-
competitive mechanism, one that is less restrictive, and is, thus, legal, to guarantee the 
same aims on which these theories, including the quality certification theory, are based. 
 
6.3.1.3. RPM: Product Differentiation – Image Theory 
 
When analysing RPM, the question must be asked as to whether high retail prices can be of 
benefit to manufacturers and consumers, and potentially to competition. Orbach argues that 
they can. He explains that some manufacturers are motivated to maintain and initiate high 
resale prices for their products to create and maintain an image of an exclusive product, 
which is appealing for some consumers. Therefore, high prices are a product feature that 
                                                 
33
 Besanko, D. … [et al.], Economics of Strategy Fifth Edition (John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 25-27; Bain 
Essays on Price Theory 3. 
34
 Marvel, McCafferty, “RPM and Quality Certification” 355; Commission Notice, Guidelines on Vertical 
Restraints, Official Journal C 130, 19.05.2010, SEC(2010) 411 (“Guidelines”), paragraphs 107(c), 107(i). 
35
 Marvel, McCafferty, “RPM and Quality Certification” 348-350. 
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should be protected by competition policy in the form of RPM, rather than made illegal.36 
Such an explanation could apply to several cases regarding RPM.37 
 
Although this theory is similar to the theories of services and quality certification, it misses 
one feature – an extra aspect which would have the potential to enhance competition 
because it is the high price itself without anything else that creates the wanted image and 
potentially attracts certain consumers. In such a case, discounting itself cannot bear the title 
“free riding” as discounters cannot free ride on any positive aspect but would rather 
discount as part of their own promotion; however, if this occurs frequently, it could destroy 
the image that the manufacturer is aiming for.  
 
The interest of certain consumers is the reason why Orbach argues that RPM should be 
protected by competition and he groups this “justification” among pro-competitive 
theories.38 However, considering that such conduct creates ancillary monopolistic prices 
and restricts price intrabrand competition without enhancing any other aspect of 
competition and welfare and, moreover, it has the potential to motivate only a minority of 
consumers depending on the nature of the market, it is in contradiction to the protection of 
effective competition. 
 
Furthermore, manufacturers have a more direct tool to increase prices: their own wholesale 
prices. Although this does not ensure that retailers will not offer discounts on their 
products, it does not restrict competition, distributors or retailers. Nevertheless, the image 
theory offers a valuable, although rather anti-competitive, reason for a manufacturer to use 
RPM.  
 
6.3.1.4. Free Riding 
 
Peritz, Pitofsky or Telser see the benefit of RPM in preventing competing retailers from 
free riding on the promotional services of retailers, such as product demonstrations and 
consultations.39 Such an advantage also appears in the case of using territorial restraints.40 
                                                 
36
 B.Y. Orbach, “The Image Theory: RPM and Allure of High Prices” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 277-307; 
also see G.R. Ackert, “An Argument for Exempting Prestige Goods from the Per Se Ban on Resale Price 
Maintenance” (1995) 73 Texas Law Review 1185; F.W. Taussig, “Price Maintenance” (1916) 6 
Am.Econ.Rev., 172. 
37
 See US cases Leegin; Bausch & Lomb; Parke, Davis; Colgate; Park & Sons; Dr. Miles. 
38
 Orbach, “The Image Theory” 306-307. 
39
 R.J. Peritz, “A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine” (1988-1989) 40 Hastings Law J. 511; 
Easterbrook, “Vertical Arrangements” 152-153; R. Pitofsky, “In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case 
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Retailers who do not invest in promotional services (or after-sale services or quality 
certification) can free ride on these services by avoiding the extra cost of services. 
Therefore, they have an advantage over other retailers.41 Logically, the services need to be 
linked to the product not to the retailers’ business in general. They must also be provided 
before sale without the possibility of charging a separate fee for them and consumers must 
seek these services, otherwise, such an attempt would not be efficient. Hence, as 
Kneepkens observes, the argument that free riding on promotional and pre-sale services 
has a potential to be anti-competitive applies only to a limited group of services.42 
 
These theories, and most notably the theory of services, were used in several US cases to 
justify the existence of both RPM and VTR.43 On the other hand, the EU Courts and the 
Commission chose a different approach at their inception, promoting free riding as a legal 
and pro-competitive activity primarily to protect competition and the free market.44 
Currently, the Commission considers free riding as part of a justification for applying 
vertical restrictions. However, EU competition policy recognises free riding justifications 
only in the case of pre-sales services and promotional activities, and not in the case of 
after-sale services, and only with the condition that the product in question is relatively 
new and/or technically complex and/or where reputation plays an essential role. The 
product must also have a high value and it must not be practical for the producer or other 
suppliers to include a requirement of promotion and/or pre-sales services in the distribution 
contract with all distributors.45 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing” (1983) 71 Geo.L.J. 1487, 1494; Posner, “Chicago School” 
926-927; Telser “Why Free Trade?”, 86, 91. 
40
 Marvel, “Heavy Trucks” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 79, 83-84. 
41
 P.M. Ippolito, “RPM Myths that Muddy the Discussion” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 157-158; K.G. 
Elzinga, D.E. Mills, “The Economics of Resale Price Maintenance”,  in Competition Law and Policy, Collin 
W., (2008) American Bar Association, Chapter XX, pp. 2-3; Peritz, “Genealogy” 511; Easterbrook, “Vertical 
Arrangements” 152-153; Pitofsky, “In Defense of Discounters” 1487, 1494; Posner, “Chicago School” 926-
927; Telser “Why Free Trade?”, 86, 91. 
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721; 728; 731; Bausch & Lomb, at 728; John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. Rep. 24 (Sixth 
Circuit, 1907), at 45; for Territorial Restraints: Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 
(1977), at 55-56.  
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 See e.g. Case 56/64, 58/64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission 
of the European Economic Community, [1966] ECR 299; Case 258/78, L.C. Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele 
v. Commission [1982] ECR 2015; Case 161/84, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard 
Schillgallis [1986] ECR 353.  
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Consumer Focus refuses to accept the free-riding theory. The organisation argues that free 
riding should be protected as it reflects consumer demand and the nature of markets. Free 
riding not only decreases prices, it also increases innovation as suppliers must find 
different ways to sell their products and fulfil consumer needs.46  
 
For some services, such as free maintenance, it is more reasonable that customers who 
decide to buy a product because of the offer of extra services will buy it from retailers who 
offer those services. A customer can buy a service with the product; if she/he buys the 
product without the service, she/he must pay for it later if she/he ever needs such a service. 
One can state that, firstly, this applies to services whose purpose is not providing 
information. Secondly, if a customer buys from a retailer who does not offer services but 
sells the product more cheaply than competitors, the customer is interested in the product 
itself and not in the services. Allowing free pricing policy in such circumstances enriches 
competition. 
 
Furthermore, even though it can be true in some cases that RPM (or territorial restraints) 
increases distributors’ interest in offering services and quality, free price policy does not 
stop retailers from developing business strategies based on services and quality rather than 
on prices. On the contrary, free price policy means that the different needs of different 
consumers will be met. Simply, some retailers focus on consumers searching for the lowest 
price; other retailers may offer extra services to other consumers if there is this demand. 
Hence, free price policy opens more possibilities for retailers to compete and covers 
different consumer needs.  
 
Lao also argues that the existence of free riding is positive for competition and the 
relationship among retailers with different preferences is complementary as it increases 
total sales and thus enhances competition.47 Gundlach, Cannon, Kenneth and Manning 
conclude in their marketing study summarising findings across marketing scholarly work, 
                                                 
46
 Consumer Focus (the statutory organization for consumers across England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland) “Consumer Focus Response to Vertical Restraints Block Exemption Regulation” (September 2009) 
pp. 11-12; Daniel J. Schuler’ statement, Consumer Protection Against Price Fixing, hearings on S. 429 
before the Subcommission on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Commission on the 
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1991); Retail Competition Enforcement Act, hearing before Senate 
Commission on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 281 (1987); also see M. Lao, “Resale Price Maintenance: 
The Internet Phenomenon and Free Rider Issues” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 473-512; P.J. Harbour, L.A. 
Price, “RPM and the Rule of Reason: Ready or Not, Here We Come?” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 229; R.L. 
Steiner, “The Leegin Factors – a Mixed Bag” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 55. 
47
 M. Lao, “Resale Price Maintenance: The Internet Phenomenon and Free Rider Issues” (2010) 55 Antitrust 
Bulletin 492-494; also see S. Van Baal, Ch. Dach “Free Riding and Customer Retention across Retailers’ 
Channels” (2005) 19 J. Interactive Marketing 76. 
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including those based on empirical data, that some manufacturers encourage the existence 
of free riding to increase their intrabrand competition. In cases where manufacturers 
introduce RPM, such conduct tends to increase the free riding phenomenon and, aside from 
a unified price or price range, it also results in the same or similar non-price strategies; 
thus, RPM tends to have adverse effects restricting choice and diversity.48 
 
Innovation and competition have introduced new methods for shopping, such as the 
internet. Consumers seek available information and compare not just prices, but also 
services and quality. Such consumer behaviour promotes fair and effective competition, as 
discussed in Chapter 3 “Vertical Competition and Structure”. These aspects result in multi-
channel consumers and multi-channel distributions. Indeed, this enhances competition and 
total welfare and reflects the diversity of consumer demand.49 
 
Allowing the free riding argument as a reasonable justification for vertical restraints can 
prevent the natural development of, and innovation in, different markets. It can also restrict 
consumer choice and the efficiency of distributors and/or retailers. In contrast, refusing to 
allow such justifications has led to innovative ideas. For example, perfume manufacturers 
provide samples in magazines which means that consumers are not as driven by visiting 
brick shops as they would be without this promotional method. Books and music markets 
include reviews and online samples.50 
 
Allowing the existence of RPM and potentially VTR disturbs effective competition, 
including innovation and the natural advantage of the most efficient distributors, 
If [consumers] wish to seek advice from ‘official’ suppliers and then shop online to get a better price 
then they are simply expressing their preference for price over information. This choice will then 
drive change in the marketplace. Existing suppliers will either have to rebalance their offer, 
lowering prices or offering some other innovation (such as in-house coffee shops in bookstores) or 
exit the market. This is the normal operation of the marketplace. Every product or service is a 
combination of item and information. If there is a market for both parts of the offer the suppliers, 
assuming a degree of efficiency in both elements, will find alternative ways to supply consumer 
demand.51 
  
                                                 
48
 G.T. Gundlach, J.P. Cannon, K.C. Manning, “Free Riding and Resale Price Maintenance: Insights from 
Marketing Research and Practice” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 384, 412-418. 
49
 Gundlach, Cannon, Manning, “Marketing Research” 391-401, 403-410, 412-413; Harbour, Price, “RPM” 
225-244; also see Chapter 3 “Vertical Competition and Structure”, pp. 39-40. 
50
 Consumer Focus “Focus Response”, 11; for instance, see the book section on Amazon.com. 
51
 Consumer Focus “Focus Response”, 12. 
Barbora Jedličková                                 Chapter 6: Theories of Pro-Competitiveness v. Anti-Competitiveness  
 
 215
The US Supreme Court was right when it stated that antitrust law could not accept a 
defence that competition itself, for instance price competition, is unreasonable.52 As 
Pitofsky highlights, trying to prevent free riding would be against the US free market 
ideology and thus against democracy. He further states that a competitive market should 
not give manufacturers the authority to decide which retailers will stay in the market, 
whether the retailers are offering services or whether they are charging lower prices.53 
Each retailer has its own responsibility for its business decisions and its marketing strategy.  
 
Finally, Peeperkorn correctly highlights that, even if RPM is imposed, it does not eliminate 
the free riding issue as retailers or distributors can still use the “dominant strategy”, which 
applies in game theory, to pocket the higher margin instead of using it for promotion.54 
 
6.3.1.5. Interbrand Competition 
 
The US and EU approaches both prefer interbrand competition over intrabrand 
competition.55 Therefore, the effect of the pro-competitive theories on interbrand 
competition must be analysed. This includes consumer demand, market structure and the 
nature of the product as these aspects may determine whether pro-competitive theories can 
apply in reality. For instance, Comanor argues that if the market is competitive at the 
interbrand level and products are relatively homogenous, then RPM does not solve the 
problem of free riding because there will be free riders distributing for other competing 
manufacturers.56 However, when applying game theory, the legalisation of both RPM and 
VTR can lead to situations when all or almost all manufacturers use such restrictions. This 
cumulative effect at the interbrand level must lead to the restriction of interbrand 
competition as price competition will be restricted at this level in the case of RPM, or 
competition in general will be restricted at the interbrand level in the case of absolute 
territorial restrictions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
52
 See National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
53
 Pitofsky, “In Defense of Discounters” 1493. 
54
 L. Peeperkorn, “Resale Price Maintenance and Its Alleged Efficiencies” (2008) June European 
Competition Journal 201, 206. 
55
 US: Mack Trucks, at 225; Leegin, at 889-890, 895-897; State Oil v. Khan, at 15; Business Cards 
Tomorrow, at 1205; Business Electronic, at 725-726; Sylvania, at 51-65; EU: GSK, paragraphs 114-296. 
56
 W.S. Comanor, “Vertical Price-Fixing-Vertical Market Restrictions, And the New Antitrust Policy” (1985) 
98 Harv.L.Rev. 1000. 
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6.3.1.6. Pre-Sale Services Theory - Advertising as Entrance Barrier 
 
It is questionable whether advertising and other promotional tools can be classified as 
“services”. One could argue that promotion forms part of a business marketing strategy and 
therefore does not have to, as its first aim, assist consumers. Rather, it assists 
manufacturers and potentially their distributors and retailers. Nonetheless, advertising may 
be beneficial for competition as it can increase it, in particular by better disseminating the 
flow of information.57 
 
However, Posner, when discussing pre-sale services, proposes that advertising is desirable 
for consumers because it delivers information that is important to them.58 This is 
contentious, given that there are advertisements that concentrate on impressions rather than 
factual information about the quality and price of the products.59 Many products are not 
advertised, yet consumers are able to obtain information about them, for example from 
their packaging. 
 
Furthermore, according to Posner, the Chicago School supposes that promotional cost 
creates a barrier to entry for new competitors who want to penetrate the market, as the 
promotional cost is an extra expenditure that might discourage a new competitor from 
entering the market. Therefore, imposing RPM can be essential business strategy for new 
competitors. It can be used as a tool to assist new competitors to overcome this entrance 
barrier by securing the retail price to retailers and, thus, securing a return of their 
promotional investment.60  
 
Klein argues even further by defending the use of RPM, claiming that it is the 
manufacturer’s tool to resolve the incentive differential and, thus, this “restriction” 
motivates distributors to promote a manufacturer’s products by guaranteeing a margin for 
                                                 
57
 See, for example, Ippolito, “RPM Myths” 154; S.I. Ornstein, D.M. Hanssens, “Resale Price Maintenance: 
Output Increasing or Restricting? The Case of Distilled Spirits in the United States” (1987) 36 J. Industrial 
Economics 11; J.E. Kwoka, “Advertising and the Price and Quality of Optometric Services” (1984) 74 
Am.Economic Review 211; L. Benham, “The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses” (1972) 15 
J.L.& Econ. 337.  
58
 Posner, “Chicago School” 925. 
59
 See Nelson, “Comments” 949, 950. 
60
 Posner, “Chicago School” 930; see also G. Shaffer, “Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A 
Comparison of Facilitating Practices” (1991) 22 Rand Journal of Economics 120-135; Elzinga, Mills, “The 
Economics of RPM” 1-15. 
Barbora Jedličková                                 Chapter 6: Theories of Pro-Competitiveness v. Anti-Competitiveness  
 
 217
its distributors.61 However, as Grimes points out, this does not lead to pro-competitive 
results if there are other and less restrictive options.62 The question is moot as to whether 
the same distributors would be motivated to promote these products if all manufacturers 
used RPM. Moreover, as mentioned previously, the direct objective of RPM is not the 
promotion of products. Finally, the desired margin depends on market structure elements 
such as interbrand competition. 
 
The same reasoning can be used with respect to territorial restraints.63 In particular, 
exclusive territories avoid free riding and allow dealers to invest money in promotion for 
new competitors. Having distributor intrabrand monopolies allows the manufacturer and its 
distributors to set prices high enough to cover promotional costs.   
 
If interbrand competition is anti-competitive because of a monopoly or oligopololy, then 
there is a high possibility that Rey’s and Stiglitz’s assumption will apply in an exclusive 
territories system. They claim that a barrier to entry exists because there are no other 
distributors in the market who would invest in advertising to penetrate the market, and not 
because advertising is itself a barrier to entry.64 On the contrary, if the interbrand 
distributor competition is highly competitive, then distributors can be highly motivated to 
invest in pre-sales services, if required by consumer demand. RPM or territorial restraints 
are therefore not necessary; the most efficient distributors will naturally benefit and 
competition will be balanced without these vertical restraints. 
 
It is an important fact in the nature of business that each new competitor must prepare its 
business strategy and consider why it wants to enter the market, whether it will make a 
profit after a certain amount of time and whether it has enough capital.  
 
6.3.1.7. Theory of Services - Direct Compensation 
 
Peritz and Comanor suggest that manufacturers can offer retailers financial compensation 
for their services to ensure the same conditions for retailers who promote products and free 
riders who may be advantaged by not carrying promotional costs. This compensation could 
                                                 
61
 B. Klein, “Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in the Absence of Free-Riding” (2009) 76 Antitrust L.J. 
437. 
62
 W.S. Grimes, “A Dynamic Analysis of Resale Price Maintenance: Inefficient Brand Promotion, Higher 
Margins, Distorted Choices, and Retarded Retailer Innovation” (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 101. 
63
 See Areeda, Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, 418-422. 
64
 Rey, Stiglitz, “Exclusive Territories” 446. 
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be reflected in the wholesale price for the distributors or retailers.65 Telser argues that it is 
difficult to set prices for services because it is difficult to predict how many customers of a 
particular retailer will be interested in the promotional services. Moreover, he presumes 
that it can be very expensive, including the cost of negotiating and concluding such 
contracts.66  
 
One could argue that if a manufacturer invests its time and money to introduce RPM, then 
it is difficult to imagine that it would be less expensive than agreeing on direct coverage of 
services’ expenses. It is also difficult to set the minimum price or price in RPM because 
different distributors will have different promotional and general costs; in other words, 
their efficiency differs. RPM or territorial restraints conceal efficiency and effective 
competition and can discourage more efficient distributors.  
 
Furthermore, if the minimum cost is too low, the services theory cannot apply. Or, at least, 
there will be distributors who would like to invest more money into promotion. If it is too 
high, distributor efficiency is restrained. This could also set excessive prices for customers 
and increase profits, similar to a monopoly, depending on the market structure and its 
nature.  
 
These arguments, supported by Mathewson’s and Winter’s economic study that shows that 
a simple uniform price maintenance is not efficient in the competitive market,67 contradict 
the reasoning by Gould and Preston. They claim that RPM is a useful tool for a 
manufacturer to set up efficient, in other word profitable, outlets, and avoid less efficient 
retailers staying in business.68  
 
Finally, RPM or VTR do not directly oblige or motivate distributors to invest in services. 
On the other hand, if a manufacturer compensates retailers for the costs of promotional 
services directly, it can directly motivate its retailers to promote its products. Areeda and 
Hovenkamp argue that the competitive alternatives may fail to offer optimal services.69 
However, it is questionable as to how RPM and/or territorial restraints can offer optimal 
                                                 
65
 Peritz, “Genealogy” 571; Comanor, “Vertical Price-Fixing” 987. 
66
 Telser “Why Free Trade?” 92-94; also see Ippolito, “RPM Myths” 161. 
67
 G.F. Mathewson, R.A. Winter, “An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints” (1984) 15 Rand Journal of 
Economics 27. 
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services if the manufacturer does not control services or their volume and does not directly 
influence its distributors to use services. 
 
Easterbrook claims that if RPM is imposed, it is easy to observe if services are used: if the 
price drops then services also drop.70 However, there are several factors which influence 
price aside from the cost of services. A retailer can sell below price to clear its stock or as 
part of a promotion. Furthermore, as previously discussed, RPM does not ensure the use of 
services. Additionally, Steiner argues that services and other previously-described 
objectives are usually better achieved through other marketing strategies.71 
 
6.3.1.8. Direct Obligation or Imposing Services – Selective System 
 
Pro-competitive effects can be achieved through means that do not restrict competition, 
that is without using RPM, and that protect competitiveness and the more efficient 
competitors.72 One such means, direct compensation, was discussed previously.  
 
Bailey and Leonard argue in their economic study that, instead of using RPM, a 
manufacturer can use other tools, such as minimum advertised pricing policy, to achieve 
the same retail pricing practices but without decreasing total welfare, as is the case in 
RPM.73 Steiner explains that such competitive means are more effective than RPM, which 
does not monitor the performance of the pro-competitive activities in question.74  
 
As Brunell rightly observes: 
these other activities raise demand directly, and only indirectly raise prices, while resale price 
maintenance raises prices directly and only indirectly may lead to the hoped-for benefits.75 
 
Pitofsky argues that there is no guarantee that retailers know what the manufacturer wants 
and, even if they do, that they will follow its instruction when RPM or even territorial 
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 Easterbrook, “Vertical Arrangements” 156. 
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 R.L. Steiner, “How Manufacturers Deal with the Price-Cutting Retailer: When Are Vertical Restraints 
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restraints are used.76 This applies to both services and quality certification. There is no 
direct empirical evidence to support that applying vertical restraints increases services or 
the quality of a product. On the contrary, cases discussed in previous chapters and some 
studies, such as the study of the US music industry, indicate that not only do RPM and 
VTR not increase services and quality, but they also lead to welfare losses.77 Moreover, 
parties base their arguments on free riding, services and quality theories in situations when 
their intention was not to improve services and/or quality. For example, the party in the 
case of Golf Sales mentioned this; however, RPM applied also to authorised online dealers 
who did not offer any consulting services.78 
 
In certain cases, it is possible for a manufacturer to impose services itself. Comanor pointes 
out that if it does so, distributors are not jeopardised by free riders and the manufacturer’s 
profit increases, as does the price charged to distributors. It is important to understand that 
this only applies to certain markets where consumer demand increases with services.79 
However, some services cannot be performed by the manufacturer, in particular shop 
assisting. This kind of promotional service also establishes a retailer’s reputation and 
becomes a part of its ability to compete.  
 
Another possible way to avoid free riding and ensure services, quality and the reputation of 
products is the manufacturer’s refusal to deal with non-suitable retailers. The manufacturer 
can specify the exact standards required from its distributors, including services. It can 
                                                 
76
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Restraints: Durand, “On the Efficiency”; W.F. Mueller, F.E. Gaithman, “An Empirical Test of the Free Rider 
and Market Power Hypothesis (April 12, 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of 
Wisconsin) in W.S. Comanor, “The Two Economics of Vertical Restraints” (1992) 21 Sw.U.L. Rev. 1281; 
W.P. Culbertson, D. Bradford, “The Price of Beer: Some Evidence from Interstate Comparisons” (1991) 9 
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offer its product only to those retailers or distributors who have a quality certification. 
However, this can be difficult for a new competitor who must be able to attract distributors 
and offer them reassurance.  
 
Therefore, the manufacturer can base its distributive system on a selective system and 
create objective selective criteria, including particular services and/or quality, when 
choosing its retailers. If the retailers do not obey with the distributive agreement, then the 
manufacturer can terminate their agreement. This means that all retailers have to use 
services directly; nonetheless, they are free in price competition and, thus, efficiency 
remains.80 
 
6.3.1.9. Increasing Non-Price Competition 
 
Both the theory of services and the theory of quality certification presume in a certain way 
that RPM increases non-price competition as it motivates distributors to compete in 
different areas than just price, such as competing in services, innovation, quality and 
reputation.81 This presumption does not apply to absolute VTR as distributors in absolute 
territories do not have to increase non-price competition within one brand. Arguably, they 
are not motivated to compete at all. However, if the product is not significantly 
differentiated in such aspects as brand reputation, the more competitive the interbrand 
market is, the more the distributors are motivated to compete, as discussed in Chapter 3 
“Vertical Competition and Structure”. 
 
Moreover, market structure, consumer demand and the nature of products, amongst other 
factors, play important roles. For instance, while sophisticated products, such as 
computers, or more complex products, such as houses, may involve the need for services, 
this is not true when selling simple products, such as fruit, sheets and drinks. Therefore, a 
general claim that RPM increases non-price competition and is, thus, justified cannot apply 
in all cases.  
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 For instance, see AEG-Telefunken, paragraphs 33-34. 
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 See Kneepkens, “Resale Price Maintenance” 658; Telser “Why Free Trade?” 86. 
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6.3.2. Theory of Welfare Effects 
 
The theory of welfare effects explains that RPM is beneficial for consumers because it 
increases their welfare. Welfare can be improved by increased services, innovation and 
other factors based on the use of RPM. The previous theories focused on the 
manufacturer’s choice; however, this theory is based on consumer interests. Nonetheless, 
the theory also presumes that manufacturer interests are the same as consumer interests. 
Bork and Brief claim that RPM increases competition in services, which subsequently 
increases consumer demand and, hence, RPM is “highly pro-competitive and enhance[s] 
consumer welfare by stimulating interbrand rivalry”.82  
 
Pitofsky disagrees with Bork and Easterbrook that manufacturer interests are the same as 
consumer interests. He also does not believe that manufacturers and their dealers share 
interests either. Dealers do not want the best profit for manufacturers but for themselves 
and, understandably, consumers do not want the highest profit for the manufacturers and 
retailers but the best price, quality and services for themselves.83 Although, manufacturers 
must attract consumers (and also distributors) to profit, the highest profit for a 
manufacturer does not exactly mirror the best interest for a consumer. 
 
This is well demonstrated in the Leegin example: Mr. James Donahau had bought Leegin’s 
belt at a discount of $20 and not at the full price of $60. He asked sarcastically whether he 
would have been better off if he had bought it for $60 after RPM was used. He said that he 
would not as there were no other advantages or services for him as a consumer than the 
price.84 
 
The theory of welfare effects is based on an assumption that consumers make their choice 
merely in relation to non-price aspects, such as extra services – the more services offered, 
the more products consumers buy or the more consumers that are interested in buying the 
products – and that RPM increases the choice of such aspects (services). As explained 
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Yale L.J. 373, 403 (quotation); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, 
Spray-Rite (No.82-914); also see Leegin, at 889; GSK, paragraphs 171-172; Kneepkens, “Resale Price 
Maintenance” 658. 
83
 Pitofsky, “In Defense of Discounters” 1491; compare with Easterbrook, “Vertical Arrangements” 135, 
147; Bork, “Price Fixing and Market Division” 373; Adam Smith already recognised that producers were 
driven only by their own interests (mainly profit making) – see A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Books I-III 
edited by A. Skinner (Penguin Group, London, 1999), Book I, Chapter II. 
84
 The American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, “The Antitrust Fall Forum” (November 12-13, 
2009) Washington D.C. (Mr. James Donahau – November, the 13th). 
Barbora Jedličková                                 Chapter 6: Theories of Pro-Competitiveness v. Anti-Competitiveness  
 
 223
above, in reality, this does not motivate all consumers. As Durand demonstrates in his 
economic thesis when analysing pre-sale services, consumer welfare is only positive if the 
elasticity of pre-sales services of demand is high.85  
 
Furthermore, there are other important factors for consumers when making their choice. 
These factors are linked to the product, the brand and the market. As explained by Spence, 
this theory supposes that there are only marginal consumers who are sensitive to any 
product improvements and services.86 Hence, even though the price increases, they will be 
more interested in the product if it is improved or offered with additional services. 
However, there are also other consumers, or only other consumers, in the market who are 
not interested in price at all and will continue buying the same amount of a product; these 
are called infra-marginal consumers.87 Schulz’s economic model proves that the efficiency 
of RPM depends on the characteristics of consumers, comparing those consumers who buy 
spontaneously and those who search for different information.88 
 
Types of consumers other than marginal and infra-marginal consumers exist in the market. 
For example, there are also consumers whose preference is only price. As Comanor points 
out, to claim that vertical restraints have a pro-competitive effect by increasing consumer 
welfare, leads to the assumption that it must be true that all consumers value new services. 
However, if only one half of consumers are marginal and value services, with consumer 
surplus declining, services will not increase profit and vertical restraints will be not 
efficient.89  
 
Rey and Stiglitz argue in their economic study that the standard theory of consumer 
behaviour or Posner’s test of the presence of “efficiency-enhancing” costs causing a shift 
in the demand curve does not exactly apply in reality because the structure of different 
markets is more complicated and includes a number of different aspects.90 Nonetheless, in 
the competitive market, as Mathewson and Winter calculated, a simple uniform price 
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86
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maintenance was not efficient.91 However, economists Fisher and Overstreet obtained the 
opposite results in their economic study.92  
 
Conversely, Ippolito argues that consumer prices could decrease if RPM is introduced, if 
RPM motivates distributors to promote and/or introduce services; thus, the manufacturer 
can decrease its own activities in this sense.93 However, this statement is based merely on 
an assumption without any practical evidence and without considering the basic aspects of 
RPM and competition. This thesis shows the opposite. Firstly, manufacturers are driven by 
high profits and, therefore, unless they are pressured by circumstances or the bargaining 
power of vertical competitors, they simply would not decrease their wholesale prices. 
Secondly, with the same motivation, distributors would not decrease retail prices primarily 
when RPM is used. 
 
Generally, the structure and the nature of a particular market, as well as aspects such as the 
rightly-set objective of antitrust/competition law, should play an essential role in theories. 
The protection of consumers does not necessarily mean the same as economic efficiency or 
the protection of competition. However, consumer demand is an important factor for 
competition as it should determine which competitors remain in the market.  
 
Comanor summarises that to say that vertical restraints increase consumer welfare is too 
general and is not based on any economic analysis.94 Bork refutes Comanor’s arguments as 
“thoroughly inadequate”, claiming that Comanor suggests that promotion, advertising and 
other sales efforts should be illegal per se.95 However, as is obvious from Comanor’s 
article, he explains that vertical restraints are not necessarily used for promotional or other 
services but more probably restrict competition to increase profit. He also stresses that 
there are other, more direct methods to promote a product or avoid the benefits for free 
riders.96 As Williamson summarises, Bork presumes that there is almost no friction on the 
vertical chain, which grossly suppresses the importance of one of the main aspects of 
business: the operation of strategic considerations, including transaction costs.97 
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6.3.2.1. Interbrand Competition 
 
Cases discussed in previous chapters include an argument that RPM and VTR increase 
interbrand competition.98 However, RPM and territorial restraints can also restrict 
interbrand competition in certain markets, as has also been discussed in previous chapters 
and was argued by Durand in his economic research. Durand studied car distribution 
systems in the US, which are based on franchise agreements containing exclusive 
territories.99  
 
The vehicle industry includes various types of customers. Some pre-sale services are 
essential for selling cars, such as showrooms and test-drives. This is in the nature of a 
product that is expensive and technically complex and complicated. The results of 
Durand’s study show that reducing the number of dealers by imposing exclusive territories 
had an anti-competitive effect in the US vehicle market. The consumer welfare effect was 
low, if at all, because the pre-sales service elasticity of demand was not statistically 
significant (almost equal to zero) and thus the exclusive territorial restraints raised the 
price-cost margin and allowed producers to exercise a higher degree of market power. 
Restricting intrabrand competition also reduced interbrand competition.100  Therefore, the 
territorial restraints in this market were inefficient and restrictive towards competition and 
general welfare.101 
 
6.3.3. Theory of Output 
 
The theory of output discusses the same reasoning as previous theories, but from the 
opposite angle, concentrating on production rather than consumer welfare. 
 
Bork believes that anti-competitive theories of vertical restraints result in a restriction of 
output.102 He claims that output increases when imposing RPM (as well as any other 
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vertical restraint) because additional services increase the interest of consumers to buy the 
product concerned. Therefore, vertical restraints are pro-competitive.103  
 
This could apply only if the market structure allowed for such a result; that is, if the market 
included only mere marginal consumers and not any other groups. If it does, then 
increasing the price will decrease output because consumers whose preference is price will 
seek a cheaper alternative, as explained in previously mentioned theories. 
 
For instance, suppose that a manufacturer produces luxury products and, therefore, wishes 
to maintain an image of luxury products. It applies RPM or a vertical territorial restraint to 
obtain such a result. If there are both consumers who are motivated by price and consumers 
who shop only in luxury shops, then the manufacturer’s output will not increase when 
applying RPM or a vertical territorial restraint because consumers motivated by price will 
stop buying the product, or they will start to buy less, while other consumers will continue 
to go to luxurious shops. However, if there are only consumers who buy the product 
because it is luxurious, not everybody can afford it and the product is only sold in 
expensive fashionable stores, then their interest will remain the same, or potentially 
increase after the use of RPM.104  
 
6.3.4. Facilitating Entry by New Entities 
 
RPM and VTR can assist a new company to penetrate the market or a company to 
penetrate a new market by motivating distributors and retailers to get involved and sell its 
products. In general, the risks of unknown profit are reduced if RPM or absolute territories 
are introduced.105 RPM used by a penetrating company could also eliminate or minimise 
slotting allowances, in other words, fees paid for the retailer’s shelf space, in the case of a 
producer seeking large retail stores. Slotting allowances can be very high if a producer is 
new to the market.106  
 
                                                 
103Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, 295-297; Bork, “Price Fixing and Market Division” 403; also see the 
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RPM offers some certainty for distributors that their investment in the new product will be 
profitable while lowering distribution costs. In such a situation a distributor can better 
predict risks and returnability of investment. Depending on the time period, this seems to 
be beneficial for the market as it increases interbrand competition at the beginning because 
the market is enriched with a new product.  
 
This theory is well-established in both EU and US cases.107 However, according to the EU 
approach, it is illegal to maintain the vertical restriction after the product is no longer new. 
It is based on the understanding that, after a certain time, maintaining such a restriction 
would restrict free competition.108 
 
Comanor proposes two different approaches: one for products which are new to the market 
and where the increase of consumer welfare is probable, and another one for older products 
where promotion or other information services are not likely to increase the interest of 
consumers.109 If competition policy allows and legalises vertical restraints in general, this 
could lead to a contra-effect. In particular, using exclusive territories can establish 
oligopolies and, thus, “implements to entry”.110 This restricts potential distributors from 
entering the market and even potential sellers could be restricted as they would have no 
distributors to choose from. On the contrary, if RPM and territorial restraints are used for 
new competitors to enter the market, this would lead to the promotion rather than 
restriction of competition. 
 
Paldor argues that manufacturers initiate RPM not only to penetrate the market but an 
established manufacturer may use RPM to assure or establish downstream-level 
exclusivity; in other words, as a motivation for its distributors to sell only its products or to 
                                                 
107
 Territorial Restraints: EU: C-56/65 Société Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH [1966] ECR 
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display them exclusively.111 Although this is a logical reason for initiating RPM by a 
manufacturer, it is also conditional. Firstly, this can be of benefit to the manufacturer in 
question if its competitors do not also use RPM. Secondly, this does not offer any certainty 
that the distributors will comply, as it is in their interest to sell as many different products 
as possible and thus receive the highest profit. RPM does not ensure exclusivity in contrast 
with, for instance, exclusive territorial restraints. 
 
6.3.5. The Reduction of Distribution Costs; Efficiency 
 
Some market structures are such that territorial restraints can minimise distribution costs 
and create the most efficient method for distribution. For instance, this can be true in the 
personally delivered newspaper market.112 This justification was confirmed in the US cases 
of McDaniel113 and Newberry.114 However, the negative, anti-competitive effects of 
absolute territorial restraints could prevail over distribution efficiency.  
 
Areeda and Hovenkamp claim that, although it is possible that vertical restraints have 
alternatives which do not restrict competition,115 this does not mean that vertical restraints 
should automatically be illegal. They believe that the fact that vertical restraints, in 
particular RPM, have been used in practice (even though some forms of vertical restraints 
are illegal and RPM has been illegal per se for a long time) means that, in some cases, 
these restraints are more effective than their alternatives, or the alternatives are not always 
available.116 This can also have other explanations, for instance, the manufacturer and its 
distributors were not aware of the illegality of RPM or the territorial restraint was used 
simply for anti-competitive reasons. 
 
Areeda and Hovenkamp continue with their argument stating that the transaction costs may 
be excessive, for instance, if the manufacturer offers to pay for services separately.117 This 
can be true if RPM or territorial restraints do not include any financial loss and cost or the 
financial loss is smaller than the cost of separating the services. On the contrary, allowing 
free riding can lead to lower costs and higher total welfare.118 However, as further 
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discussed in this chapter, RPM and/or VTR do not guarantee any pro-competitive aims, 
such as providing services: their first objective is restrictive. Therefore, how would a 
manufacturer calculate the cost of RPM if it wants to use it for a pro-competitive reason 
when it does not even have the certainty of such an effect? And why would it use such 
vertical restraints for pro-competitive reasons if it cannot assume such results?  
 
The manufacturer has means other than direct compensation, for example, a selective 
distribution system where it can specify that it would sell its products only to distributors 
who will offer specific services (what kind, how often etc.). Maintaining and announcing 
RPM and/or territorial restraints have arguably similar costs to selective systems; however, 
the manufacturer can be sure of its pro-competitive result.  
 
However, if the manufacturer is hoping to create a luxury brand with high prices without 
offering anything else, the RPM or territorial restraints could possibly create artificial 
luxury products without reflecting the reality of the product concerned. This is certainly in 
contrary to welfare and efficiency.  
 
6.4. Anti-Competitive Theories 
 
The anti-competitiveness of RPM is not as obvious as the anti-competitiveness of 
horizontal price fixing, which usually raises prices and strengthens the market power of 
manufacturers involved in the horizontal conduct. Moreover, as Bernett, Fletcher, 
Giovannetti and Stallibrass claim and as it is observed in this thesis, the number of 
economic studies analysing possible anti-competitive effects of RPM and VTR is much 
smaller than those analysing the possible economic explanations of pro-competitive 
effects.119 Therefore, in addition, this section introduces some further anti-competitive 
explanations aside from analysing existing anti-competitive theories. 
 
6.4.1. Retailer Cartels 
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In general, it can be stated that RPM or VTR can have the same effects as a cartel.120 
Comanor explains that RPM, if initiated by retailers, will have an anti-competitive 
intention and also probably an anti-competitive effect, as powerful retailers may fear 
intrabrand competition, particularly if they are less efficient, and may thus pressure their 
manufacturer to use RPM.121 Rey and Stiglitz highlight that exclusive territories limit the 
number of retailers, which may enable them to engage in tacit collusion. This is less 
possible and likely in a competitive retailer market.122  
 
A retailer cartel based on vertical arrangements is likely to be more stable than a horizontal 
agreement because the cartel is managed by a manufacturer and followed by its retailers.123 
Retailers or a retailer with significant bargaining power based on a monopsony or 
oligopsony can pressure their manufacturer to impose a vertical restriction, such as setting 
prices above the competitive level.124 Shaffer explains that retailers are interested in 
softening competition to keep higher profits and to stop more efficient retailers and other 
price cutters, including more efficient competitors, from “stealing” the profit from them.125 
 
There are several factors, such as products, the market and competitors, which always need 
to be considered when claiming that RPM or territorial restraints have the same effect as 
cartels. Moreover, vertical restraints are not the same as horizontal restraints. A horizontal 
cartel restrains interbrand competition. A restriction where a manufacturer and its 
distributors agree to fix a price primarily affects the manufacturer’s products at the 
intrabrand level. This can have a negative or even a positive effect on interbrand 
competition. If the market is highly competitive with a number of competitors and the 
product is homogenous, then price fixing can increase the output of other competitors. 
Therefore, interbrand competition will not be restricted and such vertical restraints will not 
have the same effect as interbrand cartels.  
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Bork, paying particular attention to interbrand competition, recognises vertical restraints as 
instruments that “would not eliminate the rivalry of resellers of other manufacturers’ 
products”.126 However, there would be a significant restriction of competition limiting 
consumers’ choice of a cheaper substitute if competition is oligopolistic and other 
competitors “follow the leader”, or if the brand is monopolistic or significant in other 
ways.127 
 
Durand shows that restricting intrabrand competition through the use of territorial 
restraints in the vehicle industry in the US had negative effects on interbrand competition. 
Moreover, it had no positive impact on consumer demand but, instead, allowed car 
manufacturers to raise their prices above the competitive levels.128 As Rey and Stiglitz 
highlight, exclusive territories can significantly affect prices and profits, and it is not only 
the retailers who can benefit from the lack of competition but also the manufacturers, 
primarily in the form of a franchise fee.129 
 
6.4.2. Manufacturer Cartels 
 
RPM helps to maintain manufacturer cartels by ensuring that not only wholesale prices 
remain the same or in the same range, but also retail prices by maintaining the price at the 
retailers’ level and, simultaneously, by preventing cheating. Manufacturers might introduce 
RPM as part of their cartel to assist them to monitor and enforce collusion and enhance 
price transparency.130 VTR can also be used to maintain manufacturer cartels as territorial 
restrictions make transparency obvious.131  
 
Such vertical arrangements restrict interbrand competition, strengthen the manufacturer 
cartels and prevent manufacturers from cheating.132 Similarly, when imposing territorial 
                                                 
126
 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, 292; see also Elzinga, Mills, “The Economics of RPM” 5-6. 
127
 See Chapter 3 “Vertical Competition and Structure”. 
128Durand, “On the Efficiency”; also see Chapter 3 “Vertical Competition and Structure”. 
129
 Rey, Stiglitz, “Exclusive Territories” 446. 
130
 Guidelines, paragraph 224; Bennett, Fletcher, Giovannetti, Stallibrass, “Resale Price Maintenance”, p. 21; 
Peeperkorn, “Resale Price Maintenance” 201, 206; Kneepkens, “Resale Price Maintenance” 661; Elzinga, 
Mills, “The Economics of RPM” p. 6; Scherer, Ross, Industrial Market, 550; P.M. Ippolito, “Resale Price 
Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation” (1991) 34 The Journal of .Law & Econ. 281; also see 
Press Release, FTC, Record Companies Settle FTC Charges of Restraining Competition in CD Music Market 
(May 10, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/05/cdpres.shtm; Grimes, “Dynamic Analysis” 134-142. 
131
 Guidelines, paragraph 151; Areeda, Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, 439-441. 
132
 Areeda, Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, 19-20, 321; Shores, “Contract Conundrum”  377, 402-403; see 
Guidelines, paragraph 100(b). 
Barbora Jedličková                                 Chapter 6: Theories of Pro-Competitiveness v. Anti-Competitiveness  
 
 232
restraints, it would also strengthen the manufacturers’ and retailers’ power if a cartel 
divides the market not just among manufacturers, but also among retailers.  
 
Bork refutes this theory, arguing that RPM is totally unnecessary for manufacturer cartels, 
considering the outlet reports and opportunities and the reasons for cheating inside the 
cartels. Moreover, RPM attracts government attention and, therefore, RPM would be used 
as part of cartel collusion only very rarely.133 Although, these arguments are valid, it can be 
observed that even a horizontal cartel attracts suspicion from a government; it occurs 
frequently in reality, even though the competition authorities generally focus on horizontal 
rather than vertical restrictions to protect interbrand competition. Finally, the market 
structure and amount of participants need to be considered when claiming the presumption 
that a participant is cheating. A cartel consisting of manufacturers and retailers would, 
logically, have more members; therefore, the assumption that parties could have more 
opportunities to cheat is correct. However, the cartel is also more transparent as using 
vertical restraints in a horizontal cartel makes it easier to determine whether somebody has 
cheated.  
 
6.4.3. Restrictive Effects 
 
The above explanations of the reasons for keeping RPM and VTR illegal are based on an 
assumption that cartels are illegal. This could, therefore, lead to the conclusion that the 
form itself is illegal. However, such a form, primarily in vertical restraints, does not have 
to restrict effective competition by reducing efficiency. Therefore, this sub-chapter 
discusses the possible restrictive effects of RPM and VTR. 
 
6.4.3.1. Price Increase, Output Decrease and Restriction on Growth of Efficient 
Distributors 
 
Vertical restraints can have several restrictive effects. RPM, and sometimes VTR, increase 
prices at the vertical level at least.134 The scarce empirical studies from France, the UK and 
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the US show that RPM and VTR increase prices.135 On the other hand, free price policy 
can increase competition, decrease prices and increase demand. 
 
Ornstein and Hanssens show in their study based on economic data and focusing on output 
that RPM in the US market of alcoholic beverages did not have any pro-competitive effects 
but simply lessened competition as it decreased output.136 Saas and Saurman analysed 
territorial restrictions in the US beer market. Contrary to the previous study, they argue that 
such restrictions had pro-competitive effects because, although it increased retail prices, 
output remained the same.137 However, such a conclusion would indicate that there was a 
welfare loss rather than a gain. Even if VTR increased promotion, the output did not 
increase, in fact it remained the same despite the fact that retail prices increased. This 
could be explained by the popularity of beer consumption. As the beer industry does not 
offer special services to consumers and as promotion without other benefits cannot be seen 
as completely welfare enhancing, there was a consumer welfare loss. It is possible that 
distribution improved and the output remained the same but this did not necessarily 
enhance total welfare, as retail prices increased reflecting higher profits for both breweries 
and their distributors. 
 
Generally, anti-competitive conduct is that which increases prices and/or decreases output. 
Brunell, Peeperkorn and Steiner argue that among other anti-competitive explanations and 
theories, RPM should be illegal because (and if) it increases prices and prevents efficient 
distributors from growing. In other words, it reduces dynamism and innovation at the 
distribution level.138 More efficient distributors benefit from free competition and with 
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them consumers, competition and the economy is better off because this promotes 
competitive efficiency.  
 
Steiner argues that in the Japanese market, aside from barriers to entry, RPM has prevented 
more efficient distributors from performing at the distribution level as highly and 
efficiently as in the US.139 He claims that when vertical restraints prevent more efficient 
distributors from being rewarded for their capacity to be efficient, several restrictive results 
occur on the vertical stage. Firstly, distribution costs are higher because less efficient 
distributors benefit from such conduct. Secondly, the total costs in the vertical system 
remain higher because of eliminating the option of allocating functions between 
manufacturers and more efficient distributors. Thirdly, advertising has a tendency to be 
lower as the cost of distribution is higher, which has a negative impact on output. And, 
finally, innovation, product quality and consumer choice are restricted.140 
 
Obviously, RPM prevents price decreases because distributors of a certain brand are 
prevented from lowering their sale prices. This can lead to a general price increase as 
argued above. In VTR, a distributor of a certain brand who does not compete with other 
distributors due to territorial restrictions is not motivated to decrease the price if, for 
example, the demand curve for this product has the tendency to be inelastic. When 
imposing such restraints, distributors do not have to be as motivated to compete, nor do 
they have to be as effective and have as efficient a distribution system as they would need 
without the existence of such restraints.  
 
6.4.3.2. Influencing Retailers’ and Consumers’ Choice - Foreclosure 
 
As previously discussed, RPM restricts consumers’ choice of potentially cheaper products 
or services and territorial restraints can lead to the same restriction as RPM. In addition to 
what has been said in the previous sub-chapter, they can also restrict consumers’ choice of 
products that are more innovative or improved because, most notably, absolute territorial 
restrictions foreclose the whole intrabrand competition; however, the foreclosure of price 
intrabrand competition in RPM can also restrict innovation as effective distributors are not 
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rewarded accordingly. Such results are contra-motivating factors for retailers to be as 
efficient and as innovative as possible.141  
 
RPM and/or VTR can influence retailers to promote or choose manufacturer’s products at 
the expense of the manufacturer’s competitors. Moreover, they reduce consumers’ choice 
due to the excessive concentration on brands, including promotion and high prices.142 This 
statement would not apply when fixing maximum prices or when fixing prices at a lower 
level. However, when the price is fixed high, the minimum price is set high or the product 
market is divided into territories, retailers may receive a higher profit. A retailer can set 
prices high without RPM or territorial restraints but they would risk a loss of profit if other 
retailers (competitors) maintained lower prices. RPM assures retailers that all will sell for 
the same price or the same minimum price. Therefore, it is profitable to favour this product 
at the expense of the manufacturer’s competitors or even decide to sell only this product, 
depending on the position of the other retailers. The existence of territorial restraints can 
influence retailers’ choice in the same way as RPM.143 
 
Bork claims that this discrimination is very rare. He assumes, without further explanation, 
that such a situation can even be beneficial for consumers.144 It is difficult to prove beyond 
a doubt whether the previously-described situations are or are not real threats, particularly 
because empirical studies are lacking and the restraints in question have not been 
completely legal. However, it is very difficult to imagine that consumers could benefit 
from a form of discrimination that restricts competition, when retailers “refuse” to 
distribute competitors’ products preferring a manufacturer with RPM or with a territorial 
restraint. Moreover, such behaviour restricts competition because it decreases distributors’ 
choice of other competitors. On the other hand, it does not directly make distributors refuse 
to distribute competitors’ products. This is rather a side-effect because it can be still 
profitable for retailers to sell other products. Therefore, knowledge of the market is 
essential when making this assumption in a particular case. 
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6.4.3.3. Manufacturers’ Margin and Profits 
 
Steiner discusses situations in different markets when a manufacturer is forced by retailers 
or the situation on the vertical stage to introduce vertical restraints.145 Peeperkorn argues 
that in some RPM cases a manufacturer may introduce RPM because  
the manufacturer generally prefers [intrabrand] competition not to be so fierce that it also starts to 
put pressure on its own margins, in other words that the downstream competition means that 
important buyers demand lower purchase prices.146 
 
Although this argument is highly valid, it would not apply to all market situations in 
practice. This is only possible if the manufacturer does not have a strong bargaining power.  
If it did, it could more or less dictate the conditions of the market. A competitive intrabrand 
situation is usually of benefit to the manufacturer and retailers generally have no power to 
pressure it to lower selling prices as there are no other strong manufacturers to buy from. 
Therefore, to apply Peeperkorn’s argument, power must be on the side of retailers, as this 
presumes that retailers can choose from various manufacturers.  
 
6.4.3.4. Manufacturers’ Business Profit Strategies 
 
Manufacturers can be motivated to introduce RPM or even VTR as part of the process of 
making the right and most efficient business decisions for themselves. A similar 
“justification” was discussed previously in the case of Consten & Grunding, where the 
applicants claimed that the vertical territorial restraint in question assisted the distributor to 
plan its business. The Court of Justice rightly stated that this was not a reasonable 
justification because risks are a part of business and the restriction of competition to 
eliminate potential risks is not on its own legal justification.147 Since this case, parties have 
not used this or similar explanations.  
 
Excluding situations discussed in the pro-competitive theories, introducing vertical 
restraints by a manufacturer could be illogical at first glance as this could contradict its 
interests and cause potentially fewer sales and, therefore, less profit. However, this is not 
always the case. Firstly, a manufacturer can introduce a vertical restraint to persuade its 
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distributors into another restraint, such as a tie-in.148 Secondly, VTR and/or RPM can be a 
useful business tool to assist a manufacturer in maximising production and profit. If the 
manufacturer knows or sets the retail price, and/or if it knows the number of products it is 
going to sell in a certain period, it can determine its profit and plan and adjust its future 
production accordingly. RPM and/or setting vertical territories are useful tools in this sense 
for assisting the manufacturer to set the most effective production and price to maximise its 
profit. 
 
However, the obvious question arises as to whether this form of motivation for using VTR 
and RPM is anti-competitive and illegal.149 The aforementioned pro-competitive theorists 
claim that RPM (or VTR) are manufacturers’ tools, which they use to introduce and/or 
maintain pro-competitive purposes. However, it is argued in this sub-chapter that a 
manufacturer introduces RPM or a vertical territorial restraint for its own benefit, without 
including any extra benefit for consumers. It introduces it merely to increase its profit 
based on the ability to make better judgments of future situations in the market if it uses 
one of the restraints in question.  
 
Williamson argues that vertical restraints promote the strategic purposes of a manufacturer; 
however, Williamson does not specify what these strategic purposes are. He explains that a 
manufacturer considers different transaction costs in its business strategy. Williamson also 
claims that a manufacturer’s strategic decisions are usually more effective as they save 
rather than increase transaction costs, unless they lead to dependent oligopolies or 
monopolies, or such “restraints”, most notably exclusive dealing such as exclusive 
territories, are used in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets.150 
 
In summary, Williamson argues that, aside from the aforementioned situations, vertical 
restraints could restrict competition only seemingly, as such “restrictions” can save 
transaction costs and subsequently lead to more effective competition, which is  pro-
competitive rather than anti-competitive. Hence, each situation must be economically 
analysed based on the transaction costs to determine whether it is pro- or anti-
competitive.151 Although Steiner agrees with the conclusion that each situation must be 
economically analysed he illustrates in several examples why vertical restraints, in 
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particular RPM but also territorial restraints, lead to less rather than more efficient 
competition and higher transaction costs.152 Also, Gundlach, Cannon and Manning argue in 
their marketing study that the existence of free riding and thus unrestricted competition 
leads to lower costs.153 Nevertheless, as Hovenkamp highlights, manufacturers use vertical 
restraints to control the vertical market because they believe that they will save their own 
transaction costs and increase profits.154 
 
There are other, different points raised in this sub-chapter that are not necessarily in 
contradiction with Williamson’s arguments, and are in addition to Steiner’s reasoning. 
Neither of these scholars openly considers the manufacturer’s business plan as a reason for 
using vertical restraints. 
 
Steiner highlights several reasons as to why manufacturers introduce vertical restraints: 
More often than not, leading brands benefit from retail price cutting even when the off-price 
retailing sector has a relatively low share of market. Why is it, then, that many leading brands have 
adopted vertical restraints before and since the end of fair trading? ... [T]he fear of having their 
goods appear on the shelves of unprestigious stores was probably a decisive factor in the 
manufacturer’s decision to restrict competition. ... Some leading brands seem to have been mistaken 
in adopting vertical restraints in the first place, or to have retained the restrictions well after they 
should have been abandoned. Still other brands may have had a “mutually dependent” relationship 
with larger market share retailers.155 
 
A manufacturer only considers its own transaction cost saving. As observed by 
Williamson, such a decision is based on bounded rationality. Additionally, opportunism 
could lead against competitive benefits. If a manufacturer makes an error, it is already 
punished by the less profitable results.156 If such a restriction is used for the purposes 
described in this sub-chapter, then the manufacturer’s intention is to save transaction costs 
and find the most efficient way to obtain the highest profit for itself. However, this does 
not necessarily result in the most efficient intrabrand, interbrand and vertical competition, 
which can be described as the saving of transaction costs for every player in the chain or 
within the market and the most effective competition and results for consumers based on 
fully functioning competition within the nature of that market. Grimes argues and shows in 
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several cases that RPM decreases social welfare and is anti-competitive because this cost-
saving concerns only the manufacturer and, for that reason, it is interested in RPM.157 
 
In such a situation, retailers/distributors are restricted when making strategic business 
decisions and must find their own, most efficient strategies, which means a restriction of 
competition in price or territories. This does not necessarily result in efficient intrabrand or 
even interbrand competition. Moreover, the manufacturer does not necessarily choose the 
most effective business strategy for itself as its decision-making process is based on 
bounded rationality, which is restricted to the information that the manufacturer 
possesses.158 Even if the purpose for using the vertical restraints in question is pro-
competitive, as discussed in the pro-competitive theories, the transaction costs of such a 
restriction are not necessarily lower in comparison with the legal, “pro-competitive” 
alternatives discussed. 
 
If such behaviour leads to transaction cost savings at least at the intrabrand, but mainly at 
the interbrand, level, it could increase the efficiency of competition and if it does, 
economically, it is right for such a conduct to be legal. However, the question arises as to 
whether procedural law in the form of private proceedings has the capacity to accurately 
determine this. And, thus, whether such an approach would be applicable in reality and 
whether it could ensure legal certainty and the aim of the law of vertical restraints, which is 
the protection of effective competition. 
 
There are other business decisions, such as lowering production, which restrict competition 
but are also legal. Easterbook includes vertical restraints, including RPM and territorial 
restrictions, with this group of manufacturers’ business tools and argues that they only 
form “a way by which one manufacturer competes with others”.159 Generally, if the 
manufacturer does not hold dominant power, unilateral conduct is not illegal under the 
TFEU or the Sherman Act. Changing its own wholesale prices and lowering production, 
among other actions, can simply mean that a manufacturer is adjusting to different 
conditions in the market but, mainly, it is making its own strategic business decisions 
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which are within its scope and which do not interfere with the rights of others. However, 
the difference between legal, potentially restrictive, unilateral conducts and RPM and VTR 
come down to two factors. First is the primary purpose, which is restriction, as discussed 
previously (and the effect is also presumably restrictive). Second, such vertical restraints 
directly change matters which would be based on the business decisions of the 
distributors/retailers if competition was not restricted and if the theory of ownership was 
incorporated into the law of vertical restraints. Even from an economic perspective, both 
vertical territorial and price restraints do not allow the best rewards for the most efficient 
distributors. This contradicts the principle of effective and free competition.  
 
6.5. Theory of Ownership 
 
Although the theory of ownership is not an established and existing theory in either EU 
competition law or US antitrust law, supposition of such an understanding in the law of 
vertical restraints was obvious in US case law at the beginning of the application of the 
Sherman Act.160 The freedom of distributors was also protected in the EU case of 
Novalliance/Systemform.161 Furthermore, the freedom of the individual was a core aspect 
in English “competition” law in the Middle Ages (although not in the same way as 
described in this sub-chapter),162 and this aspect is also reflected in the ordoliberalistic 
protection of individual economic freedom. Finally, economic freedom and fairness is at 
the centre of attention of the current US antitrust policy.163 
 
The theory of ownership, as recognised and discussed in this thesis, is not a direct anti-
competitive or pro-competitive theory, but is based on the participants’ rights and their 
freedom to make business decisions. In antitrust/competition law, the theory of ownership 
used to partially, and could, play an essential role in determining who is responsible for a 
particular anti-competitive behaviour and whose rights were violated.  
 
The US case of Dr. Miles introduced ownership rights in RPM cases. The Supreme Court 
explained that only the owner of a product had the right to determine its price.164 A few 
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years later, the same Court partially reversed its ruling stating that the manufacturer could 
announce in advance its price policy, setting retail prices, and was free to terminate a 
contract with a dealer who did not follow the set prices.165  
 
The question is moot as to where the boundaries are. If a manufacturer announces its 
policy regarding retail prices and the retailer agrees with the policy, then the retailer has 
exercised its right of ownership. However, in such a scenario, the manufacturer did not act 
unilaterally when setting the prices but, rather, in collusion with the retailer. If setting 
prices is illegal, or should be illegal because it restricts competition in the market, then 
they are both responsible for this action.  
 
On the other hand, the retailer does not have to agree with the manufacture’s price setting 
and can determine its own retail prices. This should be its right. Additionally, it is the right 
of the manufacturer to choose with whom it will deal and to refuse to deal with anybody 
else. However, the retailer would not be in a position to exercise this right if it acted under 
the threat (arguably duress) that its contract would be terminated or that a contract will not 
be concluded in the first place. In this situation, the retailer would not be free to determine 
its retail prices. Moreover, the termination of a contract with a dealer who did not agree 
with a manufacturer’s policy should be illegal as the reason for the termination of the 
contract is anti-competitive.166 (This also applies via versa in situations when a 
manufacturer has little or no bargaining power.) Unfortunately, the Sherman Act and the 
TFEU do not cover this kind of issue. Thus, if RPM restricts competition without any 
benefit, the European Commission tries to prove the existence of an agreement.167 
 
Areeda and Hovenkamp, and in some part Williamson, argue that manufacturers are the 
right persons to decide whether to use RPM or VTR as part of their business. They know 
the market and their business and they are better placed than the courts to recover any 
mistakes they make if they enforce a vertical practice that is inefficient for their 
business.168 However, if the manufacturer decides not to invest in its own distribution but 
                                                 
165
 Colgate, 307. 
166
 Acting under economic duress has not been applied in competition/antitrust law. Moreover, some national 
legislations have even reversed their position towards economic duress, claiming that such an action is fully 
legal – for instance, the Czech Republic: Obchodni zakonik, zakon c. 513/1991 Sb. (Commercial Code), 
§267(2); [Compare with Art. 3.9 (Threat) and Art. 3.10 UNIDROIT Principles 2010; UK doctrine of 
economic duress, for instance - Universe Tankships of Monrovia (1983)]. 
167
 See B. Jedlickova McCabe, “Boundaries between Unilateral and Multilateral Conducts in Vertical 
Restraints” (2008) 10 ECLR 600. 
168
 Areeda, Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, 30-31; Williamson, Antitrust Economics, 123-160. 
Barbora Jedličková                                 Chapter 6: Theories of Pro-Competitiveness v. Anti-Competitiveness  
 
 242
sells to distributors and retailers, it determines that its business will not be vertically 
integrated and passes certain risks to independent entities – its distributors/retailers – who 
should be free to do their own business. The manufacturer should not make decisions on 
behalf of the retailers or distributors. Moreover, they know their local customers better 
than the manufacturer to determine their own prices and other conditions.169 
 
 
The European Commission observes: 
The retailer is the closest of all the institutions in the distribution chain to the consumer and is 
increasingly using the knowledge derived from this position to develop activities more suited to 
consumer demand.170 
 
As well as in current US policy, in the EU, the freedom of distributors/buyers, to determine 
their selling territories and retail or other prices is not protected and such “freedoms” are 
not recognised as distributor rights. Moreover, restrictions of such “freedoms” do not 
necessarily restrict competition.171 However, the question is open now as to whether the 
law of vertical restraints should be changed and partially based on the theory of ownership. 
Nonetheless, the theory of ownership arguably already applies in the determination 
between agency and non-agency agreements in both US antitrust law and EU competition 
law.172 
 
6.5.1. Basic Freedoms 
 
Free and effective competition should be based on freedom and rights; companies 
incorporate human beings and should, therefore, have some of the rights of human beings. 
Similar to basic human rights, such rights should be inalienable if legal persons are truly 
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independent entities and not dependant, such as agents. The inalienability prevents possible 
abuse such as giving up ownership rights for the benefit of the party possessing a 
significantly stronger bargaining power.173 
 
The theory of ownership of competition law is based on three basic freedoms:  
1) what to sell or offer; 
2) for how much; 
3) to whom (which includes where, when). 
 
Each seller should have some legal certainty that the law will protect the basic freedoms of 
their business decisions, based on the ownership of a product/service. Indeed, the issue is 
more complicated as manufacturers and other participants may wish to sell, as part of their 
products or services, certain services and trademarks and build specific reputations. 
However, this does not contradict the freedoms, as buyers will buy the products with these 
other attributes. Certain boundaries and rules can be or are already determined which can 
assist to classify what is and what is not part of one product as, for instance, a tied product 
is not part of the main product. The cases on tying give some idea of such boundaries and 
rules.  
 
Price is arguably one of the most important aspects for profit making. Therefore, this 
would lead to the conclusion that the buyer should be free to determine its price once it 
buys the product and should not be restricted by the manufacturer who already exercised 
its right when it sold the product to the buyer and, thus, determined its wholesale price. 
 
Similar to RPM, in relation to vertical territories, determining territories while drafting 
distribution agreements, provided they are not forced upon one party, could simply be 
recognised as a business deal. However, and on the contrary, if a legislator allows parties 
to restrict and divide their territories, this could potentially lead not only to intrabrand 
restriction, but also to a “network effect”, which is a situation based on game theory when 
several or all distributors are driven to have a market just for themselves and can lead not 
only to intrabrand but also to interbrand restrictions.174  
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It was argued in Chapter 2 “Objective of the Law of Vertical Territorial and Price 
Restraints” that effective competition should be protected by the law of vertical territorial 
and price restraints. The objective of protecting effective competition is enhanced by 
protecting fair and free competition. 
 
For competition to be effective, fair and free, the law must clearly set the rights, in other 
words freedoms and responsibilities, of participants. This means that although, and on the 
contrary to the deontological approach, this law is primarily based on the consequentialist 
or teleological approach, which focuses on the harmful effects, or in other words the 
outcomes and effects, arising from conduct, the law should go even further as it should 
precisely determining the participants’ rights and responsibilities. This determination 
would involve applied natural law based on a deontological approach, as rights and ethics 
are considered in such a suggested approach. Therefore, by recognising and applying the 
theory of ownership as discussed above, the law of vertical territorial and price restraints 
would ensure economic freedom and fairness. In other words, this would ensure that 
competitors are free to compete without being forced to apply VTR or RPM. 
Simultaneously, entities introducing and even forcing other, mainly vertical competitors, to 
apply VTR or RPM would be liable for such behaviour. Such a situation would assist with 
fair allocation of profits based on efficiency of each entity involved in vertical 
arrangements between suppliers and buyers; and thus, in general, with maximising 
efficiency. 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
 
Economic theories offer various explanations for the existence of RPM and VTR. These 
explanations are either pro-competitive or anti-competitive. Although RPM and VTR are 
different forms of vertical restrictions, the reasons for their use are almost the same.  
 
The traditional anti-competitive theories are based on forms rather than on anti-competitive 
effects. Such a formalistic approach does not fully respect the objective of the relevant law 
as set out in this thesis: the protection of effective competition. It is time to move away 
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completely from this approach, and consider the different nature of vertical restraints as 
explained in Chapter 3 and concentrate on the main element of effective competition: 
effects and efficiency, particularly when the primary effects of the discussed restraints are 
usually in the form of a restriction of intrabrand, and potentially also interbrand, 
competition and consumer choice. 
 
Although there are several possible pro-competitive explanations for the usage of RPM or 
VTR, the arguments are not strong enough to support the per se legalisation of RPM and 
VTR. Even horizontal price fixing or minimum price setting and territorial restraints can 
have possible positive effects on competition in some markets. However, this does not call 
for a radical change in competition legislation and policy, which would legalise such 
conducts. Horizontal cartels can have some forms of efficiency and economic advantages, 
for instance, the members of cartels stop competing among themselves and, thus, they save 
money which they can use for innovation. Nonetheless, such a potential positive side to 
cartels does not lead to the final conclusion that these should be legal. 
 
Arguably, the most pro-competitive usage of both RPM and VTR when considering 
effective competition as the objective of this law includes situations where new 
competitors wish to enter a market. RPM or territorial restraints can assist a new 
competitor in attracting distributors, making the necessary investments and saving 
advertising costs and, thus, improves their ability to penetrate the market. 
 
Nonetheless, the reasoning behind most pro-competitive theories is fragile and not 
applicable to all markets in general. The majority of the existing pro-competitive theories 
are based on similar reasoning, where the essential aspect is free riding. However, it is 
arguable whether free riding harms or promotes competition. Generally, free competition, 
which includes free pricing competition, should be protected rather than lessened. As the 
US Supreme Court stated, antitrust law cannot accept a defence that competition itself, for 
instance price competition, is unreasonable.175 
 
Although the economy and economic theories are pivotal in competition, the law itself 
must be based on other, more legal aspects such as the rights, freedoms and responsibilities 
of parties. It has been observed that commentators generally forget that not only 
manufacturers, but also distributors, should have the same ownership rights and freedoms 
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 See National Society of Professional Engineers. 
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to make business decisions. The owner of a product should have the right to set prices and 
choose its customers, and it should be free to make such decisions without being placed 
under duress. Each player must be free to make its own business decisions and take full 
responsibility for these. 
 
Moreover, law which is easily applicable and which protects legal certainty cannot be 
overcomplicated or over-technical. This could occur in the law of vertical territorial and 
price restraints if policy shifted focus merely to technically-complicated economic analysis 
and collecting data in each case. Such an approach would miss the legal aspect based on 
rights and responsibilities, and would not support legal certainty and transparency, which 
are two of the main principles of the law in general.  
 
 To summarise, pro-competitive or anticompetitive theories are justified if they serve the 
purpose of protecting effective competition in the sense that in reality, within the real 
markets, vertical arrangements and their mutual interactions, it is shown that competition 
in general including its all forms has lead to increased efficiency. Without this, hindered 
competition is not justified. With the assistance of the theory of ownership, effective 
competition will also honour economic freedom and fairness. The competitors will be free 
to make their own business decisions without being forced to apply restrictions such as 
RPM and VTR and may take responsibility for their business decisions. This will lead to 
fair rewards to entities for increasing their efficiencies which will motivate them to 
compete and be as efficient as possible. Entities with stronger bargaining power genuinely 
introducing restrictions such as VTR and RPM will be responsible for such behaviour. 
Such a balance does not only serve the purpose of protecting effective competition, but it 
also supports free and fair competition. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
“If vertical competition gets no respect in antitrust analysis, surely the ultimate insult is to 
deny that it exists at all.”1 (Robert Steiner) 
 
 
7.1. Summary 
 
This thesis argues against some existing competition policies and principles, such as the 
objective of the law of vertical territorial and price restraints. Chapter 2 explains that the 
principal objective of the law of vertical territorial and price restraints should be the 
protection of effective competition and not any other values where the effective 
competition is based on maximising economic efficiency. Efficiency is maximised if 
competition and competition law respects the nature of the relevant product and geographic 
market including aspects establishing the nature of the market. Chapter 3 investigated these 
aspects in the framework of the vertical chain as VTR and RPM are based on vertical and 
not (only) horizontal relationships and interactions. Chapter 2 indicates and Chapter 3 
further confirms the complexity of establishing the exact impact of RPM or VTR on 
efficiency in particular situations which include consideration of all aspects of vertical 
interactions: vertical markets and vertical competition. However, this must be simplified 
when enforcing relevant law.  
 
Chapter 3 revealed the existence of vertical competition as it showed that entities at the 
vertical level not only compliment each other, but they also compete as they are able to 
take profit from each other. Unfortunately, vertical competition has not been officially 
recognised and acknowledged by EU competition law and US antitrust law and the courts 
and competition authorities applying them as it is obvious in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
These Chapters also prove the lack of acknowledgement of bargaining power. Bargaining 
power plays an essential role in RPM and VTR and thus should have played in the law of 
vertical territorial and price restraints as analysed in Chapter 3. The lack of this recognition 
is reflected in the fact that relevant law and its application is focused on horizontal market 
analysis rather than addressing the vertical competitive interactions and the fact that an 
                                                 
1
 R.L. Steiner, “Vertical Competition, Horizontal Competition and Market Power” (2008) 53 Antitrust 
Bulletin 252. 
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entity or entities with significant bargaining power, which is not necessarily entity or 
entities with a strong horizontal market position, at one level of vertical chain can abuse 
such position and vertically restrict competition. The relationship between intrabrand 
competition and interbrand competition is simplified and the importance of intrabrand 
competition especially in certain cases is not recognised most notably in the US.2 
 
Chapters 3 and 6 explain and reveal possible motivations for using RPM and VTR which 
are not always obvious in the case law as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 6 further 
surveys these intentions in its analysis of the existing pro-competitive and anti-competitive 
theories, and unveils loopholes in these theories. It criticises the formalistic approach 
within the traditional anti-competitive theories and the demagogical approach within the 
majority of pro-competitive theories, which do not prove impacts on efficiency, offering 
new suggestions and points of view.  
 
Chapter 6 further discusses the issue introduced in Chapter 2: the importance of economic 
freedom and fairness which assists the principal objective of competition law as set in 
Chapter 2. Generally, any area of law is best enforced if it respects fairness. This is 
determined by rights and responsibilities which follow from the theory of ownership and 
should play an important role in the law of vertical territorial and price restraints as 
discussed in Chapter 6. In competition law, when protecting effective competition, it is fair 
allocation of profits which means more profit for more efficient entities. Such fairness is 
only possible if competitors are free to compete without restricting effective competition. 
An example of such a restriction is a situation when a retailer with significant bargaining 
power forces a supplier and other retailers to introduce RPM. If RPM or VTR is forced 
upon others by a competitor with strong bargaining power, it must be this competitor who 
should be liable for such behaviour. This reflects the nature of vertical interactions as 
discussed in Chapter 3; however, such approach is not recognised by the current EU and 
US antitrust/competition policies which are rather focused on formalistic approach suitable 
for horizontal cartels as discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 critically surveyed the development of the laws of vertical 
territorial and price restraints and included an analysis of the relevant and significant cases 
in both the EU and the US within the broader historical framework, showing some 
inconsistencies, simplified explanations of anti-competitiveness and/or pro-
                                                 
2
 See, e.g., Leegin 2, Leegin, Sylvania. 
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competitiveness and uncertainties. For example, these cases reveal that the intentions of 
parties to use RPM or VTR are not always clear, as they have been initiated for the most 
part by suppliers. Such intentions do not always fit within the current, most notably US, 
understanding of the reasons for the existence of vertical territorial and price restraints 
which is based on the presumption that suppliers introduce RPM or VTR for rather pro-
competitive reasons. However, the thesis shows that, although there is a potential for pro-
competitive intentions of suppliers introducing RPM or VTR, the survey in the thesis 
reveals that the suppliers can be motivated to introduce RPM or VTR to restrict 
competition. For instance, Chapter 5 discusses cases where producers in their own interests 
used RPM or VTR to restrict parallel-trade competition. This is typical for the 
pharmaceutical market. 
 
The other supplier’s reasons for introducing RPM or VTR which are anticompetitive and 
have the potential to restrict effective competition are: 
• Increasing Output: If RPM means that there are more retailers interested in 
selling manufacturer’s  products, which increases manufacturer’s output and 
therefore profit.  
• The Loss of Retailers (an important retailer): The first quick consequence of 
losing a main retailer leads to decrease of outlets for the manufacturer. At least 
before it finds a new one if consumers do not switch to competing products.  
• A Business Strategic Tool: Producers use vertical restraints to control the 
vertical market and adjust its future business strategy because they believe that 
they will save their own transaction costs and increase profits. However, it 
rather decreases social welfare because this cost-saving concerns only the 
manufacturer.  
• Maintaining High Wholesale Prices: Producers use RPM or VTR to more easily 
maintain higher wholesale prices as they guarantee retail margins through 
RPM.  
• Maintaining Distributors’ Loyalty.  
• Maintaining its Reputation for a Premium, Expensive Brand.  
• Lobbing; Improving its Position and Increasing Bargaining Power: for example, 
a smaller producer may fear even being considered by a large retailer and/or it 
needs to lobby for better shelf position. Therefore, introducing RPM can give it 
some benefit in the bargaining process.  
• Persuading its Distributors into Another Restraint, such as a tie-in. 
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As Chapter 6 discusses, the theories based on the presumption that free riding is anti-
competitive are not necessarily pro-competitive explanations of the application of RPM or 
potentially VTR as free riding can rather enhance than restrict economic efficiency and 
thus effective competition. The thesis reveals that there is only one clearly pro-competitive 
and effective competition enhancing explanation for a supplier as to why it would 
introduce RPM or VTR: penetrating a new market. This is usually based on balanced 
bargaining power rather than abuse of such power because the supplier must offer some 
certainty to its buyer to persuade it to take certain risks of selling a new product, or a 
product new in the particular geographic market. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 among others discuss the current EU and the US approaches to VTR and 
RPM. Chapter 4 shows that the US approach to VTR and RPM has been significantly 
changing. Although the current approach is the rule of reason in both cases, the approach 
differs from one another. While in VTR introducing the traditional rule of reason in the 
case of Sylvania lead to de facto legalisation of VTR, which is not necessarily based on 
real impacts of VTR in different markets as further discussed in Chapters 3 and 6, RPM’s 
rule of reason is not soundly based. The recent cases on RPM, Mack Trucks and Leegin 2, 
do not reveal whether the traditional rule of reason or its modification will apply to this 
form of vertical restrictions. Moreover, it is not clear from the case law as to what is 
included and what is not included in the group of vertical price restrictions.3 Even the case 
of Leegin which introduced the rule of reason to all form of RPM does not offer clearly 
persuasive arguments for this change, simplifying the nature of RPM when it generalises, 
for example, that the restriction of intrabrand competition increases interbrand competition 
which is proved false in discussions in Chapters 3, 6 and 4 too. This leads to significant 
legal uncertainty and lack of consideration of nature of vertical restraints including the 
existence of vertical competition. 
 
The EU approach to RPM and VTR differs and is more consistent than the US approach as 
discussed in Chapter 5 protecting among others a significant aim of the EU: the common 
market. Nevertheless, one of the issues identified in Chapter 5 is that the pro-competitive 
justifications are not always truly considered by the Commission and that the Commission 
aims to protect consumer welfare when it applies relevant competition law and not total 
welfare and thus effective competition as it is defined in Chapter 2. Despite all, the current 
                                                 
3
 See Mack Trucks, Euromodas, Business Electronics. 
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approaches are based on legislative/Treaty provisions which were drafted to tackle 
horizontal rather than vertical restrictions, and as this thesis shows, they do not fully 
consider the nature of such restrictions including the existence of vertical competition.  
 
7.2. Main Findings for an Argument against Legalisation 
 
Although this thesis included numerous findings, in terms of the future EU and US policies 
and suggestions of legal changes, the following findings are the most crucial: 
 
Generally speaking, RPM and absolute territorial restrictions should not be legalised 
because:  
1. The potential for restricting effective competition is significant. Even if in 
particular cases, RPM and/or VTR have pro-competitive effects, general and 
absolute legalisation of these restraints could eventually lead to the restriction of 
effective competition without enhancing any efficiencies. Based on, for instance, 
game theory, they will be utilised: 
a. To eliminate more efficient distributors. This occurs most notably when the less 
efficient distributors have bargaining power and pressure the seller to introduce 
a vertical restraint. Without using such a restraint, the most efficient distributors 
will benefit more from the functions of free competition. 
b. To restrict interbrand competition across the whole industry, as anybody would 
be free to introduce such a restraint.  
c. To restrict intrabrand competition in individual, single cases. Even restricting 
intrabrand competition contradicts the objective of the protection of free and 
effective competition and can have more restrictive consequences than those so 
far assigned to RPM and VTR most notably by the courts in the US. 
2. RPM and/or VTR dishonour and restrain basic freedoms of vertically competing 
participants if such conduct is forced upon a party because, in such situations, 
ownership rights are not respected and participants are not free to determine their 
business within their ownership-rights framework. 
 
The reason for not legalising as explained in point 2, which is based on legal rights rather 
than on economic effects, leads to the same final conclusion as point 1., which involves 
the economic debate, and that is that the legalisation of RPM and VTR would contradict 
the genuine objective of the law of vertical restraints by restricting effective competition. 
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Nevertheless, the possible and real pro-competitiveness of VTR and RPM in individual 
cases must be protected. Most notably, VTR and RPM assist companies and have 
significant pro-competitive benefits in situations where they are attempting to penetrate a 
market. However, such situations do not justify the absolute legalisation of RPM and VTR 
for the reasons previously discussed. 
 
7.3. Current Approach and Suggested Approach 
 
The law must be transparent and certain, and its enforcement must be established within a 
workable time and cost framework. As this thesis has revealed, these basic principles have 
been suppressed in the law of vertical territorial and price restraints in both the EU and the 
US. In the US system, and partially in the EU system, not just is the approach to RPM and 
VTR uncertain, with only little guidance for lawyers who are left in doubt as to how to 
advise their clients, it is also overcomplicated, over-technical and expensive. It has been 
advocated in both jurisdictions that the right economic analysis should apply to cases 
tackling RPM and/or VTR; however, this advocacy has not assisted legal certainty and 
transparency, as such an approach can be significantly complicated. Furthermore, it is not 
clear what the correct economic analysis is, as there does not exist a mutual consensus or 
clear understanding of the effects of the vertical restrictions in question within vertical 
competition. Moreover, vertical competition is not recognised in the existing EU and US 
antitrust/competition policies, rather these policies are based on an understanding of the 
term “competition” which is suitable more for horizontal restraints, a point criticised by 
Steiner. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the EU approach is more soundly-based and 
more appropriate to this matter.4 
 
However, due to economic crises, the recent EU competition and US antitrust policies have 
highlighted the importance of legal certainty and transparency in competition/antitrust 
law.5 Furthermore, considering the intensive discussion, most notably on RPM in the US, it 
is the right time to begin the process of serious and appropriate changes to the law and 
policy to honour the legal principles of transparency and certainty. Generally, the current 
                                                 
4
 Compare the existing approach as discussed in Chapter 5 “Development of the EU Law of Vertical 
Territorial and Price Restraints” with the legislative suggestions as discussed below. 
5
 US: Ch. A. Varney, “Vigorously Enforcing the Antitrust Laws: Developments at the Division,” 
(Washington, DC, 24/6/2011), pp. 15, 1, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/272536.pdf; EU: A. 
Italianer “EU Priorities and Competition Enforcement”, Dublin, 25/3/2011, p. 10, 
hhtp://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2011_03_en.pdf. 
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approach to vertical territorial and price restraints includes two issues: firstly, the objective 
of the law of vertical territorial and price restraints and secondly, the nature of vertical 
arrangements and the real effect of RPM and VTR on effective competition. 
 
7.3.1. Objective 
 
The current approach to vertical territorial restraints in the USA and in the EU has not 
always respected the protection of effective competition based on efficiency enhancing 
total welfare but it has rather focused on one of the aspects of competition such as the 
protection of consumer welfare which does not necessarily lead to maximising total 
welfare. The principal objective of the law of vertical territorial and price restraints is to 
protect effective competition based on efficiency as discussed in Chapter 2. However, for 
competition/antitrust law to be easily enforced and respected by the society based on legal 
certainty and for competition law to be efficient, an aspect of law: fairness; and an aspect 
of competition:  economic freedom must be protected and honoured. This means 
following: 
 
• Effective Competition Based on Efficiency: Competition law protecting effective 
competition and thus competitive process motivates undertakings to be as efficient 
as possible. Only efficient undertakings remain in the market and less efficient 
undertakings will receive less or will be even driven to exit the market if they do 
not increase their efficiency. 
• Fair: Fairness has two aspects while protecting effective competition: A fair reward 
for undertakings which means that the more efficient competitors having their 
efficiency based on competitive and legal conducts should be rewarded more than 
less efficient competitors. Secondly, only competitors who make business decisions 
in the form of VTR or RPM should be liable and should be punished for such 
behaviour. This includes competitors with stronger bargaining power who are 
forcing others to apply RPM or VTR and not the forced parties. 
• Free: Competitors are free to compete on fair bases and thus increase their 
efficiencies without being restricted by e.g. vertical restrictions. Competition law 
must play a role of a referee or a watchdog making such restrictions, which hinder 
effective competition, illegal and punishable. 
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7.3.2. The Nature of Vertical Arrangements 
 
As the development of the legal regimes outlined in and Chapter 4 and 5 have revealed, at 
the beginning of the existence of the Sherman Act in the US and EU competition law, 
vertical restrictions were not at the centre of attention when the main legislation was 
drafted. Therefore, the existing primary legislation in both the EU and the US do not 
respect the differences between vertical competition and horizontal competition and the 
nature of vertical arrangements, including vertical restraints. Attempts to tackle RPM and 
VTR within the existing legislative framework have proved to be formalistic, mostly 
incorrect and insufficient.  
 
Most notably, focusing on the determination of the existence of multilateral conducts 
rather than purely on the effects of certain behaviours in competition in the form of 
increasing or decreasing efficiency is not sufficient as some conducts are defined as 
multilateral, although it could be argued that they are unilateral, and simultaneously, some 
anticompetitive behaviour hindering effective competition remains legal as multilateral 
conducts are not proved. The new approach should be based on the understanding that 
vertical competition exists. Therefore, even vertical entities compete among themselves 
trying to take profit from one another. The competitors with better position on the vertical 
chain are the competitors who have stronger bargaining power in vertical arrangements.  
 
Therefore, the new approach to vertical territorial and price restraints must be based on 
bargaining power rather than horizontal market power. Bargaining power is power which 
occurs between participants on vertical chain when negotiating their business 
arrangements. When their arrangement is not well balanced but rather inclines to be one 
sided and thus offers more benefits to one party, this one party has stronger bargaining 
power. In general bargaining power is the ability to negotiate better conditions in 
bilateral/multilateral arrangements including contracts and agreements. 
 
7.3.3. Legislative Suggestions 
 
Considering the above arguments, it must be concluded that the most suitable way of 
changing the approach to VTR and RPM is to amend the existing primary legislation: the 
TFEU and the Sherman Act. This amendment must reflect the nature of vertical restraints 
based on the existence of vertical competition and, hence, its final wording should include 
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two aspects. Firstly, the existence and the significance of bargaining powering in vertical 
arrangements; and, secondly, the fact that effective competition must be restricted with 
Member States in the EU or within states in the US to reflect the ineffective results of such 
vertical arrangements without punishing entities for using vertical arrangements that have 
pro-competitive effects, such as penetrating a new market. 
 
The existing provisions are not sufficient enough to be applied to tackle vertical restraints 
in particular RPM and VTR. Firstly, Article 101 of the TFEU and Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act presume the existence of some form of meeting of minds; however, as the 
thesis shows, the majority of analysed cases are based on situations when one party with 
stronger bargaining power forces the other party to comply. 
 
Secondly, Article 102 of the TFEU when it states “…a dominant position within the 
internal market…” and partly Section 2 of the Sherman Act require monopolistic or 
dominant horizontal market power which is not equivalent to bargaining power, although it 
influences bargaining power as further explained in Chapter 3. Thus these provisions focus 
on the determination of dominating/monopolising a particular horizontal market which 
does not show whether bargaining power was abused at the vertical level in certain cases 
dealing with RPM and or VTR but rather whether an undertaking/person or 
undertakings/persons abused their horizontal market power in the horizontal market. 
 
Despite this, Section 2 of the Sherman Act has a potential to be interpreted to include 
bargaining power as it states that “[e]very person shall… mnopolize any part of the trade 
or commerce…” if the words “the trade or commerce” could be interpreted as to include 
vertical chain; in other words, arrangements between a buyer (buyers) and a supplier 
(suppliers). This could include situations when a buyer with bargaining power forces a 
supplier to terminate a contract with another buyer who is more efficient to sell for less. 
That they the buyer with bargaining power monopolises the trade in relation to the 
product/service of the supplier at the buyer level. Nevertheless, the US courts have applied 
this provision to horizontal market power in situations when a person or persons have 
monopolised (or have attempted to monopolise) relevant, horizontal market. It is difficult 
to imagine that such practice of applying Section 2 could be changed without introducing 
any legislative changes. 
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The wording of the new provisions, in addition to existing articles/sections and completely 
respecting the existing versions of the Sherman Act and the TFEU, could be as follows: 
 
The TFEU: 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of bargaining power which have, as their 
object or effect, the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market insofar 
as it may affect trade between Member States. 
 
This provision tackling vertical restraints must further include the application of Article 
101(3). 
 
The Sherman Act: 
Every person who shall abuse or attempt to abuse or combine or conspire with 
another person to abuse bargaining power in any part of the trade or commerce 
among several States, or with foreign nations, and thus restrain trade shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine… 
 
In both legal systems and presumably in the competition law systems of all developed 
countries, the abuse of bargaining power in the form of RPM or VTR, such as forcing 
another party to use RPM/VTR, should be presumed to restrict competition for reasons 
discussed previously, unless proven otherwise by the party abusing the power. If that party 
wishes to justify its conduct and prove the pro-competitive effects, it would have the 
burden of proof. Logically, power would not be abused if, for instance, RPM or VTR is 
used by an entity penetrating a new market as it does not possess significant bargaining 
power. However, this situation would change the moment it had established its position 
and become a powerful competitor. Such an approach is well-balanced, making liable that 
party or parties who have the power to enforce RPM and/or VTR upon others, avoiding 
unnecessary formalism and, importantly, respecting the nature of vertical arrangements, 
including the effects of RPM and VTR as discussed in this thesis.  
 
Contrary to horizontal market power when applying Article 102 of the TFEU and Section 2 
of the Sherman Act, bargaining power does not have to be precisely measured and 
therefore, this is a less technical approach. It is not complicated and technical to determine 
who has stronger bargaining power in a particular relationship between a supplier and a 
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buyer or in a particular range of relationships including several buyers and/or suppliers. 
Simply, by analysing the arrangements between them, it can be determined whether a 
particular vertical restraint such as RPM or VTR was forced upon the other party as it was 
one way aim and it served the benefit of the first party without offering any reciprocal 
conduct. 
 
Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU and Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act remain; 
therefore, other aspects of vertical arrangements could be tackled using the existing 
provisions. Article 101 of the TFEU and Section 1 of the Sherman Act would still apply in 
situations based on the existence of a mutual agreement between parties on the vertical 
chain when bargaining power is not abused. For example, this includes cases when two 
parties of an agreement agree to apply two forms of vertical restraints for the benefits of 
each party as described by Steiner and discussed in Chapter 3. European Commission 
should improve its application of Article 101(3) as discussed in the Chapter 5. The US 
courts should introduce a structured rule of reason to RPM and VTR which would balance 
the burden of proof between parties and simplify the procedure and serve the legal 
certainty. Such a structured rule of reason could reflect the EU practice: at the first stage, 
the petitioner should prove the existence of RPM or VTR, and then the respondent could 
introduce pro-competitive explanations and effects. In that case, the petitioner would have 
to prove that any anticompetitive effects overweight such pro-competitive effects to win 
the case.  
 
This approach to vertical territorial and price restraints ensures that all subjects of 
competition benefit from the legal system appropriately and fairly. It is based on the 
protection of free and effective competition respecting “fair-play” in competition and 
across industries. Only in fair-play can players compete to their maximum abilities without 
unfairly obtaining profit; this is competition at its most efficient.  
 
7.4. Final Remark 
 
I would like to conclude this thesis in a personal manner as I have built a very personal 
relationship with my PhD thesis over these past four years of intensive research. Hence, I 
believe that readers will forgive me for my final, personal lines: 
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I believe in justice, humanity and fairness, including fair-play and fair and efficient 
productivity in business. These are the principles that should be reflected in any area of 
life, such as personal, working, inter-states and business and, thus, in any area of the law. 
Therefore, these principles play a central role in this thesis which shows that not only the 
law of vertical territorial and price restraints, but also the complete law of vertical 
restraints should be changed, based on knowledge and a better understanding of vertical 
competition with a soundly-based approach that protects free and effective competition and 
ensures fairness for everybody. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE 1: STRUCTURE OF MARKETS1 
 
 
 
DEMAND SIDE 
FORM 
 
 
MANY 
 
FEW 
 
ONE 
SUPPLY SIDE FORM 
 
          MANY                         FEW                             ONE 
Perfect Competition 
 
Oligopoly Monopoly 
Oligopsony Bilateral oligopoly Monopoly – 
oligopsony 
Monopsony Oligopoly – 
monopsony 
Bilateral monopoly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 H. von Stackelberg, Marktform und Gleichgewicht (1934, Julius Springer, Berlin) in P. Dobson, M. 
Waterson, A. Chu, “The Welfare Consequences of Exercise of Buyer Power” 16 (Sept. 1998) Office of Fair 
Trading, Research Paper 8.  
TABLE 2: VERTICAL CHAIN (MARKET STRUCTURE and MARKET POWER) 
 
 
Raw Materials 
Producers 
Monopoly Oligopoly Monopoly + possible 
bargaining power 
Oligopoly + possible 
bargaining power 
Perfect Competition 
 
 
 
Raw Materials 
Distributors 
Monopsony  
(double 
marginalisation if 
bargaining power 
is rather balanced) 
Oligopsony 
(double 
marginalisation if 
bargaining power 
is rather balanced) 
 
Monopoly 
 
Oligopoly 
Monopoly/Monopsony 
+ possible bargaining 
power 
Oligopoly/Oligopsony 
+ possible bargaining 
power 
 
Perfect 
Competition 
 
 
 
Manufacturers 
Monopsony  
(double or triple 
marginalisation if 
bargaining power 
is rather balanced) 
Oligopsony 
(double or triple 
marginalisation) 
if bargaining 
power is rather 
balanced 
 
Monopoly 
 
Oligopoly 
Monopoly/Monopsony 
+ possible bargaining 
power 
Oligopoly/oligopsony 
+ possible bargaining 
power 
 
Perfect 
Competition 
 
 
 
 
Distributors 
Monopsony  
(double or triple or 
multiple marginalisation 
if bargaining power is 
rather balanced) 
Oligopsony 
(double or triple or 
multiple marginalisation 
if bargaining power is 
rather balanced) 
 
Monopoly 
 
Oligopoly 
Monopoly/ 
Monopsony + 
possible 
bargaining power 
Oligopoly/ 
Oligopsony + 
possible 
bargaining power 
 
Perfect 
Competition 
 
Retailers 
Monopsony  
(double or triple or 
multiple marginalisation 
if bargain power is rather 
balanced) 
Oligopsony 
(double or triple or 
multiple marginalisation 
if bargain power is rather 
balanced) 
 
Monopoly 
 
Oligopoly 
Monopoly/Monop
sony + possible 
bargain power 
Oligopoly/Oligo
psony + possible 
bargain power 
 
Perfect 
Competition 
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Table 2: Explanation 
 
This table shows the basic relationships between contractual parties at the vertical level. It 
determines bargaining power only from the perspective of market structure and related 
market power. It manifests that it is complicated and probably almost impossible to 
correctly determine the impacts of certain conduct on the entire vertical chain and thus it is 
difficult to precisely analyse relevant vertical competition. However, it is important to note 
that market structure and market power are only two aspects of bargaining power. Other 
aspects can influence bargaining power in such a way that the results could be in 
contradiction with this table. It would be more complicated to draw a table showing this as 
it would include more options if other aspects influencing bargaining power, such as brand 
reputation and transparent information, were included. 
 
 
  Vertical Relationship:                         Vertical Relationship/Interaction - Ideal Situation:                             
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SUBSTANTIVE LEGISLATIONS: EXCERPTS 
 
The European Union 
 
Article 101 of the TFEU 
 
(1) The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, 
and in particular those which: 
 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
 
(2) Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically 
void. 
 
(3) The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
 
— any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
 
— any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
 
— any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which contributes to 
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does 
not: 
 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
attainment of these objectives; 
 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question. 
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Article 102 of the TFEU 
 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market 
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in 
so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; 
 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
 
 
 
The United States 
 
 
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
 
Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or 
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, 
or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both 
said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
 
 
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
 
Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire 
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, 
or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both 
said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
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